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Background on the Working Group 
The CIGRE WG C4.601 on Power System Security Assessment was formed in August 2004, 
at the CIGRE Session 2004 and was given the charter to specifically look at the following 
needs in the industry: 
1. The design of controls to enhance system security.  This includes local device 
controls as well as system wide area controls and remedial action schemes. 
2. Modeling of existing and new equipment required for power system analysis.  (In this 
task it was felt that the most pertinent and timely activity was to look at the modeling and 
dynamic performance of wind generation systems.) 
3. The design of monitoring systems for real time stability evaluation and control. 
4. New analytical techniques for assessment of power system security. In addition to 
advances in computational methods, this includes the development of emerging 
approaches such as risk-based security assessment and the application of intelligent 
technologies. 
To this end, all of the above subject matters were tackled by the Working Group.  More 
specifically, of the more than one hundred members and contributors to the work, three adhoc 
groups were developed within the Working Group, each given the task to address one of the 
first three subject matters above.  The fourth task is one that the working group as a whole has 
presently started on, after having finished the other three tasks.  The three completed tasks 
have resulted in the publication of three CIGRE Technical Brochures.  These are: 
• CIGRE Technical Brochure on Wide Area Monitoring and Control For Transmission 
Capability Enhancement (this effort was lead by C. Rehtanz) 
• CIGRE Technical Brochure on Modeling and Dynamic Behavior of Wind Generation 
as it Relates to Power System Control and Dynamic Performance (this effort was lead 
by P. Pourbeik) 
• CIGRE Technical Brochure on Review of On-Line Dynamic Security Assessment 
Tools and Techniques (this effort was lead by K. Morison) 
During the course of the work, in addition to the formally elected WG members a large 
number of others contributed significantly to these efforts.  All have been properly 
acknowledged.  The combined group of members and contributors constituted 125 experts 
from 25 countries.  These included experts from equipment manufacturers, utility engineers, 
consultants and research organizations around the world.  The work on the three Technical 
Brochures mentioned above was completed in December 2006, with final reviews and 
approvals before publication occurring in early 2007.  Thus, the work took nearly two and a 
half years to complete.   
All three documents constitute timely and valuable information for transmission system 
planer, operators, reliability organization and engineers in research and consulting firms.   
As stated previously, the Working Group is currently working on its last assignments (item 4. 
above).  It is expected that this will be reported on in the near future. 
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On-Line Dynamic Security Assessment Tools and Techniques 
This document addresses the third task assigned to the Working Group.  Ensuring the secure 
operation of large interconnected power systems is of paramount importance both from a 
socio political perspective and from an economic perspective.  To ensure that a power system 
is sufficiently reliable, that is, that there is an acceptable probability of it operating 
satisfactorily over the long run, the system must be  
• properly designed with security as a primary consideration, and  
• monitored and controlled during operation to ensure sufficient security margin exists 
at all times.   
Secure system operation has become a particularly challenging task with the evolution of the 
electric power industry toward open markets over the last decade which has introduced a 
number of factors that have increased the possible sources for system disturbances, reduced 
the robustness of systems, and reduced the predictability of operation.  On of the key methods 
for ensuring for reliable system operation in the dynamic market environments of today is the 
use of on-line dynamic security assessment tools (DSAs).  This report is a comprehensive 
technical brochure on several aspects on dynamic security assessment (DSA) tools and 
techniques including: 
• An overview of salient security issues which are fundamental in ensuring the robust 
and reliable operation of power system.  The motivations for improved methods of 
system analysis are presented and the concept of on-line dynamic security assessment 
is introduced. 
• A description of the generic requirements for on-line DSA systems and covers 
structural components as well as functional aspects.  The requirements include issues 
associated with modeling, computation, performance, and reliability of DSA systems. 
• A survey of the state-of-the-art in on-line DSA systems around the world.  The survey 
includes descriptions of a number of on-line DSA systems and, in most cases, 
discusses the design objectives, the system architecture, performance, experience, and 
unique features.   
• A presentation of some of the on-going research and development activities in the 
field of DSA. 
• A summary including an identification of the aspects of on-line DSA that are 
currently not being actively addressed or which hold potential for future development 
The primary motivation for this work was to clearly identify where the present state of the art 
in on-line DSAs stands today and to describe practical installations around the world and the 
experience of users with these systems.  Based on this, to then be able to identify what gaps 
may exist and where much needed improvement should be made.  This document is divided 
into five chapters, which addresses this goal.   
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction to the subject and outlines the motivation for this document 
and the layout of the report. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of power system security issues, defining the categories of 
stability issues that are of concern and that require assessment for identifying the present 
status of the system. 
Chapter 3 covers the requirements for an on-line DSA.  The key components are (i) 
measurement of system status, (ii) modeling of the system components, (iii) computation of 
contingency scenarios to be investigated during each assessment period, and (iv) visualization 
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of the results to help the operator understand his/her course of action.  The system may also 
contain control actions. 
Chapter 4 presents an account of on-line DSA systems in operation around the world.  
Discussions are given on the functionality and application of the DSA systems, their 
computational features and their performance. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 a summary is given on the findings of the report as well as the on-going 
research on on-line DSA systems highlighting possible opportunities for future work in this 
area.   
Conclusion 
This report has documented various aspects of on-line DSA systems including the need for 
such systems, their requirements, the state-of-the-art, and on-going research work.   
Maintaining security in power system operation is a critical function which has become more 
challenging in recent years largely due to the growing complexity of power systems and their 
associated controls, deregulation, and a general trend for load growth to outpace generation 
and transmission additions. 
Traditionally, security has been achieved solely through off-line analyses using forecasted 
information.  In the new environment, this approach has proven inadequate and often 
impractical.  As a result, on-line DSA has emerged in which a snapshot of the current system 
is obtained and is used to conduct security assessment.  This approach reduces the need for 
prediction of system conditions and therefore is expected to provide more accurate 
assessments.  However, since all data must be assimilated in near-real-time, and computations 
must be conducted automatically with little or no human intervention (and in a tightly 
constrained cycle time), on-line DSA has many inherent challenges. Depending on the nature 
of a given system, the scope of DSA may be quite broad including the analysis of any or all of 
transient security, voltage security, small signal security, and frequency security. 
It is clear that significant advances have been made in the field of on-line security assessment 
technologies; this report has documented some fifteen state-of-the-art installations and 
reported the existence of numerous others which are either in-service or under development.  
These systems include assessment of voltage security, transient security, and small signal 
security.  The range of assessment capabilities includes determination of critical 
contingencies, transfer limits, and determination of remedial measures necessary to ensure 
security. The computational methods used for each type of security assessment is varied, and 
depends on the specific requirements (speed, accuracy, reliability), system characteristics 
(large, small, meshed, radial, etc) and, in some cases, the techniques available in the state-of-
the-art tools used. 
A significant amount research and development is on-going in the field of on-line; most R&D 
aimed at extending the features and capabilities of existing system.   Areas of work include 
handling of new technologies such as wind farms, improving speed and scope of assessments, 
improving visualization of results to operators, using optimization in determination of 
remedial measures, and use of intelligent systems. 
In addition to the on-going R&D reported in this document, there are a number of areas that 
warrant a focus for the next-generation of on-line DSA systems.  These areas may are: 
• Speed of Analysis 
• Solution Robustness 
• Load Modeling 
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• System modeling  
• Risk Based Security Analysis 
• Intelligent Technologies 
• Optimal Remedial Measures 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
Power system security refers to the degree of risk in a power system’s ability to survive imminent 
disturbances (contingencies) without interruption to customer service. It relates to robustness of the 
system to imminent disturbances and, hence, depends on the system operating condition as well as the 
contingent probability of disturbances [1].  The system condition is determined not only by the system 
operating point (generation and load) but also by the devices dynamics as well as controls and 
protections which will operate should an event occur. 
 
Ensuring secure operation has always been of paramount importance in the safe and economic 
operation of power systems.   When a system is insecure it becomes exposed to severe, and in some 
cases, catastrophic, system failures of the types observed in recent years in various power grids 
around the world; events that have enormous economic costs and may even lead to loss of life.  The 
importance of system security is highlighted by the significant number of blackouts that have 
occurred around the world, such as the major North American blackout of August 2003. 
 
To ensure that a power system is sufficiently reliable, that is, that there is an acceptable probability of 
it operating satisfactorily over the long run, the system must be (a) properly designed with security as 
a primary consideration and (b) monitored and controlled during operation to ensure sufficient 
security margin exists at all times.   Secure system operation has become a particularly challenging 
task with the evolution of the electric power industry toward open markets over the last decade which 
has introduced a number of factors that have increased the possible sources for system disturbances, 
reduced the robustness of systems, and reduced the predictability of operation.   Traditionally, system 
operators depended heavily on the results of operational planning studies conducted off-line to guide 
them through day-to-day operations.   In today’s complex systems, total reliance on this off-line 
approach has become impractical and the use of on-line dynamic security assessment (DSA) has 
emerged and is growing in usage worldwide.   In this approach, a snapshot of the actual system 
condition is taken and comprehensive security analysis performed in near-real-time with sufficient 
speed to either invoke automatic controls or to permit the operator to take necessary protective actions 
to ensure adequate security is maintained.  Many sophisticated systems are in use today capable of 
assessing transient security, voltage security, and small-signal security.  To deal with the complexity 
of such assessments, today’s on-line tools use a wide range of system measurements, analytical 
techniques, computer system architectures, and visualization methods.  Although the need for on-line 
systems is clearly growing in most power systems, detailed and exhaustive off-line studies can often 
still be used when they can be transformed to general guidelines, trends, and directions to follow.  
Such may be the case in power systems in which the uncertainties and variations of operation either so 
not exist or can be shown to have minimal impact on system dynamic performance. 
  
With security being of paramount importance to the electric power industry as a whole, it is important 
that all those involved in system operations be aware of the on-line DSA technologies available and in 
use today as well as the developments underway for the future; this is the goal of this document. 
 
This document is structured as follows, 
 
• Chapter 2: Provides and overview of power system security issues and introduces the concept 
of on-line dynamic security assessment. 
 
• Chapter 3: Describes the generic requirements for on-line DSA systems and covers structural 
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components as well as functional aspects. 
 
• Chapter 4: Presents the state-of-the-art in on-line DSA by describing leading-edge systems 
throughout the world.  
 
• Chapter 5: Presents a description of on-going research and development activities in the field 
of on-line DSA. 
 
• Chapter 6: Presents a summary of the findings and provides some observations and directions 




[1] IEEE/CIGRE Joint Task Force on Stability Terms and Definitions, “Definition and Classification 







OVERVIEW OF POWER SYSTEM SECURITY ISSUES 
CHAPTER 2   Overview of Power System Security Issues 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Security and stability are related terms. Security is considered to be an instantaneous, time-varying 
condition that is a function of the robustness of the system relative to imminent disturbances. Stability 
is a narrower condition concerning the continuance of parallel, synchronous operation of all operating 
units (synchronous generators) of a system, and is a very important factor of security. 
 
A typical modern power system is a high-order multivariable process whose dynamic response is 
influenced by a wide array of devices with different characteristics and response rates. Depending on 
the network topology, system operating condition and the form of disturbance, different sets of 
opposing forces may experience sustained imbalance leading to different forms of instability. The 
instability of a power system can be classified taking into account the considerations [1]: 
 
? The physical nature of the resulting mode of instability as indicated by the main system 
variable in which instability can be observed. 
? The size of the disturbance considered, which influences the method of calculation and 
prediction of stability. 
? The devices, processes, and the time span that must be taken into consideration in order to 
assess stability. 
 
According to the above consideration the power system's stability can be classified as voltage, rotor 
angle and frequency stability as shown in Figure 2-1. 
 
1. Rotor Angle Stability. Rotor angle stability refers to the ability of synchronous machines of 
 
Figure 2-1 Classification of Stability 
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an interconnected power system to remain in synchronism under normal operating conditions 
and after being subjected to a disturbance. It depends on the ability to maintain/restore 
equilibrium between electromagnetic torque and mechanical torque of each synchronous 
machine in the system. Instability that may result occurs in the form of increasing angular 
swings of some generators leading to their loss of synchronism with other generators.  The 
rotor angle stability is further divided to small-disturbance (or “small-signal”) stability and 
transient stability. Small signal stability refers to the ability of the power system to maintain 
synchronism under small disturbance. Transient stability is concerned with the ability of the 
power system to maintain synchronism when subjected to a severe transient disturbance.  
 
2. Voltage Stability. Voltage stability is concerned with the ability of a power system to 
maintain steady acceptable voltages at all buses in the system under normal operating 
conditions and after being subjected to a disturbance. Instability may occur in the form of a 
progressive fall or rise of voltage of some buses. The main factor causing voltage instability is 
the inability of the power system to maintain a proper balance of reactive power throughout 
the system. Large disturbance voltage stability is concerned with a system’s ability to 
maintain steady voltages following large disturbances. Small disturbance voltage stability is 
concerned with a system’s ability to control voltages following small perturbations, such as 
incremental changes in system load. 
 
3. Frequency Stability. Frequency stability is the ability of a power system to maintain the 
frequency within a nominal range, following a severe system upset that may or may not result 
in the system being divided into subsystems. It depends on the ability to restore balance 
between system generation and load with minimum loss of load. 
 
2.2 Power system operating states 
 
The operating states of a power system are classified according to its security level, to help operators 
design appropriate control actions. Most authors credit Dy-Liacco for defining these different states in 
shown in Figure 2-2 [2,3].  
 
Power system's operation is governed by three sets of generic equations: one differential and two 
algebraic. The differential set represents the dynamic behavior of the system. The first algebraic sets 
comprise equality constraints, which refer to the generation-load system balance. The second 
algebraic set comprises inequality constraints, which state that all network elements operate within 
their bus voltage and power limits. 
 
? Normal State. In normal state all constraints are satisfied, which means that the balance 
between generation and load (plus losses) is met and that no equipment is overloaded. In 
addition the system's reserve margins are sufficient and it is able to withstand any of the set of 
plausible contingencies. 
? Alert State. When the system's security level is weakened or the probability of disturbance 
increases, then the occurrence of a plausible contingency would cause the system to reach a 
state where some network equipment would be overloaded. In this state all the constraints are 
satisfied but the reserve margins are not enough to guarantee that the constraints will be 
satisfied when a severe contingency occurs. In this state, preventive actions can be taken to 
restore the system to the normal state. 
? Emergency state. The system can transpose from alert state to emergency state, if a 
sufficiently severe contingency takes place, before any preventive action is taken. Some of the 
inequality constraints are violated, which means that some network equipment is overloaded. 
The system, however, remains intact and can be restored to the normal state (or at least to the 
alert state), if the suitable corrective actions are taken. 
? In extremis state. The system can transpose from the alert state to in extremis states when a 
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severe disturbance takes place, or from the emergency state when no corrective action is 
taken. In this state both equality and inequality constraints are violated. The system loses 
synchronism, there are cascading outages and possibly shutdown of a major portion of the 
system. Control actions, like load shedding or controlled system separation are used for 
saving as much of the system as possible from a widespread blackout. 
? Restorative state. In the restorative state, the operator performs control actions in order to 
reconnect all the facilities and to restore all system load. The system can reach either the 
normal or the alert state, depending on the conditions. 
 
 
2.3 Security Assessment 
 
There are three levels of security assessment [4]: 
 
? Security monitoring. Security Monitoring consists in checking if the operating conditions are 
satisfied. 
? Security analysis. Security analysis consists in checking the system ability to undergo 
disturbances. A system is said to be secure if it can withstand each specified disturbance without 
getting into an emergency state. Otherwise it is insecure or in an alert state. It is obvious that if all 
possible disturbances were taken into consideration, it would be very difficult to find a secure 
Operating state. In practice, only disturbances with a reasonable probability to occur 
(contingencies) are considered. 
? Security margin determination. The task of assessing the level of security for a given operating 
condition or topology configuration (under a pre-assigned set of contingencies) requires the 
definition of a security margin using some selected variables or parameters. Within this context, 
 
 
Figure 2-2 Dy-Liacco's power system operating state transition maps adapted by Fink and Carlsen 
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the objective is not only to bring the system from an insecure to a secure state but also to maintain 
adequate security margins. These margins are particularly needed in the transmission open access 
environment, which is prevailing in an increasing number of countries. In this case, the operator 
wants to know how much load or transfer increase can be accepted without the system becoming 
insecure. 
 
Security assessment can be classified into Static Security Assessment (SSA) and Dynamic Security 
Assessment (DSA) according to the differences in the required analysis methods. 
 
? Static security Assessment (SSA): are methodologies that verify bus voltage and line power flow 
limits for the post contingency operating state, considering that the transition between the pre-
contingency and the post-contingency operating states has taken place without suffering any 
instability phenomena in any part of the system. 
 
? Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA): are methodologies for evaluating the stability and quality 
of the transient processes between the pre-contingency and post-contingency states. In this case, 
DSA aims at ensuring that the system will be stable after the contingency occurrence and that the 
transients caused by such a contingency will be well damped, of small amplitude and with little 
impact on the quality of service.    
 
2.4 Dynamic Security Criteria 
 
In practice, the typical criteria for DSA include ([5]): 
 
? Stability.  This concerns loss stability through the evolution of relative machine angles (loss 
of synchronism, either in an aperiodic manner or oscillatory manner), loss of voltage or 
frequency control. 
? Voltage excursions (dip or rise) beyond specified threshold level and duration. This includes 
separate voltage excursion threshold/duration pairs for voltage dip and voltage rise, and 
maximum/minimum instantaneous excursion thresholds. 
? Frequency excursions (dip or rise) beyond specified threshold level and duration.  
? Relay margin criteria. These are defined for pre-disturbance and post-disturbance 
conditions. If relay margin is violated for more than a maximum specified time after the 
disturbance, it is identified as insecure. 
? Minimum damping criteria. For a designated list of contingencies, if the post-disturbance 
system exhibits oscillations, they must be positively damped (decreasing in amplitude). 
 
With these criteria in mind, DSA may be divided into three main components,  
 
o Transient Security Assessment (TSA), which includes the assessment of transient 
stability as well as voltage and frequency excursions, as well as relay margin violations, 
which may occur in the transient period. 
o Voltage Security Assessment (VSA), which includes the assessment of voltage stability 
and generally also includes the assessment of under/over-voltage violations that may 
occur in the time period of interest. 
o Small-Signal Stability Assessment (SSSA), which includes the assessment of small-
signal stability in which assessment of system oscillations (damping) are of interest. 
2.5 Off-line Vs On-line DSA 
 
In the operating environment, a secure system is one in which the operating criteria are respected at 
pre- and post-contingency conditions.  This implies that analyses must be performed to assess all 
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aspects of security, including the thermal loading of system elements, voltage and frequency 
variations (both steady-state and transient) and all forms of stability. The computations needed to 
accurately assess the security of a single defined system condition are technically rigorous and require 
considerable effort.  As a result, security assessment has been historically conducted in an off-line 
planning environment in which the steady-state and dynamic performance of the near-term forecasted 
system conditions are exhaustively determined using tools such as powerflow and time-domain 
simulations.  Because of the engineering and computational efforts needed for the more complex 
assessments, such as required for stability assessment, it was necessary to compute system operating 
limits well in advance of the time in which they were expected to occur.  In this approach, the most 
critical conditions and contingencies had to be examined even though most would never actually 
occur.  But the operating limits computed off-line for a postulated scenario do not necessarily apply to 
all other power system operating conditions. This is because the stability limit is a local property of 
the system state vector. For each new solution of the system of equations that describe the system 
state there is a new stability limit. Simply stated, the stability limits are not fixed and change with the 
system’s loading, voltages and topology. It is precisely this changing nature of the stability limits that 
makes it necessary to recompute them as often as possible, for each new system state, after each state 
estimate, and after each load-flow [6]. Another aspect of real-time operation that the off-line studies 
do not adequately capture deals with trend analysis.  In addition to the information regarding current 
system status the system operator is keenly interested in knowing the status of the system as it 
transitions in future time.  Off-line analysis by its very nature fails to capture the changes in system 
status.  Hence, there exists a drive to obtain more accurate and relevant information using the on-line 
data [7]. 
 
To help compensate somewhat for this shortcoming, some system operating limits are often quoted as 
a function of measurable independent power system variables (e.g. generation, inertia, demand etc).  
Using linear regression, limit equations are defined with sufficient margin to ensure that they 
encompass, to within reasonable confidence, the various limiting states of the many operating 
conditions studied off-line.    Because of the way these limit equations are derived, it is likely that the 
predicted limit at a particular operating condition may be under-estimated.  This leads to inefficient 
utilization of the interconnectors, with a correspondingly lower return on the investment.   Conversely 
on rare occasions, the limit equation can over-estimate the true operating limit, leaving the insecure 
post contingent system state undetected. 
 
In the new competitive environment, the uncertainty of predicting future operating conditions has 
created a need for a new approach to security assessment: On-line Dynamic Security Assessment 
(DSA).  In this approach, a snapshot of the actual system condition is taken and the system security for 
this operating condition is computed in near-real-time with sufficient speed to either trigger an 
automatic control action or to allow time for the operator to react if a contingency analyzed is shown 
to be potentially insecure.  Since this approach performs analyses on a snapshot of the current system 
condition, the uncertainty embedded in off-line analysis using forecasted condition is largely 
eliminated.   This approach provides a radar-like mechanism that continually sweeps the system for 
potential problems that may result should a contingency occur.  While it is uncertain if on-line DSA 
could have prevented, or reduced the extent of, any of the system blackouts observed around the 
world, it is very likely that such assessments would provide operators with early indications of 
pending trouble and provide the opportunity to take remedial actions. For example, the data published 
in [8] depict a succession of worsened system states during the hours prior to the August 14, 2003 
blackout -- voltages getting lower, lines tripping, and generating units reaching the excitation current 
limit. These were signals that the system was approaching its stability limit, and could have been 
detected by real-time stability tracking tools. It is precisely the ability to predict approaching blackout 
conditions that renders on-line DSA, perhaps equipped with fast front-end calculators of the distance 
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REQUIREMENTS FOR ON-LINE DSA 
CHAPTER 3   Requirements for On-Line DSA 
3.1 Overview 
There are a number of requirements that must be met for a successful on-line DSA implementation.  
These consist of structural requirements, (including such items as essential system components and 
data connections) and functional requirements (describing such items as what the system must do and 
how fast it must perform).  This Chapter provides a general description of these requirements.  
Chapter 4 contains some additional information on specific requirements provided for some state-of-
the-art DSA implementation.   
 
The basic functions of an On-line DSA system includes the following basic steps, 
 
1. Take a snapshot of the power system condition 
2. Develop a suitable network model 
3. Combine any additional dynamic data and contingency data required to perform the 
assessment 
4. Perform the analysis 
5. Report on results of analysis  
6. Raise alarms when security issues are detected. 
7. Identify security issues and make recommendations on how to alleviate them.  (This function 
is not always achievable). 
 
Although there are a variety of on-line DSA architectures (as described in Chapter 4) that can achieve 
these functions, most on-line DSA systems can be divided into the components as shown in Figure 
3-1 [1,2]. 
 
Figure 3-1  - The components of an on-line dynamic security assessment system 
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3.2 Measurements 
On-line DSA systems rely heavily on the breadth and quality of measured data taken from the power 
system.    The measurements obtained are used for four primary purposes, 
  
a) Input to state estimation (SE) tools from which system network and contingency models will be 
developed.  This is the most common approach in which SCADA measurements are used as input 
to SE which in turn produce network (powerflow) model suitable for use with security assessment 
tools.  Other inputs, such as those from phasor measurement units (PMUs) may be used to 
augment the SCADA data set in an effort to produce a more accurate system model.  
b) Direct input to security computation tools.  Examples include use of measured quantities to assess 
system damping, or use of PMU data (such as angle spread across a system) to infer stability.  
c) Benchmarking of system models or security assessment results.   Examples include (i) use of 
PMU measurements to verify quantities in models produced by state estimators or (ii) use of 
disturbance monitors to benchmark system responses predicted from the on-line DSA system. 
d) Arming or triggering of Special Protection Systems.  An example is the arming of generation 
rejection schemes directly from PMU measurements.  This assumes that either off-line or on-line 
studies have provided a relationship between the measured value and the required arming.  
 
System measurements can be obtained from a number of sources including traditional Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, phasor measurement (PM) units and disturbance 
monitors.   
3.2.1 SCADA Systems 
Because all power systems have existing SCADA systems, this remains the primary source of data to 
be used as input to DSA systems.   SCADA systems also offer a rich range of measured parameters 
and are updated at relatively fast rate.    
 
For on-line DSA purposes, useful measurements include,  
 
• Active power of most power lines, power transformers and generators 
• Reactive power of most power transformers, shunt reactors, shunt capacitors and generators 
• Voltage of most substations 
• Frequency measured at a few locations of the grid 
• Status of most network switched related to power lines, power transformers and generators 
• Transformer tap positions 
 
The above-mentioned quantities should be updated in the database at the interval of a few seconds. 
 
The secondary signals of instrument transformers used for protective relays and energy measurements 
can be utilized to provide power, voltage and frequency measurements at a short interval. It is 
recommended to utilize the secondary circuits used for energy measurements instead of those used for 
protection relays to get more accurate measurements. When assessing the damping of power 
oscillations (related to transient security and small signal security) an interval of approximately 100 
ms is sufficient. 
 
It should be noted that, for large interconnected power systems, SCADA systems might have limited 
observability; that is, measurements are available only for a portion of the full system.   As discussed 
below in the section on modeling, this may have significant implications when using the measured 
data for developing a real-time system model for use in simulations.     
3.2.2 Phasor Measurements 
There is a growing interest in the use of phasor measurements for power system security assessment, 
and phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been widely installed in many power systems throughout 
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the world.  PMUs have the advantage of providing accurate time-synchronized measurements from 
locations that can be geographically remote (over so-called “wide-areas”).    
3.2.3 Disturbance Monitors 
This is a class of device that monitors system performance and record specified quantities when 
disturbances occur.   Devices of this sort may be called Fault Recorders (FR), Sequence of Events 
Recorders (SER), Dynamic Swing Monitors (DSM), or Disturbance Monitors (DM).  Although these 
types of measuring devices do not generally play a role as inputs to security assessment, they can play 
a valuable role, if logged into a DSA database, in benchmarking security assessment results.   
3.3 Modeling 
 
When detailed analyses are to be performed for on-line DSA, high quality models of the 
interconnected system are needed.   In fact, since all analyses are dependent on the quality of the 
system model, it may be the most important component in the DSA system.   
 
The modeling requirements (size, detail, and extent of component models) depend largely on which 
security or stability issues are relevant for the power system in question.     For example, if security 
problems are quite localized and steady-state analyses (i.e. powerflow-based methods) are sufficient, 
then a simple powerflow model produced by the state-estimator may be sufficient.  However, if 
security issues are more widespread (say in the case of inter-area oscillation problems), then a large-
scale model would be required and dynamics of key devices would have to be provided.   
3.3.1 Network 
The foundation for most on-line DSA models is the network model produced as a solved powerflow 
case by the state estimator.    The state estimator is, therefore, a critical link in the data assembly 
process and it is important that it can reliably produce an accurate powerflow model each DSA cycle.   
Accurate not only implies solved, but also implies that the powerflow solution is representative of the 
actual system conditions.  Some quantities, such as generator outputs and limits are critical if device 
dynamic models are to be matched and initialized with the powerflow to create a dynamics simulation 
case (see the section 3.3.2 below). 
 
Some key issues are associated with network modeling, including: 
 
Network Model Size: Some interconnected power systems have grown very large in size, and as a 
result, their “full simulation” models have correspondingly expanded in dimension.  The NERC 
planning model for the North American eastern interconnection for example is now approximately 
45,000 buses and some state estimator models (which are intended to approximate the full system 
representation) for this region are approaching 20,000 buses.  In general, it is necessary to model large 
portions of the power system in on-line DSA systems since some limiting phenomena, particularly 
small signal stability, can involve wide areas of the system. SCADA data (or other source of system 
measurements) and the resulting state estimator output, on the other hand, may be limited to a specific 
region of observability (such as a specific portion of the interconnected system, usually corresponding 
to a control area). It is therefore necessary to include representation of the external system (possibly in 
the form of equivalents) prior to conducting analyses.  This can be achieved by either appending the 
state estimator model with an external representation developed “off-line” or by merging several state 
estimator models from different parts of the interconnected system. 
 
Network Model Detail:  The level of details contained in the model is also critical.  For instance, 
representing key characteristics of the distribution system is vital for voltage stability analysis.  Most 
powerflow models derived from state estimator models include load models in which all distribution 
components have been lumped into a single P & Q load.  For voltage stability analysis it is often 
necessary to break out the portion of the load that represents key components such as distribution 
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transformers, distribution capacitors and reactors, and induction motors. Similarly, details on 
generator reactive power capabilities and the maximum dispatchable power are critical in computing 
voltage stability margins for the specified system conditions and transactions.    
3.3.2 Devices and Dynamics Representation 
If dynamic simulation studies, (such as time-domain simulation) or eigenvalue analyses are to be 
conducted as part of the DSA, then the powerflow model alone is insufficient; the powerflow model 
from the state estimator must be matched with dynamic models for all dynamic devices in the system.  
In this regard it is critical that all key dynamics are represented correctly and appropriately.  
Depending on the specific studies to be conducted, dynamic models may be required for all or some 
of the following, 
 
• Generators, exciters, power system stabilizers, governor, prime movers 
• Generator over-excitation protection 
• Under-load tap changing transformers 
• Switchable capacitors and reactors 
• Loads  
• HVdc Links 
• FACTS Devices (particularly SVCs) 
• Network protection systems 
• Special protection systems including under-voltage and under-frequency load-shedding 
• Wind farms 
 
Issues associated with dynamic modeling 
 
It is often a challenge to match the dynamic data to the powerflow data because many state-estimators 
do not retain constant bus numbering. Therefore, bus numbering used in dynamic models must be 
mapped to match the appropriate bus numbers in the powerflow.  Often, there are a number of 
organizations that develop and maintain the dynamic models. These are usually maintained by 
planning departments who have a long-term focus on the operation of the power system and are 
usually applied to well tailored and behaved powerflows.  The EMS model, on the other hand, is 
primarily maintained by people who are more focused on the day-to-day operation of the power 
system.  Sometimes it can be difficult to marry up the immediate term network model with the long-
term model provided by planning.   Furthermore, a dynamic model may not necessarily be designed to 
cater for the ill-conditioned or extreme operating conditions that can be found in state estimated real 
time powerflows. 
 
A complete dynamic model of the power system may require certain information not always readily 
available from the SCADA or state estimator.  This may include information such as transformer tap 
positions, statuses of key equipment (power system stabilizers for example) or the mode under which 
an exciter or governor is operating. 
 
3.3.3 Load Modeling 
 
As described below, actual loads are usually made of a large number numerous individual devices that 
may have diverse dynamic characteristics.  In addition, the number and type of actual loads connected 
to a system may vary with time.  These characteristics of the physical nature of actual power system 
loads makes load modeling for simulation studies a very challenging task.   
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Actual loads consist of a myriad of devices 
 
Most powerflow models are limited in their 
representation of the details of the distribution 
system, typically representing the system model 
down to subtransmission level such as 44 kV or 13.8 
kV.  Unfortunately, virtually all loads are located 
below this voltage level.  As shown in Figure 3-2, the 
actual load below the subtransmission level may 
consist of a large number of components with widely 
varied characteristics such as resistive and inductive 
loads, induction motors, thermostatic loads, and 
extinction lighting loads.  These may be connected 
though a distribution network consisting of feeders, 
transformers, voltage regulators, and static 
capacitors.   Since it is impractical to represent all 
these loads in detail, an equivalent representation is 
required in which all these components are 
represented by a simplified “equivalent” model that 
must be capable of representing the dynamic 
performance of the aggregate of all “downstream” 
components and controls.  
 
Load composition may vary greatly with time 
 
The number and type of loads connected to the 
system normally varies continuously through time, as 
different load components are switched in or out in response to residential, commercial, or industrial 
activity.  As a result, the magnitude as well as the dynamic nature of the load may change 
significantly with the time of day, day of the week, and season of the year.  Other factors such as 
sporadic changes in weather may cause highly unpredictable and irregular variations in the nature and 
amount of load.  This “statistical” nature of load makes it very difficult to establish a load model that 
is generically applicable in power system studies. 
 
Load Modeling Practice 
 
Loads can be modeled as constant power, voltage and/or frequency dependent, or as composite load 
consisting of a variety of components including dynamic devices such as induction motors.  The type 
of load models required depends largely on the type of analysis to be conducted.  To date, acquisition 
of suitable load parameters (types or loads, characteristics, and temporal information) have limited the 
types of load models generally used, usually to simple voltage dependent models (for example, for 
static analysis, constant power loads are often used as they are assumed to be the “worst case” loads 
since they neglect the “natural load shedding” which occurs from the voltage dependency of most 
load types).   Such simple models, however, are generally unable to capture load dynamics (such as 
motor stalling or the effect of rotating load inertia) which may be important in some simulations.  For 
on-line DSA, the current industry practice is, for lack of a better alternative, to assume the same load 
models as used for system planning or operational studies.  A superior approach would be to derive 
load models for on-line DSA from real-time measurements.  This type of approach is used at Hydro 
Quebec where load modeling is done in real time based on load forecast [3]. A global exponential 
factor Np value is calculated that represents the impact of voltage variation on the power consumption 
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The calculation is based on the combination of load (heat load, air conditioning load, lighting load and 
base load). 
 
Formerly transmission system capacity limits were calculated using a relation between four values of 
the global Np factor and four temperatures ranges. This method had the drawback of providing an Np 
factor too sensitive to rapid temperature variation. Since there is an Np factor associated with each 
type of load and forecasting models work by predicting load based on different uses, it was suggested 
in 2004 to compute a global Np factor based on these models. Thus Np factors were suggested for 
base, heating, lighting and air conditioning load. The global Np factor is calculated from the 
proportion of each of the uses in total demand. This method results in more stable hour-to-hour 
changes in this factor and better grounds the global Np factor on the type of consumption. 
 
Special Consideration for Dynamic Load Components 
 
Dynamic load characteristics, for the purposes of dynamic simulation, can often be extracted from 
fault recordings at major load centers [4].  
Models derived from these characteristics transform what would normally be represented as a single 
load in the state estimated powerflow to a composite load model that attempts to account for the 
following components: 
• Equivalent distribution transformer models with saturation characteristics 
• Portion of dynamic induction motor model with shake-off characteristic (Shake-off represents the 
portion of load dropped as a result of the transient voltage dip during the application of a fault on 
the system.)  
• Portion of distribution capacitor load  
• Portion of equivalent static voltage and frequency dependent load with shake-off characteristic 
It has been found that these composite load models can accurately emulate the recorded fault 
waveforms.  When applied in dynamic simulation they have been shown to make a moderate 
difference when compared to simpler voltage dependent load models.  Even the simple addition of 
distribution capacitor modeling has been shown to make a difference of up to 5% in interchange 
capability. 
The proportions assigned to each load component are predefined from the load type represented at the 
bus. E.g., smelter loads, residential, commercial or industrial. 
Given the limited number of opportunities to fit models to fault recordings, one needs to be careful 
whether this model can be extrapolated and applied at any particular time for real time analysis.  
Whilst the total load is known from the state estimator, the composition of this load would vary with 
time of day, day of week and with season.  Nevertheless, this technique has shown that it would 
provide a more conservative estimate of a dynamic limit when compared to simpler voltage dependent 
load models.  A substantial effort is still required to gain a better understanding of the load 
characteristic and to more accurately predict load compositions at any point in time. 
Whilst it does provide a more conservative outlook, such composite load models can adversely affect 
DSA performance.  Bearing in mind that, the exact composition of loads may not be known 
accurately in real time, one needs to consider whether the burden on performance warrants the 
additional accuracy that can be achieved. 
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Despite current efforts, and considering the importance of loads in power system security assessment, 
it can be concluded that load modeling, and in particular real-time load modeling, is a domain in 
which further research and development is warranted. 
3.3.4 Contingency Modeling 
Contingency models will vary according to the type of security being examined but are likely to be 
more onerous in nature for the transient security domain.  Contingencies in general need to be able to 
cater for a variety of events including, 
 
• Loss of single item of plant, including generators, loads, lines, transformers, reactive plant and 
HVDC plant. 
• Dynamic loss of generation or load contingencies such as: 
o Loss of largest generation in a region 
o Loss of largest generation at a station 
o Loss of largest load at a station 
For these contingencies, the plant to be tripped would need to be determined 
at the time of analysis. 
• Application of unbalanced faults at any location along a line.  All types of unbalanced faults and 
three phase faults need to be allowed for. 
• Opening a line or transformer at either end at different times.  Note that lines other that the faulted 
line may be opened to clear a fault. 
• Adjustment to generation or loads 
• Adjustment of HVDC set points 
• Multiple line faults when considered to be credible. 
• Multiple contingent events which are considered to be credible, e.g. the loss of multiple 
generation plant at a station as a result of common mode failures 
 
The contingencies need to identify the appropriate items of plant being faulted or operated. If the 
contingencies are defined in EMS terms, the definition will need to go through the same conversion 
process as the network model 
 
3.3.5 Special Protection Systems (SPS) 
Special Protection System (SPS) modeling is becoming more and more critical.  Lack of SPS 
modeling may result in false indication of insecure operation.  Some SPS can be quite novel and 
complex and may require just as complex modeling capability, which may be difficult to address 
generically.  One such example is a scheme that dynamically arms for tripping of units and loads at 
different locations based on the current system conditions at the time. 
 
There are basically two techniques to model an SPS: 
• The SPS actions could be modeled as part of the contingency definition.  If the contingency is 
modeled in the EMS, the SPS actions can also be determined in the EMS and translated as part of 
the contingency definition. 
• The SPS could be modeled as a separate function in the analysis engine, and applied together with 
the contingencies.  This technique could be used for static security, and for transient security 
analysis, where SPS can be modeled by dynamic models.  For other forms of stability the post 
SPS state of operation needs to be analyzed. 
 
This technique would require the full modeling of the SPS triggers and actions, but would also 
provide the greatest functionality.  
 
SPS triggers would need to include under and over voltage, line and transformer loading, interface 
loading and various logical combinations of these. Trigger thresholds could be a constant or some 
function of seasonal or device ratings.   
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SPS actions need to cover all the actions that can be modeled in a contingency. 
 
3.3.6 Model Accuracy and Validation  
 
For a system model to be used in DSA simulations, it is critical to ensure that the model is capable of 
adequately replicating the actual response of the power system to which it is to be applied.  If devices 
are modeled on a component basis, then it is necessary to ensure that both the device models and data 
are correct for the full myriad of devices that could be present. Depending on the type of simulations 
to be performed, both steady-state and dynamic models (and associated data) must be validated. 
Devices for which dynamic models may be needed include generators and controls, system 
protections (relays and special protection schemes), FACTS devices, HVDC links, under-load tap-
changing transformers, switchable shunts and reactors, and loads.   
 
To have confidence in the results of analysis, the models used must be validated for accuracy.  While 
this is a considerable challenge, it can be separated into three components.   
 
• The first type of validation is measurement validation and can be achieved through use of 
advanced measurement technology (such as phasor measurement), better metering, and advanced 
state estimation algorithm. 
 
• The second type of validation is device model validation. As a preliminary step, surveys can be 
conducted to determine if the simulation models match the actual devices in the field. If needed, 
further validation can be achieved through field-testing of devices.  For example, in the wake of 
the blackouts of 1996 in the western interconnected system of North America, the Western 
Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) mandated a generator testing and model validation 
activity.  This process has uncovered a wide number of errors and inadequacies in the original 
WECC model library and has resulted in fully validated dynamic models for generators and 
controls.  Load modeling is more of a challenge, and due to the inherent variation of load over 
time, field-testing has been met with limited success.  Alternative approaches, such as synthesis of 
models from survey data and on-line load model identification devices, are likely to be more 
fruitful. 
 
• The third type of validation is system model validation.  This involves verifying that the overall 
responses of the simulating model are consistent with the actual system performance.  Because 
only limited system testing is possible in this regard, the main source of validation is thorough 
replication of actual system disturbances.  Data obtained from disturbance monitors or phasor 
measurement units can be invaluable in these efforts.    
 
3.4 Computation 
3.4.1 Required Computations 
 
What operators need to know at any instant of time is (a) how secure is the current system state, (b) 
how secure will the system be if it is maneuvered, in the next few minutes, from the current state to a 
different state, and (c) if the degree of system security is unacceptable, what measures can be taken to 




Figure 3-3: Security nomogram showing a secure region in 
which the operator can maneuver the system without 
encountering operating criteria violations.  This is a two-
dimensional nomogram representative of the case of two 
generation groups.  The boundaries are determined from 
assessment of thermal loadings, transient security, voltage 
security, and small signal stability. 
 
In essence, the primary challenge is to verify 
the security of the current state and find the 
secure region within which the system can be 
maneuvered.  This secure region can be 
conceptually visualized by the nomogram as 
illustrated in Figure 3-3 (full nomogram) [1] 
and is defined by boundaries set with respect 
to limits representing various security criteria 
including, 
 
• Thermal overloading of transmission 
elements 
• Steady-state voltage and frequency 
excursions 
• Transient voltage dip/rise 
• Transient stability 
• Small signal stability  
• Voltage stability 
• Frequency stability 
• Protection margins 
• Other 
 
3.4.2 Analytical Methods 
 
 
The types of methods used for dynamic 
security assessment are widely varied and can 
be considered as spanning into two extremes, 
 
• Deterministic evaluation using analytical solutions:  This is the most complex of approaches in 
which the response of the power system is assessed using detailed models of the steady-state and 
dynamic characteristics of the system.  Contingencies are applied and the responses computed 
using techniques such as time-domain simulations.    
 
• Direct inference from measurements:  This is the simplest of approaches in which the security of 
the power system is inferred from direct quantities measured from the grid; using the difference in 
two phasor measurements to establish transient security for example.   
 
In between these two extremes are a plethora of methods differing in computational complexity and 
which may include hybrid approaches combining simulation with some direct or measurement-based 
methods.   
 
The assessment of limits associated with comprehensive security assessment can be done using either 
full simulations or using approximate methods. Examples of full simulation methods include full 
powerflow solution of PV curves, time-domain simulation for transient security and eigenvalue 
analysis for small signal stability assessment. Approximate methods include techniques such as 
sensitivity methods for voltage security assessment and direct energy methods for transient stability 
assessment.  Although the approximate methods may offer some speed advantages, the full simulation 
methods provide the most accurate assessment of security and eliminate the question of the suitability 
of the assumptions made in approximate methods under changing system conditions. 
 
For transient stability assessment and control there exist hybrid time-domain-direct methods, which 





On-line monitoring of power oscillations 
 
There are analytical techniques based on measurements that can be used to assess the security of the 
power system without a simulation model. One of these is the on-line estimation of damping [6]. The 
method is based on the continuous and random changes of loads that create continuous small-
amplitude power oscillations. By making suitable assumptions about the nature of the random 
perturbations of the system it is in theory possible to identify the dynamics of the system. 
 
Instead of making assumptions concerning the nature of the random perturbations, it is also possible 
to simply analyze the spectrum of the measured power for instance by Fourier analysis or to use band-
pass filtering to see the amplitude of the oscillation on the most relevant frequencies which are often 
at least believed to be known beforehand based on off-line simulations. 
 
Instead of utilizing direct measurement of active power in the monitoring of oscillations it is even 
possible to use phasor measuring units (PMU) to provide inputs for the system. The power 
oscillations are seen as changing angle differences between the voltage phasors measured at the two 
ends of the corridor through which the power oscillation is taking place. By having several PMUs 
placed suitably in different parts the grid it is possible to see which areas (or even which components) 
of the system are participating most in the different modes of oscillation. 
 
It is important to pay careful attention to electromagnetic compatibility issues when monitoring power 
oscillations. If there are disturbances present in the measurement signals, there is a risk that the 
measured signals do not reflect real oscillations of the power system. 
 
On-line monitoring of power oscillations can as such only give information of the small-signal 
stability in the present state of the system. When a contingency occurs, the damping can change 
drastically. The on-line monitoring system could in principle give warnings or alarms, when the 
estimated damping gets too poor or if the amplitude of oscillation on one or several of the frequency 
bands exceeds a certain threshold. It is however questionable whether the operator can react 
sufficiently fast, if the poor damping is a result of a contingency and not of slowly developing small-
signal instability.  
 
To maintain security also in terms of contingencies it is therefore necessary to perform contingency 
analysis based on a simulation model. The on-line monitoring cannot replace the contingency 
analysis, if the n-1 criterion is applied in the operation of the power system.  Only if stability is not 
required after contingencies (n-0 criterion), the required degree of security can be based on 
monitoring only. 
 
3.4.3 Simulation of Contingencies 
The types of contingencies that an on-line DSA system should be able to model were described in 
Section 3.4.1.  However, for any DSA implementation a key decision is the scope of contingences to 
be studied.  For practical reasons, not the least of which is computation speed, it is impractical (and 
unnecessary) to fully study all possible contingencies.  Normally, the contingency specification is 
based on the applicable operating criteria such as N-1 or N-2 that must in turn be specified in terms of 
voltage level and electrical/geographic region (for example, “all N-1 for 230kV and above within the 
study region”).   The total number of contingencies which can be assessed during each DSA cycle is 
determined by the cycle time available, the time to simulate each contingency, and the computational 
resources (computer hardware) available.  For some security analyses, such as those using powerflow 
based methods, a very large number of contingencies may be examined with manageable 
computational difficulty, but for more intensive simulations, such as full time-domain simulations, a 
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large number of contingencies may require significant computational resources.  In this case 





In addition to housing the on-line data, the database should also contain history data. The powerflow 
cases used in the contingency analysis should be archived and available for a defined time period 
(days, weeks, or months) and the measurement data should be stored permanently to facilitate post-
fault analysis off-line and the studying of trends. It should be possible to regenerate the powerflow 
cases used in the contingency analysis and to re-estimate the indices related to the power oscillations 
(including mode frequencies and damping).  
 
The accumulation of knowledge concerning the dynamics of the system and the estimation of 
damping can be a slow process, which can make it necessary to perform analyses afterwards also for 
the purpose of testing new estimation algorithms. 
 
3.4.5 Intelligent Systems 
 
There are significant opportunities for the introduction of intelligent system into the type of on-line 
DSA system described above which we may refer to as deterministic systems since they rely largely 
on enumerated analytical solutions.   Intelligent systems are seen to have three features that can bring 
benefits to the real-time environment, 
 
• Intelligent systems can be very fast.  Although distributed computation is now commonplace, full 
simulation methods require minutes of time to reach a conclusion. For large power systems in 
which many contingencies must be assessed, even with multiple-CPU computing, this time may 
be of concern and for on-line analysis, time is critical.  This is particularly true if a system is 
entering an insecure state and decisions must be made quickly.  Once developed, IS technologies 
such as neural networks (NN) or decision trees (DT) can provide solutions very quickly. 
 
• Intelligent systems are learning systems.  Deterministic systems will conduct the same 
computations every cycle even if some of the calculations could be deemed inconsequential or if 
conditions arise rendering the computations less accurate.  IS systems have the ability to establish 
if a system condition has been seen previously and predict the solution accordingly.  Similarly, if 
properly designed, an IS can adapt to new conditions by “learning” from situations previously 
seen. 
 
• Intelligent system can provide a high degree of discovery.  Discovery refers to the ability to 
uncover salient, but previously unknown, characteristics of, or relationships in, a system. For 
example, through the development of NN or DT, the system parameters that are crucial to security 
can be established, much in the same way as an operator would discover such traits over extended 
periods of time by observing the system behavior. 
 
 
The role of intelligent systems is seen as one that is complementary to the so-called deterministic 
DSA approach.  The concept is that an IS will supervise the DSA and perform the following 
functions, 
 
• Establish if the system security can be established without full simulations 
• Determine what full simulations may be required 
• Assist in the interpretation of the simulation results and provide insight into system critical 
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parameters 
• Learn from the results of simulations 
• Assist in the specification of remedial actions 
 
Based on the above functions, the IS can provide direct assessment capabilities and can provide 
supervision to the existing on-line DSA capabilities, much in the same way that a human operator 




Although detailed simulations are recognized as providing the most accurate security assessments, 
speed of computation remains a challenge particularly with the complex models required in analyzing 
large interconnected systems.  Simplified or direct methods can play a complementary role with full 
simulation, particularly in contingency screening.  The typical computation cycle for an on-line 
system is 5 to 60 minutes, that is to say that a complete security assessment must be completed within 
5 to 60 minutes from the time the snapshot is taken from the system to the time the results are made 
available. Since security assessment must determine the security for critical contingencies, and since 
it is generally impractical to study all contingencies in detail, one main element in on-line DSA is 
contingency screening.  Contingency screening is the ability to select, from an extensive list, the 
important contingencies which must be analyzed in detail.  While numerous methods have been 
proposed and applied for this task, it remains a balance between speed and accuracy. Screening 
methods for thermal overloading or voltage declines may be much easier to apply than those for 
stability, in which complex dynamics and nonlinearities of the system may render simplified 
screening methods unreliable.  However, research in this field is on-going.   
 
Another approach in dealing with computation speed issue is to increase the computing power of an 
on-line DSA system by distributing computations among multiple servers. This can be easily achieved 
since the DSA problems are parallel in nature, at least at the contingency and analysis scenario levels. 
Distributing DSA analyses makes the computational performance of a DSA system scalable with the 
number of servers used, thereby increasing the DSA processing power for large system models. 
 
3.6 Automation and Reliability   
 
On-line DSA systems should run continuously on a scheduled cycle, be triggered by specified system 
changes, or invoked manually.  The system must be highly automated and be capable of completing 
all tasks, repetitively, under varying conditions with little or no human intervention.   This demands 
not only high standards for the DSA software but also functionalities with certain intelligence in order 
to provide the required results. For example, determination of appropriate remedial actions may need 
the assessment of additional contingencies and/or system scenarios depending on the security 
assessment results. Reliability is another important issue for an on-line DSA system. As illustrated in 
recent blackouts, the potential consequences of the unavailability of mission-critical software 
applications can be devastating. In addition to ensuring the deployment of high quality software and 
hardware for an on-line DSA system, techniques such as redundancy and self-healing should be 
considered to meet the reliability requirements. 
 
 
3.7 Reporting and Visualization  
 
The ability to display the results of the security assessment in a simple and meaningful manner is 
critical to the success of on-line applications. Generally, an operator is interested in the minimum 
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amount of information needed to manage the power system. 
 
Under normal situations, a security assessment tool should monitor the system in the background and 
summarize the security state of the system.  It should report how close the system is to an insecure 
state to give an operator an idea of what may be just around the corner.  
 
An interface to the EMS alarm system is essential, such that an alarm can be generated when the 
proximity to an insecure state reaches a certain threshold, or indeed if the system does become 
insecure. 
 
When insecure conditions are detected, an operator is interested to know, what the problem is, and 
how to fix it.  He is not generally interested in all the detail in between.  This should be what the 
security assessment interface focuses on.  For example, this may be accomplished by utilizing “traffic 
light” type of visualization. Green would mean a secure state, yellow would indicate an alarm 
requiring more attention due to a potentially insecure state of the system and the read color would 
indicate an urgent need to bring the system back to a secure state.  It is important that operators are 
not overwhelmed by an unmanageable number of alarms or by repetitive alarms that lose their impact 
over time. 
 
There should also be tools to visualize the detail should such a potentially insecure situation arise.  It 
is important that the security assessment tool provide sufficient information for an operator to assess 
the insecurity and apply the appropriate remedial action.  Ideally it would be good if the tool would 
provide advice on how to remove the insecure state.  Once an insecure state is detected an operator 
needs to know how to return the system to a secure state again.  In addition, an operator needs to be 
able to view and adjust inputs.   
 
Examples of DSA Displays 
 
Form a practical perspective the main display seen by the operator should provide only the high level 
critical information including such items as security status, security trend, transfer limits, critical 
contingencies and DSA system status. An example of such a display is shown in Figure 3-4 .   From 
such a display, the operator should be able to drill-down to obtain a variety of more detailed 
information.  
 
These can be provided in many formats, such as those described below and for which a number of 
other examples are provided in Chapter 4, Tabular Format: Figure 3-5 shows a summary table from a 
transient security assessment.   The table shows the results of 10 contingencies and provides the 
operator with a quick indication of which contingencies cause criteria violations and provides 
information on the type and degree of violation.  Similar tables can be used to show results of other 









Figure 3-5:Table showing results of transient security assessment using time-domain simulations.  Each row reports on the 
results of simulation of one contingency and each column provides a summary of criteria violations (shown in red).  If any 
criteria violations exist, an alarm is provided to the operator as the scenario is deemed insecure.    
 
Graphical Format: Figure 3-6  is a bar chart display showing the history of transfer limit 
computations over a number of previous DSA cycles.  This allows the operator to see at a glance, how 
the limits are evolving over time.  
 
Figure 3-4 Top-level on-line DSA Operator Display 
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Figure 3-7: Graphical display of the results of small signal analysis showing the mode-shape for a low-
frequency inter-area oscillation.   Each generator is represented as a circle (blue) or cross (red) on the map 
with the brightness of the symbol representing the generator’s relative activity in the mode.  The generators 
represented by circles are swinging against those represented by crosses.   
 
Figure 3-7 shows the results of small signal analysis displayed on a geographic map. Such 
visualization clearly indicates the regions (and specific generators) involved in an inter-area 
oscillation following a contingency.   
 




Figure 3-8: Graphical display of voltage security assessment.  The left pane shows a secure region 
nomogram in which the crosshair represents the current operating point and the green region represents the 
area in which the operator can move the generation without criteria violations.  The right pane provides a 
summary of the limiting contingency and the associated violated criteria for each point on the boundary of 
the secure region. 
 
Figure 3-8 shows a secure region nomogram for voltage security analysis.  The region is bounded by 
criteria violations of thermal overloading, voltage stability, voltage declines, and reactive power 
reserves.  With this display, the operator is free to maneuver the system within the green region 
without encountering security violations.  Combining nomograms of this type for voltage security, 
transient security, and small signal analysis results in the graphical display shown earlier in Figure 
3-3. 
 
The above security assessment result displays can be associated with other types of visualizations to 
have comprehensive understanding of the system performance under the studied conditions [8]. For 
example, a critical system condition laid out on a geographical transmission system map can help 
identify the worst regions of the system. A historical security margin chart can be used to predict and 
interpret the security of the system. 
 
 
Another trend in result visualization is to provide full security assessment results to local EMS 
console, as well as to make them available over the internet so that can be viewed at any remote 
location by authorized personnel. This can facilitate the exchange of security information among 
control centers so that preventative measures can be taken as soon as the security assessment is done.   
 
3.8 Remedial Control Actions  
 
If an on-line DSA system determines that a specific contingency or system condition may lead to an 
insecure situation, remedial measures must be determined.  Remedial measures can be either 
preventative or corrective actions and could include such actions as, 
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• Load shedding 
• Capacitor switching 
• Generator rescheduling, 
• Transformer tapping, 
• Arming of special protection systems such as generation rejection or load shedding 
• Switching operations 
• Voltage scheduling 
• Interchange scheduling 
• Frequency scheduling 
• Generator commitment/de-commitment 
 
These controls can either be invoked by the operator as recommended by the DSA system, or 
automatically invoked by the DSA system.  In this manner, the DSA system can become an integral 
part of special protection systems. 
3.9 Other Functions 
 
A number of other important requirements for an on-line dynamic security assessment system include, 
 
Study mode: The system should allow the operators or engineers to study any scenario of interest in an 
off-line “study mode” environment using base data taken from the live system (or archive).  
 
Archive: The DSA system should be able to periodically and selectively store cases studied and 
corresponding output results for use in the study mode or for post-mortem analyses. 
 
System monitoring, diagnostics, and maintenance functions:  As a component of the real time 
applications, it is important that the performance of the DSA system is monitored continuously and 
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STATE-OF-THE-ART IN ON-LINE DSA 
CHAPTER 4   State-of-the-Art in On-line DSA 
4.1 Overview 
 
As noted in earlier chapters, the number of on-line DSA installations around the world is continuously 
growing as system operators recognize that this approach may be the only practical solution to ensure 
power system security.  Figure 4-1  shows some of the known installations and Table 4-1   indicates 







In-service and described in this report
In-servce but not described in this report
Under development


































United Power System - Russia
 
Figure 4-1 Reported On-Line DSA installations 
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Table 4-1 List of some on-line DSA Installations
SCOPE 
Country/Region Location/Company/Project 
TSA VSA SSSA FSA 
Status Section 
Australia NEMMCO 3  3(MB) 3 I/S 4.2 
Bosnia-Herzegovia NOS 3 3   I/S 4.3 
Brazil ONS 3 3 3 3 I/S 4.4 
Canada BCTC 3 3   U/D - 
Canada Hydro-Quebec 3 3   I/S 4.5 
China Beijing Electric Power Corp 3    I/S - 
China CEPRI 3    I/S 4.6 
China Guangxi Electric Power Co. 3  3 3 I/S 4.7 
Finland Fingrid  3 3(MB)  I/S 4.9 
Greece Hellenic Power System  3   I/S 4.10 
Ireland ESB 3 3   I/S 4.11 
Italy and Greece Omases Project 3 3   O/S 4.8 
Japan TEPCO 3 3   I/S 4.12 
Malaysia Tenaga Nasional Berhad 3 3   I/S 4.13 
New Zealand Transpower 3 3  3 I/S 4.14 
Panama ETESA 3 3   I/S 4.15 
Romania Transelectrica 3 3   I/S 4.16 
Russia Unified Electric Power System 3 3   I/S 4.17 
Saudi Arabia SEC 3 3   U/D - 
South Africa ESKOM 3 3   U/D - 
USA  PJM 3 3 3  I/S 4.18 / 4.19 
USA Southern Company 3    I/S 4.20 
USA Northern States Power 3    I/S - 
USA MidWest ISO  3   I/S - 
USA Entergy  3   I/S - 
USA ERCOT 3 3   I/S - 
USA FirstEnergy  3   U/D - 
USA BPA  3   I/S - 
USA PG&E  3   U/D - 






(MB)   
I/S   
O/S  
U/D  
Transient Security Assessment 
Voltage Security Assessment 
Small Signal Security Assessment 
Frequency Security Assessment 
Measurement-Based 
In Service 
Tested but out-of-service 
Under Development 
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4.2 State-of-the Art of DSA in Australia – NEMMCO 
 
Australia’s largest interconnected power system encompasses the states of Queensland, New South 
Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, with transmission voltage levels ranging from 500kV 
down to 110kV. This interconnected system represents a power system that stretches 5000 km and has 
a maximum demand of 32 GW.  NEMMCO is both the Independent System Operator and the Market 
System Operator and is responsible for the secure operation of this power system under the provisions 
of the National Electricity Rules.  
 
The National Electricity Market (NEM) is a regional based market managed by NEMMCO.   An 
optimized dispatch of generation is issued on a five minute cycle which is binding.   Constraints are 
applied in the dispatch solution to ensure that the power system will remain in a secure condition.   
These constraints, which represent both the static and dynamic security requirements on the system, 
can be applied as and when required and are usually formulated using off-line system analysis.    
NEMMCO has the responsibility to enable and adjust appropriate constraints in order to ensure secure 
operation. 
 
Control of the power system is thus achieved by the application of constraints in the dispatch process.  
NEMMCO uses real-time security assessment tools to monitor the security of the power system, 
whereby closed loop control is achieved, albeit via operator intervention.  
 
 
Figure 4-2 Overview of the National Electricity Market managed by NEMMCO.  The market regions roughly correspond to state 
political boundaries. Interfaces prone to dynamic security issues are indicated 
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4.2.1 Specific Requirements  




NEMMCO is required to ensure that no item of plant within its direct oversight is to be operated 
beyond its rated capability as determined by the asset owner.  In addition, subject to any credible 
contingent event, no item of plant is to exceed its short circuit rating nor its post contingent term 
capability 
Credible events that need to be considered are usually the outage of a single item of plant, but from 




Generally, voltage security assessment is done by asset owners at the planning stage, and 
predominantly consists of Q-V, P-V and modal analysis. 
 
Real time voltage security is not considered to be as much of a concern, as thermal constraints and 




A power system that is long and thin, stretching for 5000 km hugging the Australian coast is likely to 
be subject to transient stability problems.  The critical points are along interregional boundaries where 
the transmission corridors are narrow, and in some cases only a double circuit line spans these 
regions. 
 
Transient Security is one of the most studied forms of dynamic stability in the Australian context. 
 
The Australian power system is particularly sensitive to the control system modeling details and a lot 
of effort has also gone into developing large signal models for transient stability analysis.  So much 
so, that there is now an unusually large number of user-defined models required for the Australian 
power system.  
 
Small Signal Security 
 
Similarly, small signal security is a concern in the Australian context where there are a number of 
inter-regional modes that can be poorly damped.   
 
Off-line studies are relied upon to determine the post-contingent damping behavior of the power 
system for which operating limits are derived.  Small signal limits are generally much higher than 




NEMMCO is required to maintain the power system frequency to satisfy the frequency operating 
standards within each operating region of the National Electricity Market.   
 
A Frequency Control Ancillary Service (FCAS) market dispatches raise and lower frequency control 
in terms of fast, slow and delayed services to different generators and load centers in an economically 
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optimized manner according to bids.  Sufficient FCAS needs to be dispatched to satisfy the frequency 
operating standards for credible contingent events.   
 
4.2.1.2 Performance Requirements 
 
NEMMCO has the responsibility to operate the National Electricity Market under the National 
Electricity Rules, which requires the power system to be returned to a secure operating state within 30 
minutes of having entered an insecure post-contingent operating condition. 
 
Credible contingencies to be examined are defined as the loss of a single item of plant (e.g. generator 
or line).  Credible faults, for the purposes of transient security, are generally considered to be two 
phase-earth faults of single lines.  Some double line faults can also be considered where there are a 
number of lines that share a right of way and have been declared as credible.   
 
Double line faults are not normally considered as credible contingencies, unless there are unusual 
conditions, such as adverse weather conditions or bushfires, that can increase the chance of such  
contingencies occurring.  Thus during the normal course of operating the system, NEMMCO can 
declare certain contingencies to be credible or non-credible.  In these situations it is important to the 
able to add or remove contingency definitions for analysis. 
 
Similarly, in the dispatch process, different constraints can be invoked depending on what 
contingencies are considered to be credible at the time. 
 
It is essential that the DSA cycle be completed in the minimum amount of time.  Adjustments to the 
power system are usually achieved by the invocation of constraints, which can only be applied at each 
five-minute dispatch cycle.  Thus if the security assessment tool returns a results within 10-15 
minutes, then there are only two or three dispatch cycles left for an operator to interpret the results and 
take the appropriate action to restore the power system to a secure operating state. 
 
Hence the desired performance criteria would be for a security assessment tool to be able to return a 
result within a 10-15 minute time frame. 
 
4.2.2 General Description of DSA Implementation 
 
 
NEMMCO uses a variety of tools to assess the real time security of this power system.  The network 
model for this system comprises approximately 2100 buses, 1200 lines and almost 300 generating 
units, representing a system with a maximum demand of about 32 GW. 
4.2.2.1 Static Security 
NEMMCO uses the EMS Contingency Analysis program to analyze static security.  N-1 contingency 
analysis is performed for the loss of every single item of plant within NEMMCO’s direct oversight.  
There are also a number of n-2 contingencies defined which are enabled when they are declared to be 
credible contingencies.  The effect of special protection systems are also evaluated during the 
analysis. 
The assessment involves the monitoring of  
• line and transformer thermal limits 
• node over and under voltage limits 
• voltage angle limits between pairs of loads (as provided by state estimation not measured 
quantities) 
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• interface flow limits (which represent limits derived from off-line studies of other stability 
criteria) 
 
In addition to contingency analysis, NEMMCO also runs real time short circuit analysis to ensure that 
there are no violations on terminal equipment short circuit ratings.  There are a number of areas where 
the short circuit levels have grown to critical levels over the years of operation. 
 
From the market perspective, constraints to limit post contingent branch flows are formulated off-line 
for a large variety of system conditions.  In real time, the appropriate constraints are applied in the 
market dispatch engine to enforce limits on these branch flows.  
 
NEMMCO is currently investigating options for constraint automation tools that will bring the market 
constraint formulation process to the near real-time frame. 
 
4.2.2.2 Voltage Security 
Real time voltage security assessment is rather limited at present to the assumption that an unsolved 
contingency analysis solution is a result of a voltage collapse situation.   
 
A number of voltage stability limits are determined in the off-line environment in order to maintain 
the required reactive margin as specified under the provisions on the National Electricity Rules.   This 
is predominantly based on Q-V analysis, though some P-V and modal analysis is also performed.  A 
limited number of transient security limits have also been formulated with voltage security 
considerations as part of the off-line time domain simulations. 
 
Work needs to be done to improve real-time assessment of voltage security, and options are being 
investigated to address this. 
4.2.2.3 Transient Security 
As transient security is of major concern for Australian power system, this area has seen major 
investment of resources.   
 
Off-line studies are performed to assess the transient stability characteristics of the power system and 
to derive interconnector operating limits that encompass the many scenarios examined in these 
studies.    These operating limits, which are specified in terms of system variables, such as demand, 
generation pattern and inertia, are then applied by NEMMCO as constraints in the electricity market 
dispatch process. To determine the transient stability of the power system, transmission network 
service providers and NEMMCO are largely dependant on time domain simulations, predominantly 
using PSS/E.   Direct methods are usually treated with suspicion largely because of the importance of 
control system limit action and other non-linearities in the simulation of the Australian power system. 
 
Whilst these limits are applied to the dispatch process to ensure that the power system remains stable, 
NEMMCO has also developed a real time security assessment tool that monitors the real time 
transient security of the power system, based on state estimator snapshots of the system. 
 
The state estimator solution is sent to a time domain simulation engine, which monitors the transient 
stability of the power system for a number of different credible contingencies. 
 
4.2.2.4 Small Signal Security 
Small signal stability is of major concern to NEMMCO and network service providers in Australia.  
At present there is no real time post-contingent assessment of small signal security and NEMMCO is 
reliant on off-line studies to produce operating limits. 
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In addition NEMMCO has two tools that physically measure the system damping modes present in 
the power system.  These tools are integral to the operation of the power system.  When sufficiently 
low damping is detected, additional constraints are enabled in the dispatch engine to limit power 
transfers across various interfaces. 
 
The Psymetrix monitor extracts modal damping information from the constant perturbations present 
in inter-regional line flows.  The Psymetrix monitor analyses a three-minute window of sampled data 
of tie line flows at various points in the system.    There are a number of measurement nodes spread 
across the mainland, each sampling at a rate of 50 samples/second.  Each of these nodes detects the 
different modes to varying degrees.  Because of its short sample window, it can detect instances of 
poor damping rather quickly, in which case NEMMCO can take corrective action.   
 
The Oscillatory Stability Monitor (OSM) is a wide area damping measurement tool that has been 
installed in Tasmania and on the mainland.  It measures the damping modes within the two islands.  
Every five minutes it uses a three hour rolling window of phasor and voltage samples from a number 
of collection points in the system to estimate the system damping modes.    It has been used for the 
calibration of the off-line small signal models and for stabilizer performance measurement.   
  
4.2.2.5 Frequency Security 
Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) are dispatched to ensure that the power system 
frequency is maintained within the frequency standards for credible contingent events.  These events 
include loss of generation, loss of load and network separation events. 
 
FCAS is dispatched in terms of fast (6 s), slow (60 s) and delayed (5 min) time frames, both raise and 
lower ancillary services, based on bids.  A “raise” service is one that raises system frequency.  The 
timeframes fit together so that a rapid and sustained response can provide each of the three services 
sequentially.  Governor control usually provides most fast and slow FCAS, but delayed FCAS is 
usually provided by manual control of generating units.  Load shedding or other load control can also 
provide the services. 
 
In addition to the energy market, NEMMCO manages six ancillary service markets to dispatch the 
required raise and lower FCAS for the three time frames.  Two more markets are used to dispatch 
raise and lower regulating services. 
 
The amount of each service needs to be sufficient to maintain frequency within the required bands for 
the contingency with the largest FCAS requirement.   The allocated FCAS is simply the amount of 
generation or load at risk, less the expected amount of load relief, as a result of load frequency 
dependence, at the relevant frequency standard limit.  
 
This method, however, suffers from a number of assumptions; ignoring the power system inertia, 
assuming size of disturbance is sufficiently small, and that the rate of change of frequency is zero at 6, 
60 and 300 seconds after the event.    
 
With the completion of the HVDC link between the mainland and Tasmania, where the size of the 
link represents a substantial portion of the Tasmanian load, and the island can have a relatively low 
inertia, a better method of determining the requirement is necessary.   In addition, a special protection 
system, would trip a number of generators or loads for the contingent loss of the HVDC link, resulting 
in significant inertia or load changes on the island. 
 
A new method is now being used to calculate the FCAS requirements in Tasmania.  This method 
models inertia, load relief and the various ancillary services, and requires the following inputs: 
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• Total regional demand and generation 
• Total regional (generation) inertia 
• Amount of generation or load armed for SPS operation 
• Inertias of generating units that are armed for SPS operation. 
• Load relief factor (% change in load/% change in frequency) 
 
This information is readily available in the EMS and, as the calculation of the FCAS requirements is 
an iterative solution of a number of non-linear equations, it is most practical that this be performed on 
the EMS.  The solution is passed to market systems to dispatch the various FCAS markets. 
Benchmarking against time domain simulation has shown the accuracy of this method to be superior.  
It is intended that it will later be used for dispatch of the FCAS markets of the mainland. 
 
4.2.3 Architecture 
The following sections will deal primarily with NEMMCO’s on-line security assessment tool, which 
performs base case Transient Security Analysis.  The DSA, as the application is known, is the main 
on-line facility NEMMCO has for the estimation of Dynamic Security.  
NEMMCO maintains two co-primary control centers, each fully equipped with redundant AREVA 
EMS systems.  Consequently, there is one DSA server at each site servicing the site EMS.  It was 
considered that redundant DSA servers were not necessary at each site because the alternate site 
server could always perform the analysis for both sites. 
The primary purpose of the DSA is to assess the post contingent transient security of the power 
system under NEMMCO’s oversight.  This is achieved by taking state estimator snapshots of the 
power system and simulating a number of predefined contingencies in a power system simulator on 
the DSA server.   The stability of the system is ascertained by observing the swing characteristics of 
the generators during the simulation.   The greater the angle separation between any two machines, 
the more unstable the case is considered to be.  The results are fed back to the EMS for display and 
alarming. 
There are currently 93 contingencies defined, of which 55 are normally selected.  The remaining 
contingencies are defined for unusual system conditions, most of which are defined to cover for cases 
where there is a prior outage of a double circuit line that should be considered.  The contingencies are 
grouped for rapid selection and, if necessary, contingencies can also be defined on-line.  
 
The DSA process is essentially initiated and controlled by an application on the EMS.  The EMS is 
the source not only for the steady state network model, but also for the contingency models.  This is 
necessary because of the need to be able to select and change the contingencies to be analyzed from 
the EMS. 
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 A real time DSA run is only initiated by the EMS application when a valid state estimation of the 
system is available.  The estimator solution is written to a flat file in a form that reflects the data 
structures of the EMS.  At this point it is necessary to convert the network model from the EMS 
representation, in the form of nodes and breakers, to a bus-branch form that is suitable for the PSS/E 
simulation engine.   Thus nodes are collapsed and breakers are removed.   
 
 
Once it is passed on to the DSA server, the network model is combined with the dynamic models and 
input files are created that are suitable for the dynamic simulation engine, PSS/E.  In addition the 
selected contingencies are also dumped to a flat file and the data is converted by the same process to a 
form suitable for the simulation engine to interpret. 
 
A control program on the server initiates a simulation of each contingency, starting with the 
contingency that produced that worst results from the previous run.  In this way it is likely that an 
unstable condition can be detected very early in the DSA run.  
 
The results of each simulation are collated and returned to the EMS as soon as they are available.  The 
results are displayed in the EMS in a form that ranks the results starting with the most unstable 
contingency.   
 
The DSA servers1 can adequately process the 55 contingencies for a model that consists of 
approximately 2100 buses, 300 generators and 700 dynamic models.  Even with the recent inclusion 
of HVDC models and the reduction of integration time step down to 1 ms, the configuration is 
sufficient to perform five second PSS/E simulations of all contingencies in less than ten minutes. 
 
The handshaking and information exchange between the EMS and the DSA server is achieved by 






                                                     
1 Currently a single Dell 1850 at each site with dual 3.2GHz hyper-threaded Intel IA32 CPU’s 
 
Figure 4-3  NEMMCO DSA Architechure 
 
   4-10
4.2.4 Functional Components 
The functional components can be divided into the following, 
 
• EMS Interface 
• DSA Server Master Control Program 
• Node-to-Bus Network model Conversion module 
• PSS/E Simulation Engine and associated scripts 
 
Node-to-Bus Network Model Conversion - OPDMS 
 
The Network model conversion is the cornerstone of the DSA.  Without accurate model conversion 
the DSA would be useless. 
 
The conversion of the EMS, node-breaker base model to a bus-branch network model is achieved by 
another NEMMCO application, the OPDMS (Operations and Planning Data Management System).  
 
The OPDMS is a system that was designed to provide planners, both internal and external, with state 
estimator snapshots in a PSS/E format, suitable for use in PSS/E.  It provides both positive and zero 
sequence data files, together with dynamics models of generators, excitation systems, stabilizers, 
governors, SVC’s and any other item of plant that requires dynamics models for the purposes of time 
domain simulation.  It is also capable of creating data files that can be used for small signal analysis. 
 
Bus numbers and dynamic models are mapped to the network model on an EMS node basis.  As all 
the data files, including the dynamics data file are created by the OPDMS when a snapshot is 
requested, the bus numbers will be synchronized across all data files.  This is particularly important 
when various items of plant can end up on different bus numbers depending on the breaker topology 
at the station at the time of the snapshot.  Furthermore, the dynamic model parameters themselves can 
also be a function of bus numbers.  This is useful when the model parameters specify sources of input 
signals from remote buses or even lines.   
 
The DSA uses OPDMS the model conversion module, but is independent of the OPDMS.  This is 
designed to improve the availability of the DSA.  It has its own cache of dynamics models and bus 
number mappings, which are regularly updated from the live OPDMS. 
 
The first phase of the conversion process takes place on the EMS side, where it takes inputs in the 
form of the EMS network model to create a flat file with all the information to represent the steady 
state network model, including zero sequence data.  As most of the bus information is already 
available from the state estimator the model conversion also takes place here, creating buses from 
nodes and assigning circuit identifiers, bus types and even collapsing zero impedance branches. 
 
Once the flat file is created, the OPDMS application on the DSA server combines the data in its cache 
with the network model in the flat file.  The final bus numbers are assigned to buses and to the 
dynamics models.  The snapshot consists of three PSS/E files, the static network model (or load flow) 
representation, the zero sequence model and the dynamic model parameters. A high proportion of the 
dynamic models are user-defined models, which are coded up as Fortran subroutines and linked in 
with PSS/E. 
 
The OPDMS conversion also has a number of other features to cater for PSS/E idiosyncrasies, 
including: 
 
• Converts to equivalent loads those generators that don’t have dynamic models associated with 
them.   
• Converts switch shunts to fixed bus shunts as a work around for PSS/E not being able to handle 
operational switch shunt combinations. 
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Figure 4-4   Screen shot of DSA Results Display showing Contingencies Ranked by the Severity of the Result.  Unstable results are 
immediately alarmed and coloured red to draw attention. 
 
The files created by the OPDMS should be able to run directly in PSS/E without further manipulation. 
 
In addition, the OPDMS also performs the conversion of the contingency definitions.  The 
contingencies are defined on the EMS in terms of EMS identifiers.  From these definitions the 
OPDMS creates PSS/E scripts that are synchronized with the generated PSS/E powerflow file to 
apply faults and open lines. 
 
The contingencies that have been chosen are well understood in the planning environment, where the 
mechanisms to alleviate unstable outcomes are well known. 
 
Other contingencies could possibly yield unstable outcomes also, but without the prior experience in 
dealing with the contingency, it is difficult to interpret how to alleviate them and justify their 
inclusion. 
 
EMS Application Interface 
 
The EMS has primary control over the DSA where runs are initiated and the results displayed.  It is 
the only interface available to the control room operator. Contingencies are defined on the EMS and 
using prior understanding of the contingencies, they are associated with individual cutsets.  Some may 
actually belong to a number of cutsets.  This will make it easier, when results are displayed, to 
identify which cutset needs attention should an unstable contingency be detected.  Contingencies can 
be rapidly selected on a group basis or individually as well. 
 
Results are displayed by the EMS application (see Figure 4-4) and are ranked in terms of their 
maximum swing angle.  The greater the maximum swing, the more unstable the contingency is 
considered to be.  Both the current run and previous run results are displayed, so that, whilst the 
current run remains incomplete, there will always be at least one complete set of results available. 
 
 Detailed information about an individual contingency result can be called up which includes the two 
machines that contributed most to the maximum angle swing.  This information, together with the 
cutset association, gives the operator a crude indication of where the problem could be.  The operator 
can then take remedial action by applying constraints along the cutset that is yielding the unstable 
contingency. 
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The DSA also has an interface to the EMS alarms and will raise alarms for the following conditions: 
 
• Unstable condition is detected 
• There was a simulation run failure and results could not be returned 
• The initial mismatch in PSS/E was too large. 
 
 
DSA Server Control Program 
 
The control program on the DSA server orchestrates the various tasks on the DSA server once the job 
has been handed over to the server.  This includes 
 
• Initiating the OPDMS process to create PSS/E data files for the given snapshot 
• Converting the contingency definitions to PSS/E scripts 
• Setting up the base case power flows 
• Queuing the various PSS/E simulations and running them when resources are available.  This has 
two advantages in that it is actually more efficient in terms of overall CPU performance and this 
allows the more critical contingencies to be processed first to provide results sooner. This also 
makes the application multiple processor ready for when multiple worker processors are 
introduced. 
• Collation of results from the PSS/E simulations and the packaging of these results on to the DSA 
client application on the EMS.  These results are passed back to the EMS application by simple 
file transfer where they are displayed immediately. 
• All the general house keeping on the DSA server 
• Recovering from errors in the simulation when they occur 
 
 
PSS/E Simulation Engine 
 
At the heart of the DSA is the simulation engine.  The stability of the system is determined by time 
domain simulation of contingencies on the power system.  PSS/E uses a Modified Euler algorithm for 
the integration of differential equations to perform time domain simulations.  
 
Individual simulations are queued for each contingency to be analyzed, with the worst contingency 
from the previous run at the head of the queue. 
 
The PSS/E simulations are controlled by scripts, which perform initialization and then apply the 
contingency during the simulation.  For unbalanced faults, the equivalent zero sequence impedance is 
also calculated using the supplied sequence data. 
 
The simulation time is currently set to five seconds.  Whilst a ten second simulation time would have 
been preferable, it was considered that limiting the simulation to five seconds would not introduce too 
much error and was worth the improved performance benefit. 
 
A special dynamic model in the simulation monitors the rotor angle swings of each machine in the 
simulation and assesses the stability of the simulation.  If the deviation in angle between any two 
machines reaches a predefined threshold, then the simulation is stopped and declared unstable. 
 
4.2.5 Distinguishing Features 
The stability measure is a swing criteria, where an attempt is made to measure the amount of swing 
any two generators can undergo during a contingency.  
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This rotor angle swing monitor also has a number of distinguishing features: 
 
• It ignores the initial angle spread.  The swing monitor is trying to measure the amount of swing 
between any two machines, not the angle separation.  This should avoid any bias towards 
generators that have a large starting angle.  This simple measure has proved to be surprisingly 
reliable. 
• It has the ability to look at swings within each individual island, even when islands are created as 
a result of the contingency during simulation. 
• It has the ability to exclude certain specified generators from being monitored.  This is to avoid 
problems with equivalent generators that are use do to model voltage source converters.  It can 
also be used to exclude certain small generators at the extremities of the power system, which can 
be considered as insignificant if they were to lose synchronism. 
• The monitor has early termination criteria, so if the rotor angle swings do not appear to be 
growing significantly then the simulation is terminated early to improve performance.  
 
An attempt is made to detect unstable cases as soon as possible, by running the contingency 
simulations in the order they were ranked in the previous run.  In this way a developing unstable 
situation should be detected when the first simulation is completed, which could be in less than one 
minute, well before the run is complete. 
 
Confidence in the state estimator solution is measured by the amount of mismatch the state estimator 
solution has at each bus.  If the mismatch is too high then the solution is flagged as such and none of 
the network applications, including DSA, will proceed until a reasonable solution is obtained. 
 
Since the network model conversion is such a significant step in the DSA, it would be beneficial to 
monitor the accuracy of the conversion process itself. Ideally the DSA would end up with an accurate 
representation of the current state of the power system, but errors and approximations introduced by 
the conversion process serve to blur this.   
 
In an attempt to monitor confidence in the conversion process, the initial mismatch is measured as 
soon as the powerflow is read into PSS/E, prior to any attempt at a powerflow solution.  An alarm is 
raised if the initial mismatch becomes too high to indicate that there will be some uncertainty in the 
DSA solution and that they should be treated with a bit more caution.  There are a number of other 
tests that could be performed to try to measure confidence in the converted solution. 
 
Other features of the DSA include: 
 
• The DSA can accept study cases from the EMS in the same manner as it does for real time cases 
• Facility to accept study requests from planners who submit PSS/E files directly for analysis. 
• Ability to choose contingencies on group basis 
• Ability to exclude governor models on a region basis.  This feature is required because it is 
sometimes difficult to initialize governor models and the feature allows a solution to be obtained 
at slightly less accuracy.  As governors are relatively slow acting, the removal of governors has 
limited impact on the accuracy of the solution. 
• Contingency definitions are defined on the EMS and are translated by the same process that 
generates the power flow files.  This ensures that the contingency definitions always map to the 
correct buses in the power flow. 
 
4.2.6 Performance and Reliability 
There has been a lot of work in improving the performance aspects of the process.   A number of 
trends were degrading the performance of the DSA.  These included, increasing number of 
contingencies, growth in the power system dimensions and increasing complexity of the dynamic 
models.   
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Since 2002 there have been a number of initiatives taken to improve performance, including: 
 
• Installation of faster hardware 
• Development of early termination that would detect stable contingencies early and terminate the 
simulation. 
• Improvement in the OPDMS network model conversion, which was originally taking a significant 
portion of the available processing time. 
 
The recent implementation of HVDC modeling for Basslink and the need to halve the integration time 
step, has seen another degradation to the performance where now the complete cycle takes almost ten 
minutes 
 
The current performance is just sufficient for base case analysis, which is still far away from the 
intended ultimate development. 
 
The importance of the DSA to NEMMCO has been crucial over the period of time that it has been in 
service.  NEMMCO has become reliant on the DSA, to the point where 24 hour support is necessary 
in the event of failure.   For this reason, a lot of effort has gone into making the DSA more reliable. 
 
Reliability should be considered in two contexts: 
 
• Solution accuracy, or false indication of stability or instability.  This will be discussed in the 
section on Operational Experience. 
• Reliability in obtaining a valid result and not experiencing solution failure. 
 
Much work has gone into the DSA to make it more reliable.   The DSA is a critical tool for 
NEMMCO and is expected to run successfully at each run.   
 
Figure 4-5  shows the daily failure rate the DSA has experienced over a twelve month period.  This 
represents an overall availability of 98.2% over this period.   
 
It is evident that the dominant issue is initialization failure.  Modeling changes often correlate with 
periods of higher failure rates.  The problems exhibited around the November-January time frame 
were largely a result of the introduction of HVDC models for Basslink, the new Tasmanian-mainland 
interconnection.  Initialization issues around June 2006 were as a result of tolerances being re-
tightened as NEMMCO became more confident with the HVDC models.  
 
Powerflow divergence is another significant issue and this can usually be traced back to poor state 
estimator solutions and load models in the EMS. 
 
DSA failures can be basically attributed in the following categories: 
 
• Dynamic Model robustness: 
 
This is the primary cause of initialization failure.  This is a particular issue for NEMMCO as a 
significant number of models are user-defined models, provided by network service providers.  
Most of the dynamic models come from a planning environment that work on well-behaved 
planning studies but often cannot cope with the unusual operating conditions that can be 
experienced in real time.   Usually teething problems are experienced for a period when a new 
model is implemented until it is tuned for the real time environment. 
 
Typical examples are governor models that rarely allow for overload capability of the generator, 
which is now a regular occurrence in the market driven dispatch. 
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Figure 4-5  DSA Daily Failure Rate Highlighting the Dominant Issues that contribute to DSA run failure. 
Others include models that rely on a particular topology.  The summated flow on parallel lines, 
for example, could be used as input to a stabilizer.  It would be foolhardy, however, to assume 
that all the parallel lines would always be connected to the same bus in real world examples. 
  
Another important aspect to consider here is that it requires the failure of only one dynamic model 
to render a complete solution failure.  Often it is the same model that causes initialization 
problems, and these are the models that need attention. 
 
• Telemetry and State estimator solution: 
 
The state estimator solution itself can drive models into unexpected operating conditions.  This 
often is as a result of poor telemetry coverage. 
   
The state estimator sometimes has bad estimates of loads whereby loads end up with a very poor 




Often there is insufficient telemetry of important statuses, such as HVDC control modes, AVR 
statuses, etc, so an assumed state may work much of the time, but can cause initialization failures 
when the physical operating conditions change.  
 
Other models also require analogues that are not available in the EMS.  Some governor models 
require lake levels to initialize correctly, so there is no single set of default model parameters to 
suit all conditions.  The only viable solution for this is for telemetered lake levels to be fed to the 
DSA. 
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Whilst the obvious solution would be to improve telemetry, this is not always possible and the 
best compromise is to set up manual inputs that can be hand dressed in the EMS to represent these 
inputs.  This would only be feasible for points that do not change regularly. 
 
• Bus-Branch Model: 
 
The PSS/E format does not always lend itself to the detail that is contained in the EMS and often 
approximations or assumptions need to be made in the conversion process. When these 
assumptions break down, we are often left with errors in the PSS/E solution.  This can either yield 
to PSS/E solution failure or, worse still, to an inaccurate solution.  
 
Though not ideal, the only way to address these situations is to implement work-arounds either in 
the EMS or in the PSS/E model itself. 
 
Topology dependant models are particularly sensitive to the Bus-Branch conversion.  These are 
typically models that refer to buses or lines as part of their parameter data.  These parameters need 
to be mapped correctly to EMS nodes in OPDMS so that correct bus numbers will be generated 
during the conversion. 
 
• EMS Model Issues: 
 
Usually the EMS model is more detailed than the PSS/E model, but in some instances this is not 
the case.  One example is for voltage source converter HVDC links, which are modeled as 
equivalent generator pairs in the state estimator.  There is no linkage between the two generators 
and sometimes, but surprisingly rarely, the state estimator can come up with solutions that are 
infeasible for the DC link and cause initialization problems in PSS/E. 
 
4.2.7 Operating Experience 
NEMMCO’s DSA has been operational since 2001, and in that time many improvements have been 
implemented, as a result of operational experience. 
 
Originally it was planned that the simulation load would be shared across the two sites at NEMMCO, 
with half the contingencies being processed at one site and the other half at the other site.  However, 
operators were more comfortable if the full set of contingencies were enabled at both sites.  Usually 
instabilities are quite marginal and small differences in the state estimator solution can mean the 
difference between a stable and an unstable result.  Since the estimator solutions being fed to the DSA 
are slightly different at the two sites, the DSA can yield different results at each site.  Also note that 
the timing of the results from the two DSAs are not necessarily synchronized.  An unstable situation 
first needs to be confirmed at the alternate site before NEMMCO takes any remedial action.  
 
The calendar in Figure 4-6 shows the days in a period of 12 months where unstable operation had 
been detected.  It was a surprise to note the large number of unstable indications, particularly when 
one considers that the constraints in the dispatch process should be avoiding insecure operation. 
 
During this period there was a concerted effort to investigate any unstable indications and there were 
a number of illustrative examples identified.   The volume of cases involved means that it is far easier 
to check for false indication of instability, rather than false stable indications. 
Approximately 40% of the unstable conditions detected were fleeting conditions, appearing for a 
single run only.  These are typically during switching operations or for post contingent conditions 
prior to re-arrangement of the power system back to a secure operating condition. However the bulk 
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of the remainder are bona fide unstable situations. 
• March was highlighted by an instability where the mechanism of instability was puzzling and 
difficult to alleviate as there were no interconnectors operating near their stability limit.  
Investigations later showed that the instability was actually for a hitherto neglected transmission 
corridor and no constraint was available to control its flow.  Constraints have now been created 
that can be enabled in the dispatch to cater for this issue. 
• May and June highlighted an instability that was erroneously detected because of inadequate 
distribution capacitor modeling.   This significantly contributed to a false alarm rate of almost 
20%.  The subsequent inclusion of distribution capacitor modeling yielded as much as 50 MW 
improvement in interchange capability. 
It would be worth noting that in over five years of operation no more than six different contingencies 
have ever indicated insecure conditions.  However, this does not preclude the other contingencies 
from being insecure during more abnormal operating conditions.  From the early days of operation 
investigations showed that there were a number of underlying issues that yielded false unstable 
indication. 
 
• SCADA and Estimator Issues: 
 
Some parts of the network have little or no telemetry, which can cause issues.  A good example is 
for estimated generator terminal voltages.  At some generator locations there is no SCADA 
telemetry of terminal voltage or transformer tap position. The state estimator is thus free to solve 
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Figure 4-6 Calendar Showing Days where DSA Detected Unstable Contingencies. 
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at any valid voltage and tap position.  Unfortunately, when the state estimator solves for low 
terminal voltages, the dynamic excitation models run into under-excitation. This usually results in 
local unstable modes for those generators. 
 
This was addressed by adding pseudo measurements that would bias the terminal voltage near 
1pu. 
 
Other unstable cases can be attributed to poor state estimator results, such as generators with high 
MVAr output, or SVC’s solving near the end of their dynamic range.  Improved telemetry and 
state estimator load models can help rectify most of these issues. 
 
• Dynamic Models: 
 
Often there would be a problem with dynamic models that ended up in an unexpected operating 
mode and would cause unstable indication.  This could be attributed to dynamic model 
robustness. 
 
• Network Model Conversion: 
 
Some problems with the network model conversion process may lead to unstable indication, 
though total solution failure is more likely. 
 
A number of unstable conditions have also occurred during unusual operating conditions where there 
are multiple prior outages in the system.   In these conditions the limit equations provided by the 
transmission network service providers no longer hold true. 
 
In other situations, the DSA has detected unstable local oscillatory modes rather than a system wide 
transient problem, where a single machine, or station, would have an undamped oscillation against the 
rest of the power system. 
 
However, the major issue is to understand how to deal with an unstable situation when it arises.   
Usually a particular contingency may be affected by the flow in a particular cutset, but this is not 
always the case.  Hints are provided by grouping contingencies into cutsets and by reporting on the 
two machines that contributed most to the instability, but this is often insufficient.  The two machines 
are often on the extremities of the system and it is difficult to see where the separation occurs.  There 
is no mechanism to viewing how groups of machines are separating. The incident in March is one 
such incident where this was highlighted. 
 
4.2.8 Proven Benefits 
The most exemplary benefit came to NEMMCO when a new transmission corridor prone to stability 
problems was detected.  This previously unknown issue shows how the DSA is being used to avoid 
exposure to optimistic or unknown technical limits.  With the addition of further contingencies it is 
hoped that any new problem areas can also be identified.   
 
The DSA provides confidence in the off-line limits that drive the dispatch process and acts as a 
monitoring tool that ensures that the constraints are working as they should.   It enables NEMMCO to 
run the power system close to the envelope with confidence. 
 
The DSA offers the ability to assess and maintain the power system security whilst under abnormal 
operating conditions, where there are no previously derived off-line constraints to match the system 
condition.  This seems to become a more common occurrence under the market driven environment. 
 
At present there is no financial benefit to the electricity market while the off-line constraints are being 
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used in the dispatch engine.  The DSA only operates as a monitoring tool.  However, with confidence, 
there may come a time when the traditional dynamic constraints to maintain security are replaced by 
real time constraints derived by the DSA.  This will avoid the use of overly conservative constraints; 
constraints that are derived off-line to encompass a range of system conditions.  At this point the 
market would benefit immensely by virtue of the increased transfer capabilities that can be achieved 
as a result.  Studies have shown that even small improvements in transfer capabilities can yield annual 
benefits of many million dollars. 
4.2.9 Planned Enhancements 
The current DSA at NEMMCO is far from the ultimate development.  It was set up as a proof of 
concept and was much more successful than originally anticipated.  The next stage of development is 
long overdue and involves some major enhancements.  These enhancements include: 
 
These enhancements include: 
• Continuous effort in improving the robustness of user-defined models 
• Implement a much larger set of contingencies.  This will likely include the need for contingency 
screening. 
• Determine secure operating margin in real time.  This will iteratively determine the limiting 
transfer level along transmission corridors. It will provide a better measure of the security of the 
power system and indicate the proximity to the security envelope.  A number of transmission 
corridors would need to be examined. 
• Perform oscillatory and voltage security analysis in addition to the transient security analysis.  
This will add an extra dimension to dynamic security analysis. 
• Provide useful recommendations in alleviating insecure conditions. 
• Implement faster integration algorithms.  With the order of magnitude improvement in 
computation required to support additional contingencies and iterate to a limit, it is becoming 
impractical to use the existing fixed time-step modified Euler integration algorithm of PSS/E.  
Major efficiency improvements are required to support this and alternatives are being examined 
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4.3 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Bosnia and Herzegovina - NOS 
 
4.3.1 General Description 
The Independent System Operator (NOS) of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has full dispatch 
responsibility and authority for the operation of the BiH electricity market. The BiH power system, 
which comprises the electrical generation and transmission facilities in the entire country, operates as a 
UCTE Single Control Area within the UCTE Control Block which encompasses Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. On a regional scale, the BiH power system is part of the South 
Eastern European interconnection, which includes all the transmission systems from Turkey in the East 
to Slovenia in the West, and from Greece in the South all the way to Hungary in the North. 
Due to its location at the center of significant, and unregulated, MW transfers across the transmission 
networks of the market participants in the region which may significantly affect the operating reliability 
of the grid, NOS BiH has deployed real-time network modeling and analysis capabilities that compute, 
at any moment, with reasonable accuracy, and quickly enough to support on-line decision making, the 
distance between the current operating point and the state of maximum loadability where voltages may 
collapse and units may get out of synchronism. 
The approach taken by NOS is particularly significant in the aftermath of the blackouts that affected 
utilities in US, UK and mainland Europe in 2003, and offers a fine example of fast paced and 
inexpensive enhancement of an existing SCADA system with functionality that helps monitor and 
maintain the power system operating reliability. The solution passed the system acceptance testing and 
became fully operational within only six months after the terms of reference for adding real-time 
network analysis and stability assessment to the bare-bones SCADA were published -- with the state 
estimator running at five minutes intervals, real-time stability calculations being automatically triggered 
after each successful state estimate and converging in less than 1 second, and one of the Operator’s 
consoles displaying, in a user-friendly graphic format, the continuously updated value of the distance to 
instability and the safe operating margin of the Bosnian power system. The main features of this 
implementation are summarized in the following. 
4.3.2 Architecture 
4.3.2.1 Hardware Configuration 
Prior to mid 2004, when it officially began its operations, NOS was known as the Joint Power 
Coordination Center, or ZEKC, which is the acronym in the local language. In early 2000, ZEKC 
undertook a large SCADA/EMS Project consisting of a SCADA/EMS at the NOS BiH control center, 
four regional SCADA control centers, OPGW based telecommunications, and RTU/ISAS. The 
implementation schedule for this project, which is now being pursued at full speed by NOS, is 
relatively long and the system is expected to be commissioned in 2008.  In the immediate future, NOS 
BiH will also be equipped with a balancing market system. 
In order to support its operational mission during the transition period, NOS had to upgrade the 
interim system installed by ZEKC in 2002 to provide limited functionality SCADA and AGC relief on 
a temporary basis. The enhancement was implemented in 2005 in record time and included a State 
Estimator and a Fast Maximum Transfer Capability Analyzer (FMTCA). The state estimation and 
FMTCA solutions were designed to work harmoniously with the off-line power-flow and transient 
stability programs currently used in operations planning at NOS BiH. 
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The main idea consisted of extending the interim SCADA with a state estimator that would either be 
seamlessly integrated with the existing system or run on a separate processor with input obtained from 
the SCADA real-time database. Either way, the state estimator would execute periodically, its output 
results would be displayed on the Operator’s console, and the state estimate would be made available 
in PSS/E format both to FMTCA and for subsequent study-mode processing with the load-flow and/or 
other off-line computer programs available at NOS BiH. Together, these applications would thus help 
build and update the accurate model of the power system, automatically perform real-time voltage and 
steady-state stability checks, and allow the operations personnel to monitor and enhance the power 
system’s operating reliability. 
As it turned out, the solution developed by Siemens Power Transmission and Distribution Energy 
Automation (Siemens) from Vienna with assistance from NOS BiH consisted of actually expanding 
the interim SCADA system to a distributed SCADA/EMS architecture with full support for real-time 
network analysis functionality. The FMTCA capability was provided by QuickStab [9] and was 
integrated with the enhanced SCADA/EMS by Iskra Sistemi (Iskra), Ljubljana, Slovenia with 
assistance from NOS BiH experts and Energy Consulting International, Inc., New York, USA. The 
solution architecture is depicted in Figure 4-7. 
4.3.2.2 Functional Description and Computational Method 
 
Background 
The maximum transfer capability of an electric power system, i.e. the maximum MW power that can 
be transferred from generators (including tie-line imports) to loads (including tie-line exports), is 
limited by the: 
 
Figure 4-7 Integration of the Fast Voltage and Steady-State Stability Application on the SCADA/EMS LAN 
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? Amount of available reactive compensation 
? Thermal constraints 
? Stability constraints. 
The latter are the most severe because stability violations lead directly to blackouts and, also, because 
instability develops rapidly and there is no time to react. But what’s the meaning of “violating 
stability constraints”, and how to measure the “distance to instability”? 
During the last two decades, the search for stability limits was addressed primarily on the transient 
stability and voltage stability venues. These techniques have been extensively reviewed in previously 
published work [8]. Their limitations have also been documented, and stem from computational 
burden, non-convergence of load-flow calculations near instability, and, most importantly, from the 
algorithmic difficulty to mathematically quantify a system-wide index that would qualify as a 
“stability limit”. 
A promising solution to this otherwise complex problem comes from the realm of steady-state 
stability. With the understanding that the maximum loadability is a local property of the state vector 
rather than a “generic” constant, and that for each new system state there is a potentially different 
stability limit, the distance from a given operating point to the associated state of maximum 
loadability is called steady-state stability reserve, changes when the load, topology and voltages 
change, and may be quite different from values computed off-line. The value of a steady-state stability 
reserve that is large enough for the system to withstand any set of credible contingencies without 
transient instability is called security margin. The recalculation of the steady-state stability limit and 
the security margin after each state estimate and load-flow solution is required because operating the 
system near its stability limit may lead to blackouts.  
These concepts were well known and widely accepted as early as 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the 
Special Report of CIGRE Group 32 prepared by M. Magnien way back in 1964 stated explicitly that 
“any network that meets the steady-state stability conditions can withstand dynamic perturbations and 
end in a stable operating state” [3]. 
Solution Technique 
FMTCA uses the fast and reliable method developed by Paul Dimo in Europe approximately fifty 
years ago to quickly assess the maximum transfer capability of an electric power system, and which, 
in spite of its age, is particularly useful in real-time applications [1], [2], [5], [6]. Given a load-flow 
solution or state estimate of a multi-area power system, FMTCA: 
? Computes, for each area, the maximum loadability and the safe system loading for a user-defined 
security margin 
? Identifies generators that may cause instability and ranks the machines and tie-line injections in 
order of their impact on system’s stability 
? Performs bus-level analysis, shows how the generators are “seen” from that bus, and ranks the 
buses in the order of their stability indices.  
4.3.2.3 Interface and Integration with the SCADA/EMS LAN 
As shown in Figure 1, the FMTCA application runs on a PC connected to the SCADA/EMS LAN and 
its execution is controlled by the MCE QuickStab module developed by Iskra. Every 5 minutes, this 
module scans a specific folder on the SCADA/EMS LAN and, if a new state estimator output in 
PSS/E format is found, it triggers the FMTCA computational engine which performs a full array of 
stability calculations that take less than 1 second. Then, the MCE module triggers the FMTCA’s 
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graphical engine and saves the results in a save case directory. The entire process runs automatically, 
without manual intervention from the Operator. 
The ability also exists both to repeat the stability calculations by changing the computational 
parameters, e.g., the percent security margin, load modeling assumptions, and tie-line injections 
filtering, and/or to display other calculation results, e.g., the impact of generators on the system’s 
stability conditions, and the system-wide P-V relationship. In addition, the real-time case is exported 
to the off-line LAN for subsequent contingency case calculations with PSS/E and their study-mode 
evaluation for voltage and steady-state stability violations with FMTCA. 
4.3.2.4 Distinguishing Features 
A distinguishing feature of the approach taken by NOS BIH is the ability to both continuously and 
automatically monitor, in real-time, the system’s distance to the maximum transfer capability and the 
security margin, and to manually display other results that can assist the Operator to maintain and 
enhance the system’s operating reliability  (Figure 4-8 ). 
 
An interesting by-product of this implementation is the ability to check the accuracy of the most 
recent state estimate. This is achieved by manually repeating the stability calculation in console 




Figure 4-8 Detailed Display of real-time stability monitoring at NOS. Operator’s console  
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4.3.3 Performance and Reliability 
The solution time of each FMTCA calculation is less than 1 second. However, a copy of the real-time 
case computed by the state estimator may or may not be available exactly at the beginning of the 5-
minute execution cycle. The delays, if any, in getting the input from the SCADA/EMS LAN may be 
due to a variety of factors and typically may range between 10 to 20 and, sometimes, up to 50 seconds 
-- but once the stability calculations were triggered, they converge almost instantaneously. The exact 
time of the state estimate is retrieved as a file time-stamp and is shown on the two-speedometer chart 
and on any other output displayed by FMTCA. 
The system has been in commercial operation since September 2005 and no reliability problems have 
been detected. Due to RTUs and/or communication channels unavailability, however, a converged 
state estimate may not always be available, in which case the MCE module alerts the operator that the 
5 minute interval scheduled for a new real-time stability run has elapsed without a calculation having 
been made. This, of course, is a system problem and is not specific to the FMTCA functionality. 
4.3.4 Planned Enhancements 
At the present time, Siemens and NOS BiH are working together to upgrade the current real-time 
stability solution and seamlessly integrate it with the new SCADA/EMS. One enhancement consists 
of controlling the execution of FMTCA from Spectrum, rather than from the PC. Another one, and 
extremely relevant, improvement consists of displaying the main computational results directly on the 
Siemens’ Spectrum user-interface. Finally, the ability will also be provided to trigger, automatically or 
at the Operator’s request, an FMTCA execution directly from the Dispatcher’s Power Flow program.  
In the new implementation, after completion of the stability calculations performed by FMTCA, the key 
output results will be uploaded into the SINAUT Spectrum real-time database and the current steady-
state stability reserve and security values will be stored as “calculated points” and subsequently shown 
on a trending chart with the standard SINAUT Spectrum SCADA trending facility. Additional tables 
and graphics will also be implemented on the SINAUT Spectrum’s user interface, thus providing the 
Operator with a single, consistent and uniform display environment. 
4.3.5 References 
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Ungureanu, B., “Computation and design of electrical energy systems” (Romanian edition), 
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4.4 State of the Art in Brazil - ONS  
 
4.4.1 Specific Requirements  




The installed capacity of the Brazilian power system is approximately 88.000 MW being 84% of 
hydro and 16% of thermal (coal, oil, nuclear and gas) generation.  There are 80,000 km of 
transmission lines (230 kV and above).  The peak load is around 57 MW.  The system is operated by 
the Operador Nacional do Sistema Elétrico – ONS.  
 





A power system model for studies at operational planning environment contains approximately 4000 
buses and 5600 branches, considering all voltage levels.   
 
Real Time Data 
 
Supervised data from the various utilities are concentrated in the regional centers and retransmitted to 
the main control center.  Therefore, the network represented at the main control center is more 
complete and suitable for dynamic security assessment.  However, all centers perform their own 
topology processing, state estimation and steady-state analysis.   
NEN 
SE
S Regional EMS 
Main EMS 
 
Figure 4-9  ONS control centers. 
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The supervised network (mainly 230 kV and above) currently results in estimated power flow cases – 
real time base case - containing approximately 1500 buses.  Installation of new RTUs and 
communication channels will increase the size of these cases to around 2000 buses.   
 
Real time base cases include almost all generation power plant and transmission lines of 345 kV and 
above.  Therefore, no dynamic equivalent is required, but similar generating units of a power plant are 
automatically aggregated for security assessment studies, which significantly reduces the size of the 
dynamic model.  Currently, there is no external system model coupled to the estimated network. 
 
A study is being conducted to validate the real time model (network and dynamic representations).  
The reference for this study is the model used for planning studies.  Also, need of improvements in 




Contingencies used in real time dynamic security assessment are typically the following: 
- Single-line-to-ground or three-phase-to-ground solid fault at a bus or in the middle of a 
branch followed by loss of one or two branches.   
- HVDC pole blocking.  
- Loss of generating units. 
 
Functionalities and Respective Results 
 
Six security assessment methods are required for the ONS DSA, as follows. 
- Operating Point Steady-State Contingency Analysis – This is the classical steady-state 
contingency analysis.  For this method four criteria must be checked and tabulated: thermal 
limit violation, voltage violation, voltage deviation and no power flow solution.  
Contingencies can be ranked according their respective severity.   
- Operating Point Dynamic Contingency Analysis – This is a dynamic contingency analysis.  
For this method nine criteria must be checked and tabulated: transient temporized voltage sag, 
transient instantaneous voltage sag, transient temporized voltage swell, transient 
instantaneous voltage swell, MW margin for critical generators and critical cluster, 
synchronous generator angular damping, transient angle deviation, steady-state angle 
deviation and frequency deviation.   
- Import-Export steady-state transfer limit between two-generation areas.  Boundaries must be 
given for the four steady-state criteria. 
- Import-Export dynamic transfer limit between two-generation areas.  Boundaries must be 
given for the nine dynamic criteria. 
- Steady-state security region computation - This is the set of secure power dispatch for three 
interconnected generation areas.  A security contour must be given for each steady-state 
criterion. 
- Dynamic security region computation - This is the set of secure power dispatch for three 





The DSA must offer the following resources for preventive corrective actions: 
- Ranking of voltage control resources (generator or shunt compensation) to correct voltage 
violation. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (amount and location) to alleviate thermal limit violation. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (amount and location) to avoid angular instability. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (location) to improve damping. 
- Suggested load shedding (amount and location) to move from alert/emergency states to secure 





In the first phase a loose integration is accepted.  Network state is exchanged by flat file, the DSA 
system runs asynchronously with EMS and the graphical user interface is the one implemented in the 
DSA system.  In the last phase, the DSA system access the EMS database to retrieve network data, 






Only observed network is currently modeled, but studies are being conducted to see if some not 
modeled low voltage parallel paths can significantly affect the assessment.  If this is the case, the state 
estimation process will be changed accordingly.   
 
As almost all power plant are modeled, there is no need of dynamic equivalent.  However, similar 
generating units in a power plant must be automatically aggregated by the DSA software.   
 
The dynamic model includes representation for hydro and thermal generation with respective controls 
(Governor, AVR, PSS, OEL and UEL), conventional and CCC HVDC, SVC, TCSC and loads.  
Utilities are responsible for validating the models and.  Relevant special protection schemes must be 
represented. 
 
4.4.1.3 Analytical Techniques 
 
There is no requirement for a specific technique, but results must be validated against regular power 




The DSA must access the host EMS database to retrieve network data and update assessment results.  
Dynamic models are not supported by the EMS database and, therefore, must reside in the DSA 
systems.   
 
4.4.1.5 Results Visualization 
 
Results must be displayed in tables, graphics, nomograms and power system single-line diagrams.   
 
4.4.1.6 Performance Requirements 
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Table 4-2 Case Summary 
Functionality Number of Contingencies Performance 
Static Contingency Analysis 100 < 5 s 
Dynamic Security Analysis 100 < 30 s 
Static Transfer Limit 10 < 5 s 
Dynamic Transfer Limit 10 < 30 s 
Static Security Region 10 < 1 min 
Dynamic Security Region 10 < 2 min 
4.4.2 General Description of DSA Implementation 
 
ORGANON© is the Dynamic Security Assessment system implemented in ONS [1].  It is an 
integrated environment for computing all aspects (e.g., voltage and angular stability) of power system 
security.  It is based on conventional tools (power flow calculation and time domain simulation), but 




To meet the performance requirements, ORGANON uses a distributed processing approach in a 
Manager/Workers (Master/Slaves) configuration.  The Manager process contains the high level 
instructions to do a security assessment functionality, Figure 4-10  .  The low-level instructions (solve 
a power flow problem, perform a time domain simulation, etc.) is done at Worker processes.  Then the 
Manager is responsible for generating base cases, distributing tasks among Workers, collecting the 
respective reports, communicating with external world, managing distributed resources, 
storing/displaying results and plots.  Workers receive tasks from Manager, process them using the 
specified power system simulation tool and send respective diagnosis in a report to the Manager 
 
Organon 













- Contingency Analysis 
- Transfer Limits 
- Security Region 
- Preventive Actions 
- Corrective Actions 
- Power Flow 
- Continuation Power Flow 
- Optimal Power Flow 
- Sensitivity Analysis 
- Time Domain Simulation 
- Energy Function 
- Prony Analysis 
 
Figure 4-10  Main components of the security assessment system. 
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The implementation uses a Windows platforms.  The system works with at least two processes (one 
Manager and one Worker) residing on a single or multi-processor hardware platform.  Ideally there 
should be one worker process per processor, but any other process per hardware configuration is 
allowed.   
 
Message Passing Interface – MPI standard is used for intercommunication among processes.  The 
hardware platform for the DSA system can consist of either a cluster of dedicated computers, a multi-
processor server or a set of PC’s in a general purpose LAN.   
 
The distributed processing environment system can work with any number of processors and can be 
scaled up or down to accommodate the workload of various functionalities and performance 
requirements.   
 
The system architecture is the same for both planning and real time environments.  The EMS 
connection is also available for planning applications, allowing analysis and assessment of cases that 
were captured as real-time snapshots. 
 








Required input data depend on used functionalities.  The main required information are the following. 
- Power flow base case. 
- Power flow contingency list. 
- Monitoring filters. 
- Generation groups. 
- Single line diagram. 
- Dynamic models. 
- Special protection scheme models. 
- Time domain simulation contingency list. 
- Sensitivity analysis data. 
- Criteria specification. 




ORGANON supports a vast library of dynamic models for synchronous machines and respective 
controls, HVDC, SVC, FACTS, ULTC, AGC, protection systems, etc.  Special protection schemes 
are user defined. 
 




ORGANON security assessment adopts the detailed modeling approach.  Therefore, it is based on 
power flow and time domain simulation methods.  However, it also contains simplified and faster 
methods for filtering and sensitivity calculations.   
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The basic requirements for the power flow and time domain simulation methods are reliability and 
accuracy.  For real-time implementations, performance is also critical.   
 
Power Flow Methods:  The power flow methods can represent up to 100,000 buses and 100 bus 
sections per bus.  Models for shunt compensation (continuous and discrete), phase shifters, on load 
tap changers, DC links (conventional and CCC), interarea interchange control and load are available.  
Extensive data checking facilities can be used.  The power flow computation method are the 
following. 
- DC power flow: This method is used only for initialization an contingency screening purpose. 
- Full-Newton power flow:  In this method all controls (OLTC, DC Link, etc.) are solved 
simultaneously by the Newton method. 
- Synthetic Dynamic Power Flow:  This is a very robust power flow method [3] in which most 
of controls are represented by synthetic dynamic models.  The formulation is such that if the 
solution exists and the problem is properly formulated, the solution is found.  This method is 
many times slower than the Newton method.  Therefore, it is only used when it is absolutely 
necessary to confirm the existence of a power flow solution.  
- Continuation Power Flow:  The tangent vector approach [4] is adopted for this 
implementation.  The continuation method is used for moving operating points in search of 
security borders or for computation of PV curves (maximum loadability). 
- Optimal Power Flow:  The primal-dual interior point method [5] is adopted for this 
implementation.  It is currently used to generate bases for near-real-time and days-ahead 
scenarios.  There are also plans for using it for contingency constrained optimization. 
- Sensitivity Analysis:  This is used to ranking controls for voltage and flow controls and 
estimate contingency severity.  
 
Time Domain Simulation Method:  The simulation method adopts the mixed ABM-BDF numerical 
integration method associated with variable-step-variable-order approach and simultaneous solution 
of algebraic and differential equations.  These characteristics allow improved performance (more than 
10 times faster) compared to the fixed time step approach and enhanced numerical stability.  
Simulations can be early terminated either by instability detection or steady-state convergence. 
 
Energy Function and Single Machine Equivalent Methods:  Individual numerical energy functions [6] 
and SIME [7] methods are used for energy margin computation. 
 





A security assessment system may consist of a simple operating point contingency analysis or a more 
complex functionality such as a contingency constrained security region computation.  The 
requirements depend mainly on the characteristics of the network, amount and type of remedial action 
schemes and operational practices.  But basically, a security assessment system must answer the 
following questions:  given an operating point, is the system in secure state (no criteria violation) 
considering credible contingencies (contingencies that have significant probability of occurring and 
may cause severe damages)?  If it is secure, it may be desirable to know how much some parameters 
can be changed (e.g., MW generation at specific power plants) so that the power system remains 
secure.  In other words, this is a measure of security robustness in a parametric space.  If it does not 
survive, we may want to know what needs to be done to prevent the problem?  ORGANON contains a 
set of main functionalities to answer those questions, as follows. 
 
A.  Operating Point Contingency Analysis 
 
For steady-state assessment the conventional load-flow (Full-Newton) is used.  The evaluated criteria 
can be voltage collapse, thermal limits, voltage drop and voltage deviation.   
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For dynamic assessment the time-domain simulation (Variable-Step-Variable-Order) is used.  The 
evaluated criteria can be stability margin, damping ratio, voltage sag, voltage swell, voltage drop, 
voltage violation, thermal limit, transient angular deviation, steady-state angular deviation and 
frequency deviation.  Special protection schemes can be considered in simulations.  
 
Sensitivity indices can be computed for estimation of security margins in a parametric space. 
 
B.  Security Limits in a Transmission Corridor 
 
This functionality consists of the import/export security boundaries in a particular corridor.  Two 
interconnected generation regions are defined.  Power is exchanged back and forth to search the 
security boundaries (import/export).  A boundary per criterion can be computed.  The available 




C.  Security Region 
 
This is similar to the security limit calculations, but now there are three-generation groups instead of 
two.  It is also possible to consider two-generation groups and a load group as a set of variable 
parameters.  The available criteria are the same as the contingency analysis. 
 
D.  Preventive/Corrective Actions 
 
Based on the result of the contingency analysis (static or dynamic), this functionality determines what 
actions can be taken to avoid/remove criteria violations.  As per ONS requirements, the following 
functionalities are provided. 
- Ranking of voltage control resources (generator or shunt compensation) to correct voltage 
violation. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (amount and location) to alleviate thermal limit violation. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (amount and location) to avoid angular instability. 
- Suggested MW re-dispatch (location) to improve damping. 
- Suggested load shedding (amount and location) to move from alert/emergency states to secure 
state. 
One important aspect to be emphasized here is the importance of results visualization, in particular for 
security region computations, as it automatically provides simple means of removing violations by 
moving the operating point in the generation/load plane (MW changes).   
 
F.  Base Case Builder 
 
ORGANON contains a module to build a base case for a future scenario based on load forecast, 
outage schedule and generation schedule.  Assuming the necessary information are available, the 
objective is to generate a load flow solution with no steady state criteria violation.  An optimal power 




A full graphical interface is available for data editing and output visualization.  This interface can be 
used for the standalone mode and loose connection to the EMS.  
 
OUTPUT AND VISUALIZATION 
 
For the standalone mode, all results are displayed in tables, graphics, nomograms and in single-line 
network diagrams.  For tight EMS connection the required output can be directed to the host database.  
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• ORGANON is designed to work either in planning and real-time environments.  In real time it 
can work in a cycling mode or upon user request.   
• There is an option to automatically translate real-time bus/bus section number and names into 
planning numbers and names.  
• Automatic calculation of equivalent reactor for single-line fault simulation is available. 
• Facilities for bus split/merge during simulation are available. 
 
4.4.5 Distinguishing Features 
 
ORGANON distinguishing features are the following. 
• Single-system-multi-purpose security assessment tool.   
• High performance full time-domain simulation. 
• High performance distributed processing. 
• Reliable processes and algorithms. 
• Static and dynamic security region computation. 
• Fast and reliable power flow solution methods. 
 
 




Figure 4-12  ORGANON security region nomorgram 
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4.4.6 Performance and Reliability 
 
The system is currently meeting the performance established in Section 4.3.1.6.  However, it is 
important to note that performance depends on factors such as assessment requirements and power 
system modeling and level of power system stress.  For example, if the power system dynamic model 
contains ill-defined controls (e.g., for AVR, governors, etc.) numerical integration performance 
degrades.  Similarly, power flow models with OLTC control conflicts generally require more 
iterations to converge.  Therefore, it is essential to make sure that models used in real-time 
applications are properly defined.  As a rough measure of ORGANON time domain simulation 
performance it can be said that for a 9000 bus / 1500 generator case, a 15 s simulation can be 
processed in 15 s using a 3 GHz  
 
4.4.7 Operating Experience 
 
An earlier version of some of the methods used in ORGANON has been implemented at British 
Columbia Transmission Corporation – BCTC, BC to calculate real-time static security regions.  This 
implementation entered commercial operation in 2005. 
 
ORGANON as herein described is in use in ONS planning environment (outage schedule and 
monthly schedule).  It is test phase in real-time at the main control center using a loose connection to 
the EMS.   
 
There is an on-going process for evaluation of ORGANON by major Brazilian utilities. 
 
4.4.8 Proven Benefits 
 
So far, there is no measurement of financial benefits.  For the ONS planning environment, 
ORGANON is allowing more comprehensive scenario assessments and speeding up the whole 
process.   
 
4.4.9 Planned Enhancements 
 
Visualization is an area users demand continuous enhancements.  Many output results currently 
displayed in tables will also be available in graphic formats. 
 
Connection of results to the single-line diagram are also being designed. 
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4.5 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Canada - Hydro-Québec  
 
This section presents current practices at Hydro-Québec dealing with Dynamic Security Assessment 
(DSA). 
 
4.5.1  Brief Summary 
 
For Hydro-Québec DSA and SSA are implemented and used in all power network activities. DSA is 
more than a simplistic computer computation, it is part of an integrated organizational structure and 
process. 
 
4.5.1.1 Hydro-Quebec’s DSA context 
 
The following provides some background relevant to the DSA requirements and implementation at 
Hydro-Québec. 
 
Hydro-Quebec’s network is a long radial network with some main 735 kV lines as a backbone 
transmission system. It is not synchronized to its neighborhood networks. This configuration, with 
moderate size, causes challenging dynamic stability and static situations to deal with. On the opposite 
side since there are few power lines, the transmission behavior is directly related to the number of 
equipments connected in real situation. From these two facts, we can understand the necessity for 
Hydro-Québec to do complete and thorough stability studies with detailed and precise dynamic 
models. Since it is a moderate size network we can do exhaustive simulation studies taking into 
account a finite number of power network configurations.  
 
In order to maintain a security level, we must take into account static and dynamic constraints in 
every Hydro-Québec’s operation planning and operational activities (production and transmission 
planning, maintenance scheduling, power network operation in the control room).  All of these 
activities need to be evaluated if there is no risk of constraint violation. 
 
Theses constraints have to be known exactly and rapidly in the preparation process and in real time 
situation. In less than a few seconds, from the precise power network state, all constraints, particularly 
for this power network state, are calculated and displayed. Also in study mode, any what if scenario 
can be simulated and evaluated. These strategic tasks are done by the Hydro-Québec’s DSA tool, 
called LIMSEL. This DSA system is the core for maintaining a secure state and knowing how any 
change can affect the level of security.  LIMSEL ensures a strong continuity and coherency between 
the operation planning and the operational activities. 
 
Inside LIMSEL, decision tables, based on the power system state, give all power transfer limits 
allowed to the different power transfer corridors. The power transfer limits are determined off-line 
after complex and complete dynamic and static studies. 
 
DSA’s philosophy: Mixed solution 
 
With the intrinsic dynamic complexity of the power network and long term requirement to find the 
optimal secure operational transfer limit, Hydro-Québec has chosen a mixed solution [1]. 
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First, in off-line studies, specific locations of key transfer observation points are determined. A 
thorough analysis gives the power transfer limits of the full network for each predefined 
configuration, along with additional restrictions associated with unavailable equipment in that 
configuration.  All power transfer limits results (with the impact of specific equipment) and the 
allowed configurations are given and stored in the software called LIMSEL [2]. 
 
Second, in on-line studies or during the planning process, the appropriate limits are determined by 
LIMSEL software automatically based on the expected power network topology and available 
connected equipment in the short term. This ensures that operators impose the right limits for each 
topology used. This task is automated because the computation of a set of limits (angular stability 
limits, voltage stability limits, thermal limits and different impacts of different equipments) using off-
line tools is complicated and time-consuming, and is beyond human ability for a set of numerous 
power network changes spanning only a short time horizon. 
 
This mixed solution has the advantage of accounting for the full experience of engineers, and at the 
same time gives flexible and rapid responses.  Security, reliability, and optimization criteria are 
quickly met thanks mainly to a long preparation process. Also, all the operation planning and 
operational processes are strongly coherent, relying on the same rules and constraints, and striving for 
the same optimal operational state. 
 
 
4.5.1.2 Power Network Characteristic: Challenging 
 
The HQ transmission system includes many long lines interconnecting separate areas with hydro-
electric power generation and load (see Figure 4-13 ). A large amount of power is transferred over 
735-kv series-capacitor-compensated transmission lines. Hydro-Québec’s 735 kV power transmission 
system was honored by receiving an IEEE milestone plaque2 on December 13, 2005 [3]. 
  
The current configuration, centered around Montreal, has developed over the years, first along a 
northeast axis, toward the Manicouagan and Churchill Falls generating facilities (12,000MW), and 
then along a northwest axis, toward the James Bay power stations (15,000 MW). The peak load is 
approximately 36,000 MW. 
 
Since most of the load is 1,000 km away from production area, there are large power transfers over 
only a few main transmission lines.  
 
Planners of this long, radial, high voltage power network have overcome critical challenges involving 
the following phenomena and constraints: 
• Voltage control  
• Voltage stability  
• Transient stability  
• Thermal limits  
• Post contingency voltage and power flow limits 
 
Due to theses constraints, Hydro-Québec’s Security Assessment must include Static and Dynamic 
security assessment (SSA and DSA as described in sections below). 
                                                     
2 The text inscribed on the plaque : First 735 kV AC Transmission System, 1965 
Hydro-Québec`s 735,000 volt electric power transmission system was the first in the world to be designed, built and operated at an 
alternating-current voltage above 700 kV. This development extended the limits of long-distance transmission of electrical energy. On 29 
November, 1965 the first 735 kV line was inaugurated. Power was transmitted from the Manic-Outardes hydro-electric generating complex 
to Montréal, a distance of 600 km. 
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Type of instability 
Depending on the topology of the network and the location of a disturbance, two main types of 
dynamic phenomena can lead to instability, either separately or together. These are transient stability 
phenomena in the generator area and voltage stability phenomena in the load area. The locations of 
the two stability areas on the network are shown in Figure 4-13 . 
 
From Security to Reliability issues 
Due to increasing demand, and in light of the radial structure of the Hydro-Québec network, the 
system had been seen to be vulnerable to many disturbances.  Over the last 15 years or so, new 
equipment, including new types of equipment, has been installed on the network to improve 
reliability, specifically by improving the stability performance of the system.  
 
Today, with series compensation, automatic controls and fast protection systems, the network system 
is more robust. The loss of synchronism can still occur, but only for very severe conditions. When 
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Figure 4-13 Schematic diagram of Hydro-Québec's main transmission system stability areas 
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these conditions occur, they are accompanied with high probability with mixed types of instabilities.  
 
The main limiting factor is becoming more and more the voltage levels and/or power swings seen at 
substations when the contingency occurs.  
 
Key issues: Preparedness and integration 
In response to the challenges brought on by this network, the organization of operational and planning 
functions must be well integrated.  The success of operating this power network day to day strongly 
depends on close and tight coordination between several issues involving the power network, 
maintenance needs, exchange scheduling, production planning and system controls.  
 
Daily operations schemes are prepared beforehand, based on off-line studies made at least one year, 
one month and one week previously.  
 
If new equipment is required in the network, studies begin with integration requirements. Once the 
best new additions are determined, operational studies evaluate the requirements for protection, 
control settings and measurements.  With a clear model of the resulting network, secure transfer limits 
are found.  Also for that network, maintenance schedules are prepared a year in advance, production 
and transmission equipment requirements are prepared a month in advance, and production and 
transmission schedules are prepared a week in advance taking network constraints into account. 
 
Behind all these activities is the use of a predetermined set of configurations and their transfer limit 
capabilities.   
 
Safe Network operation: respect of transfer limits of specific set of power transmission line 
configurations 
An essential condition to ensure reliable operation is to respect the stability characteristic of the 
network.  The robustness of the Hydro-Québec network is directly linked to the number of 
transmission lines connected.  As a rule of thumb, the removal of lines decreases the robustness of the 
network, but more precisely the ability of the network to transfer large amount of power safely and 
reliability depends on its specific configuration and the presence of specific equipment.  
 
One crucial efficiency factor:  knowing the stability margin of the operating configuration 
Although the stability issue is fundamental, another crucial factor is efficiency.  An adequate return on 
the high investment costs of power networks can only be achieved if it is used efficiently. The optimal 
efficiency is only reachable if the stability margins of the power network are known precisely. 
 
Stability study: Precise and detailed time domain simulation 
The maximum power transfer capability on a network can only be found with detailed studies using 
tools for assessing power flow and stability performance. The latter is based on time domain 
simulation fed by a set of contingencies and criteria.  
 
Finding transfer limits based on experience and the engineer’s know-how 
One challenging task is to find the optimal power transfer capability for a specific power network 
configuration. Some of the difficulties to be overcome are: 
 
• Stringent specific sets of criteria and contingencies are given as input, but are not sufficient to 
find an optimal solution.  Other conditions like weather, seasons, etc. affect the optimal solution. 
• The power network is in itself a complex system, with many interrelated components that 
influence stability-related behavior. The impact of these components has to be determined in 
order to set secure operation ranges. Here is where the engineer’s experience and know-how 
come into play.  The engineer contributes the following : 
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o From the multitude of simulation results, meaning is extracted and synthesized, taking 
into account prevailing conditions on each apparatus and automatic control.  
o This meaning is transferred into the control room through the use of practical directives. 
The underlying logical ideas are formulated clearly in order to be applied. 
o The past and the partially known future of the power network are accounted for in the 
evaluation of the stability analysis 
  
4.5.2 A Strategic Activity:  Defining transfer limits 
4.5.2.1 Operational Planning: respect of stability and security constraints 
 
Power network’s constraints 
 
To supervise the daily management of the transmission system, operating and transfer limit strategies 
have been established. These are intended to maintain the system’s security while seeking to offset the 
difficulties brought on by the operating constraints: 
 
• Maintenance outages 
• Stability limits (transient and voltage instabilities) 
• Thermal limits 
• Supply-load balance 
• Voltage control 
• Optimization of intertie transfer capacities 
• Risky weather period 
• Post contingency voltage and power flow limits 
 
Planning and operation studies are performed with a one year look-ahead period, and seek to optimize 
the use of the system. They must anticipate a wide range of operating situations, configurations with 
unexpected unavailability and/or the withdrawal of equipment for maintenance, in order to enable 
power transactions and production management.  
 
The severity of an event is directly related to the level of power being transferred when the event 
occurs, so operating strategies are based on a whole set of power transfer limits to be respected on the 
main transmission routes and DC installations. 
 
In addition, the overload capacity of the series capacitor banks and steady-state thermal limits on 
power lines impose additional constraints after the loss of a link. The supervision of the verification of 
these limits is provided by real-time software.  
 
The power transfer limits due to transient stability, voltage stability and thermal capacity are 
calculated in off-line studies for different topologies of the power network and integrated in real-time 
operation and in maintenance planning over different time periods. 
 
Since the HQ system is not synchronized with neighboring utilities, it does not have a strong inertia 
like that of the NPCC system, and therefore it has higher frequency sensitivity. In order to avoid large 
frequency deviations, real time operation determines, on-line, the generator reserves needed to 
adequately sustain the loss of the largest foreseeable production and load following an event. The 
control center room can impose the reduction of power transfers on specific radial transmission routes 
if the amount of power exchange is larger than generator reserve capacity. 
 
Also, during risky weather periods (lightning, geomagnetic storm, or ice storm), the amount of power 
transfer is reduced.  
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In summary, various constraints reduce the operating possibilities of the power network and 
determine the power transfer allowed. Some, like thermal limits, are updated in real time; others, like, 
stability limits are pre-determined in off-line studies. 
  
4.5.2.2 Power Transfer Limit Search 
 
The security of the Hydro-Québec system is assessed by anticipating likely conditions resulting from 




The principal objective of the power transfer limit and their associated operating strategies is to ensure 
a stable operational state of the power network with limited frequency deviation and adequate voltage 
control during specific, stringent and mandatory contingencies in order to maximize power transfer 
between production and load centers.   
 
Since the severity of these contingencies is directly related to the power transfer, the implementation 
strategy is based on a set of power limits allowed in the different corridors of the power network.  
 
Theses strategies specify the range of operation and the control actions allowed for different 
equipment and automatic controls. The action of special protection systems is also taken into account. 
 
Theses strategies cover a large range of configurations and numerous unavailability scenarios. 
 
Depending on the topology of the network and the location of the event, two main dynamic stability 
problems can occur separately or together, transient stability in the generator area, and voltage 
stability in the load area.  
 
Limits for a specific configuration should take into account, with a security factor, theses two types of 
instability phenomena following the most severe contingency as specified by criteria. The most severe 
contingency depends on the location and on the type of stability phenomenon considered. Also the 
impacts of equipment unavailability or of automatic controls are different and specific for each 
stability issue.  
 
To take into account these different issues and to facilitate the optimization of the power transfer, two 
complete sets of limits, for each subnetwork of the power network, are given with their own structure, 
for maintenance planning, control center operation planning and operations. In real time, or studying 
mode, the most limiting values are used and displayed to users by LIMSEL’s software. 
 
Moreover, each set of limits includes, in reality, a combination of specific limits coming from 
different set of contingency and criteria. For instance, in normal state, the transient limit in the Manic-
Quebec inter tie is the lowest power transfer limit values of, at least, three types of contingency with 




To organize transmission system maintenance, precise rules govern the authorized configurations 
during normal operating conditions.  In addition, to ensure sufficient coverage of likely system 
conditions created by the loss of a transmission line (forced outage condition), transfer limits are 
provided for these various conditions.  
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The set of configurations is based on different subnetwork part of the transmission network. This 
decomposition reduces the space of configuration and avoid the exponential increase of combination. 
Maintenance Configuration P:  configuration obtained as the result of the withdrawal of lines in 
accordance with the scheduling guide for the transmission system withdrawal plan.  This is the 
normal system condition. There are 114 maintenance configuration P in Hydro-Québec. 
Maintenance configuration plus the loss of a line P+1:  configuration caused by the unexpected 
tripping of a line.  Following this event, the system no longer respects one or more of the scheduling 
rules of the maintenance plan. This configuration represents 719 different cases in Hydro-Québec. 
Voltage Control configuration CT:  configuration required when line withdrawals not included in the 
maintenance plan are necessary to respect the voltage profile and operating ranges of the 
compensators on lightly loaded networks.  This practice is required by the characteristics of the 735-
kV system and the major variations in peak load in relation to off-peak loads.  The Hydro-Québec 
power system has been designed to satisfy a winter load that is three times larger than off-peak load. 
The voltage control configuration cases number 338 in Hydro-Québec. 
When a maintenance configuration is used, the system operator is assured that transfer limits and 
operating strategies exist for all configurations obtained as the result of a line tripping. 
It is important to note that when operations are being planned, the possibility of several configurations 
in which several lines can be out of service at the same time is anticipated.  These lines will be 
removed in accordance with the withdrawal plan for system maintenance. In relation to the full 
system (all lines in service), maintenance configurations (~150) allow the withdrawal of, for example, 
up to 10 lines at once, assuming one link out of service on each of the main transmission routes.  
Under real operating conditions, there can also be a large number of lines withdrawn simultaneously 
from the transmission system.  
Various other equipment can also be in maintenance (synchronous or static condensator, serie 
compensation bank, capacitive and inductive shunt reactors).  
Defining Limits 
At this time, establishing transfer limits (Figure 4-14 ) requires 
the use of substantial means and is performed entirely off-line.  
The pre-defined transfer limits are programmed in a software 
package called LIMSEL [1] (LIMSEL is in fact a table 
containing all the transfer limits associated with the various 
topologies of the power system and the unavailability of other 
strategic facilities such as synchronous condensors or static 
compensators, etc.).  In real time, the system is operated 
respecting the constraints displayed by LIMSEL, which vary 
according to the changes in the system configuration and the 
availability of strategic facilities.  When limits are exceeded, 
the system operator receives an alarm signal and makes the 
appropriate corrections to restore the network to a condition 
that again respects the security criteria. 
 
 
4.5.2.3 Standard Procedures 
When determining a power transfer capacity limit, engineers follows standard, written, procedures.  
Mainly there are three steps (planning, executing and implementation/diffusion). 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Process used to establish transfer limits 
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First step: Planning 
 
Before beginning the planning step, one must make a first request. This first request can be triggered, 
for instance, by one of the following condition: 
• Changing of operational criteria,  
• Modification of contingency list 
• Presence of new equipment 
• Change of the power network property 
• When the power transfer limits are considered insufficiently optimized or not sufficiently 
secure 
 
The planning process defines the work load, specific time domain simulations requirements, and a 
description of the mandate, and relies on the full knowledge of previous stability study methodologies 
and results.  
 
Second step: Execution 
 
This step requires doing complete, thorough stability studies and based on all derived information, 
modifying or defining a new decision table structure with its corresponding limit values. 
 
In more detail we have the following steps 
• Prepare the most suitable power network representation files (power flow and dynamic files) 
• Preliminary study : Based on mandatory contingencies, criteria and a configuration list, 
simulate the dynamic response of the power network under consideration to learn its typical 
behavior, characteristics or particularities 
• Thorough dynamic stability analysis: All pertinent electrical elements, such as voltage-
controlled automatic scheme to switch 735 kV shunt reactors and static excitation systems 
with high-ceiling excitation voltage and high-gain voltage regulator with power system 
stabilizer,  are evaluated by running sufficient simulations. Find the optimized power transfer 
limit based on the simulation results, taking into account all other important factors. 
• Determine what the best way to summarize the results.  
• Validate the work with co-workers and the future users in order to maintain a coherence with 
other power limits 
• Prepare the proposition, decision table structure 
 
Third step: Implementation  
 
Implement the new limits in LIMSEL with the control center engineer and diffuse the information to 
pertinent personnel. Finally, validate and verify that the implementation was done correctly.  
 
Along these tasks, engineers are supported by formal key steps check documentation. This 
documentation lists the main steps to be completed in order to succeed. 
 
4.5.2.4 Engineer’s Expertise and Knowledge Required 
 
Power limit calculations and optimization are a complex activity based on engineer’s expertise and 
knowledge 
 
Power network properties 
  
The power network has the following properties: 
• Many phenomena on many different time scales 
• Large diversity of dynamic responses 
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• Many nonlinearities and hysterisis phenomena that are difficult to analyze 
• Strong interaction and coupling between components 
• Mix of discrete and continuous time actions 
 
These complex properties can not be summarized in a familiar linear framework. The impacts of the 
various network components change depending on the power network state. It is therefore very 
difficult to determine an optimum.  
 
Large number of cases  
 
Even for a simple power network with 5 series compensated transmission lines, one power plant, 2 
types of instability, one specific fault and two states (normal and emergency), for full transmission 
lines,  100 cases must be studied. 
 
Many points to determine 
 
For each study case, engineers have to: 
• Find the initial condition state (voltage, load, generation)  
• Define the best qualitative criteria to make a judgment. There are mandatory criteria but they 
are not sufficient to give the optimum. Engineers use qualitative judgment in order to find 
the best solution. 
•  Search the relevant stress and observation points to be applied on the power network 
• Develop a personal search methodology. Some basic methodologies are well know and 
widely used, but still engineers need to define particular sensitivity studies, the parameters 
used in the studies, and other tests. 
• Analyze time domain results. This means  
o Check and verify the time-domain solution 
o Interpret that result and its consequence in taking account 
? Electrical conditions 
? Heuristic rules and specific knowledge 
? All previous results, sensibilities 
o Deduce the main implication of this result  
• Based on this result, determine what has to be done, what points need to be clarified and 
resolve them 




In the HQ power network, electrical responses change depending of the location and type of 
contingencies, and the seasonal period (load properties). Each location has its own particularities and 
specificities. There are no general rules. 
 
Cognitive capacity and implicit knowledge used 
 
For each study, a body of implicit knowledge, know-how, solving process, specific rational analysis 
and creativity are used by any engineer. 
 
The engineer seldom begins with blank knowledge. There is a huge historical body of knowledge 
available to him, giving critical information.  
 
Also the human being has the creativity to find a new path and to reduce the difficult problems to 
simple ones. 
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4.5.3 HYDRO-QUÉBEC’S on-line SSA 
 
On-line Steady State Security assessment 
 
In real-time using, the scheduled interchange and generating output values, equipment availability, the 
SCADA and the state estimator, real data information, steady state security assessment are evaluated. 
The most critical tasks are the following: 
 
Thermal limits are computed on selected transmission facilities (e.g lines, and power transformers) 
of the transmission network as a function of ambient conditions (temperature, wind velocity, solarity 
etc.). The current in all series compensation is also monitored. 
 
Station Topology Analysis evaluates the impact of potential station busbar or breaker faults on the 
power system topology and determines loss of important MW generation, load, or transmission 
capacity.  Multiple losses are also taken into account. 
 
Contingency Analysis analyzes network security from different contingencies (outages) and 
determines any violations. Contingencies mean single or multiple contingencies as equipment outages 
and/or switching status changes. Violation refers, for example, to load-flow limits violations (e.g 
branch amp/MVA, bus voltage, reactive power generation), overload equipments, exceeding 
maximum generation’s loss or load’s loss, bus splitting and islanding. Contingency analysis consists 
of three steps. First contingencies are adapted to the base case network of interest. It identifies and 
ranks the most critical contingencies from the list of contingencies. Finally, from a detailed power 
flow, analysis of the critical contingencies, gives the overloads and limit violations caused by each 
contingency 
  
4.5.4 HYDRO-QUÉBEC’S on-line DSA 
4.5.4.1 LIMSEL- On-line DSA tool in Hydro-Québec 
 
An efficient on-line software for the real time reliability monitoring and control of the power 
system 
 
Maintaining the reliability of the power system with respect to its steady state operation and 
particularly with respect to its ability to survive contingencies can be accomplished by applying 
preventive or corrective remedial actions. 
 
Preventive measures include enforcing equipment limits, restricting interface flows and restricting 
total generation output from particular sets of power plants. Corrective remedial actions executed by 
special protection systems include generator and load tripping, and automatic reactor or capacitor 
bank switching. 
 
The relevant parameters for remedial and corrective actions heavily depend on the actual 
configuration and the state of the power system and the set of credible contingencies to be considered. 
They are mainly determined by numerous off-line simulations, mainly transient and voltage stability 
analysis.  
 
The number and complexity of these studies has grown rapidly since more precise and less 
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Requirement to use this vast off-line knowledge in real-time and studying mode  
 
The knowledge to be collected from all these simulations has exploded as well. Therefore efficient 
processes and appropriate tools had to be designed to create, update, transform and store this vast 
amount of off-line information so as to rapidly retrieve it and to intelligently use it in real-time or in 




The development of LIMSEL (acronym meaning LIMit SELection) started at the end of 1970’s. A 
major revision and update was accomplished in the middle of 1990’s.  Figure 4-15 illustrates the 
principle under which LIMSEL works. 
 
LIMSEL is essentially a user friendly system, allowing operations personnel to complement and 
translate the results of the off-line studies and display them on-line. For this purpose, it contains 
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Figure 4-15 - Working principle of LIMSEL 
 
   4-46
and system variables (for example, generators, lines and substations as well as weather conditions and 
diverse information needed to determine the status of system protection).A specific power system 
condition corresponds to a specific set of transmission limits, system protection settings and 
operational restrictions for some system equipments. 
 
LIMSEL provides a fast access to that information. It also provides a summary of the sensitive 
elements and their impact on the limits or operating strategies. 
 
Use of LIMSEL 
 
In real-time, LIMSEL is used to supervise the actual power transfer on appropriate flow gates taking 
into account the status of all critical installations, and to establish the value of operating reserves. 
Rapid access to all information is provided using the SCADA system 
 
In study mode, for the next hours, LIMSEL is used to evaluate the impact of upcoming maintenance 
outages on transmission limits and operating reserve, and every 15 minutes to automatically update 
the operating reserve protection taking account planned outages and the most recent load forecast 
update. For the daily, weekly and monthly planning of maintenance outages, all security criteria 
including reliability margins has to be respected. 
 
 
4.5.4.2 Software Description: architecture and functional components 
 
Real time environment 
In the real-time environment, LIMSEL receives all real-time power network data (including network 
telemetry measures and signals. From these data, LIMSEL can accomplish more than just finding the 
corresponding transfer limits in different transmission corridors as shown in Figure 4-16 .  For 
instance, if any forbidden configuration is present, alarms ring and LIMSEL sends a message to 
operators with the appropriate remedial action information. 
Moreover LIMSEL transmits in real time all settings of generator tripping and load shedding. These 
settings define the amount of tripping in different power plants and the amount of load shedding for 
different load.  
Because of its critical responsibilities in system operation, LIMSEL has interfaces with other major 
control-room applications. For instance, it is connected to RPTC, the Generator rejection and remote 
load shedding system, a major special protection systems (SPS). Other applications are shown in the 
above picture. 
LIMSEL keeps a direct link with the state estimator’s contingency analysis in order to check any over 
current in series compensation banks or in transformers when there is a loss of a power transmission 
line. This relation permits the increase of the real time power limits.   
Mandatory operation rules require having power limits specific to different time periods. For instance, 
to evaluate the amount of production needed for a specific time, it is necessary to calculate power 
transfer limits for that specific time. It is why LIMSEL also serves as a maintenance planning tool.  
Finally, there is also a connection with OASIS (Open Access Same Time Information System), which 
gives all total transmission capabilities (TTC) depending on the equipment outages.  
 
Human-computer interface 
A main screen shows the operator all applicable values of power transfer limits for every 
transmission. On the same screen, LIMSEL displays relevant messages to the operator or gives the 
data status coming from other applications related to LIMSEL. 
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For each power limit calculation, the operator can visually see all the restrictions which were applied 
on the basic value. The operator can therefore easily identify constraints and determine corrective 
actions. 
 
Study mode  
LIMSEL can not only work in real-time but also is used in study mode by outage coordinators to 
prepare the planning outage schedule for the next days or months. The software can work with a 
fictitious (future) network and evaluate the impact of the outage of specific equipment on power 
transfer limits. LIMSEL is able to build a network for a specific date and hour and calculate power 
limits taking into account the planned maintenance service of equipment. This study mode provides 
the possibility to make better decisions and to optimize with respect to security criteria. 
A day-to-day study mode is available to the operator. For instance after any event on the power 
network, the operator can evaluate the impact of the next planned outage. The operator can recall the 
actual configuration and change the equipment outage status and see the new power limits. 
Through the years, LIMSEL has become indispensable for operating and planning the power network 
in real time. Thanks to its great flexibility, it is not only used to ensure security but also contributes 
many tasks related to operation. 
4.5.5 Performance and Reliability 
System performance and reliability 
The pilot program (shell) of the software runs each fives seconds on two servers and takes 
 
Figure 4-16 DSA Architecture 
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automatically the latest update information coming from 8 000 measurement and signal points 
necessary to calculate the new limits and the new RPTC settings values.  
There are at least 500 decision tables available in real-time, taking into account the complexity of 
conditions and strategies. It would be a very difficult task to operate the system without the support of 
this high level software. Sixty four study modes are possible and can be used simultaneously in real-
time by different persons responsible for managing the system. 
Since it is a critical element of this system, LIMSEL’s servers are redundant. Also, there is another 
identical copy of LIMSEL available in the back-up control room if, for an exceptional or emergency 
case, the normal control room would be unavailable. 
4.5.6 Operating Experience 
 
Successful experience with LIMSEL and the power limit calculation activities spans more than 20 
years. It has increased number of different transfer limits and ability to handle complex situations. The 
LIMSEL’s user-friendly environment and fast respond has allowed us to define more tasks. During 
this long period of time no incidence has happened.  
4.5.7 Proven Benefits 
 
During the last two decade, LIMSEL has shown its strategic role in operating Hydro-Quebec power 
system. We summarize some points showing its proven benefits: 
• Many years of day to day experience : 
o go through thousand of situations with no incidence 
o use by many people with different responsibility 
o ability to tackle from few strategies to numerous, complex, strategies 
o became a requirement for a secure operation of power system 
• It has offered several qualities: 
o flexibility 
o relatively fast response  
o robustness 
o reliability 
o provides variety of responses 
o shows historical continuity  
o shows coherence between the power limit value provided for planning and operation 
activities 
o can be used in risk management 
 
4.5.8  Planned Enhancements 
 
LIMSEL’s core structure will not see any major change in the near future, but a few enhancements are 
planned. First, LIMSEL will calculate the thermal capabilities of transformers and lines for 10 and 30 
minutes periods. Secondly, the capability will be provided to make comparison tests possible in order 
to verify the impact of modified strategies. Thirdly, an on-line documentation link between LIMSEL 
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4.6 State-of-the-Art of DSA in China – CEPRI  
In the past years, the scale and complexity of power system is increasing drastically in China, which 
has driven the need for more powerful tools to permit fast and on-line simulation of the system’s 
dynamic behavior. Transient stability simulation is an effective tool to analyze power system 
dynamic phenomena, and when combined with the use of parallel processing, can be used in a real-
time mode for on-line dynamic security assessment. 
The China Electric Power Research Institute (CEPRI) has developed a platform for the parallel 
simulation of  electromechanical transients that is based on the use of a parallel computing, (PC 
cluster), whose computer nodes are PCs interconnected using a 100M Ethernet network as shown in 
Figure 4-17 . The system has been developed and applied to the real-time electromechanical 
simulation of the large-scaled power grid. Every PC of the cluster can be configured with double 
CPU, memory and hard disk, and can carry out computation and I/O dependently. The 
communication of every PC is through Myrinet or internet. The control and computation is 
commanded by the control computer.  
The system consists of PC cluster, simulation software, and an MMI.  To deal with the parallel linear 
algebraic equation solution, which is one of the most difficult parts in transient stability simulation. 
the project used Gauss-Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel iterative methods in parallel-in-time. According to 
the requirements of parallel power system electromechanical transient simulation, the criteria of 
power network portioning are set. On the basis of Contour Tableau method, by optimizing the 
constructing process of the contour tableau, a practical power network portioning method for parallel 
processing of power system simulation is developed and is shown in Figure 4-18  . Based on the 
method, the parallel electromechanical transient simulation is developed. The interconnected 
network of Northeast China, North China, Central China, Sichuan and Chongqing can be included in 
the dynamic security assessment.  
 
Figure 4-17 The PC cluster of the DSA 
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The system has the following functions:  
? Power flow serial and parallel 
computation. 
? Fault analysis for the power system 
? Dynamic simulation for the high voltage 
DC and AC system, which can includes 
10,000 nodes. 
? Interface of parallel computer with the 














































Figure 4-18 Sequence of parallel operations for the Gauss-Jacobi 
methods. 
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4.7 State-of-the-Art of DSA in China – Guangxi Electric Power 
Grid 
 
The Guangxi on-line dynamic security assessment system (Guangxi On-line DSA) was jointly 
developed by Guangxi Power Grid Company, Nanjing Automation Research Institute, and Powertech 
Labs Inc. This system was commissioned in 2004. It is designed to provide the advanced on-line DSA 
capability to monitor the Guangxi Power Grid and to assess its transient and voltage security.  
 
Guangxi Power Grid is a provincial power grid in southern China. It is located in the midway of 
southern China interconnected system. Presently, there are more than 30 500 kV AC lines and more 
than 120 220 kV AC lines in Guangxi area and the system peak load is about 7,000 MW.  There are 
two important features in the Guangxi grid. Firstly, the 500 kV AC lines in Guangxi and two 500 kV 
bipolar DC links across Guangxi make the major part of the “Power Transmission from West to East” 
project of southern China, which routinely transfer more than 8,000 MW of power from the two 
western provinces with rich hydro and coal generation to supply the huge power demand in the 
southeastern Guangdong province (the economical center of southern China). This power transfer 
path is more than 1000 km, and the reactive power support of the AC system is mainly provided by 
the power plants in Guangxi. Secondly, more than half of the generation capacity is hydro located far 
from the load centers. Obviously stability is a major issue for systems with such features and the 
problem will be of more concern as the grid is undergoing rapid expansion to meet fast load increase. 
 
4.7.1 Features of Guangxi Online DSA 
1. An extensive set of security criteria including transient stability, damping, transient voltage and 
frequency excursions, and post-contingency steady-state voltage profiles. The credible 
contingencies can be sorted with any security criterion and shown to system operators. Critical 
contingencies can therefore be easily identified for specific operating condition. 
2. If a contingency is identified as insecure, the on-line DSA will further evaluate the emergency 
control actions available and suggest to the operators the appropriate control action. 
3. The list of contingencies to be analyzed can include the must-run contingencies prepared off-line 
and the conditional contingencies prepared on-line. The conditional contingencies are created 
automatically, based on specific powerflow conditions and other criteria. 
4. Important system conditions and the associated DSA cases are archived automatically, so as to 
allow the off-line analysis of critical system conditions to help gain insightful understanding of 
the system behavior. 
5. Key system condition and DSA results are posted on the company’s intranet. Authorized users 
can examine such information in real time using web browser at any location inside the intranet. 
 
This system has been in operation for more than two years (including trial operation). Some 
experiences as well as concerns of implementation are provided here. 
 
4.7.2 Computation speed 
Presently, the on-line system model contains about 2400 buses and 250 generators (including some 
external equivalents). At the normal condition, 7 Dell 2650 servers are designated for DSA 
computations (6 for transient stability and 1 for voltage stability). The DSA system is able to complete 
the entire assessment cycle for 80-100 contingencies within 7 minutes (in TSAT, each contingency is 
simulated to 10 seconds). It can be seen that for such a medium size power grid system, the 
computation speed is not a bottleneck anymore. The computation requirements can be easily reached 
using low cost hardware. And since the technique of Cluster of Workstation is deployed, the hardware 
platform of the DSA system is flexible and reliable, it is easy to be expanded or upgraded and 
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maintenance is not difficult either.  
 
4.7.3 External system observability 
Because the accesses to the semi-real-time information of neighbor provinces are not available, 
‘Power Flow Matching’ method has been used. Several typical power flow cases of the whole 
southern China interconnected system are prepared off-line. The DSA system chooses the suitable 
case to match the semi-real-time power flow of Guangxi Power Grid based on the tie line power flow, 
load condition and season etc., and makes a new power flow as the base for simulation. But here the 
difficulty is that Guangxi Power Grid is strongly coupled with neighbor power grids. Especially, it is 
in parallel operation with two big HVDC links, whose sending ends and receiving ends are close to 
the boundary of Guangxi, but the DSA system doesn’t have the accesses to their semi-real-time 
information. This has made many troubles to the DSA system. It seems to us that for such a grid 
which is strongly coupled with external system, without having the essential semi-real-time 
information of the external system, it is very difficult to make a reliable power system model on-line.  
 
4.7.4 Making suggestions on preventive action 
If the DSA system finds that the system condition is insecure, the operators want suggestions on two 
kinds of control actions: preventive actions and emergency control actions. The emergency control 
actions are only taken after the disturbance occurred and are mostly taken by automatic special system 
protections, so the options are limited and it is not difficult for the DSA system to evaluate them and 
make suggestions. On the other hand, preventive actions change the power flow and theoretically 
there are infinite possibilities, it is very difficult for the DSA system to choose the preventive action 
and evaluate it.  
 
4.7.5 Visualization and interactive interface 
In many cases, the operators want to do further analysis on an online case. Mostly, it is because the 
DSA system has shown that the system is insecure and the operator wants to take some preventive 
actions, and it is preferred to test such actions beforehand. Currently, this can be done by downloading 
the archived online case and using offline software to do analysis in a conventional power system 
analysis engineer’s way, but there are still challenges to be faced, 
 
(1) The current display modes of transient stability programs can not provide the user an overall 
view of the system condition, unless the user is an (very) experienced power system analysis 
engineer. It prevents the operators from easily and rapidly finding out preventive solutions of 
insecure system conditions. It may be necessary to think outside the conventional transient 
stability analysis box, find new ways to organize and present the information from the 
simulation. They may include: a new way to display the oscillations on system diagram with 
various zoom levels; a new way to display dynamic voltage variations on system diagram; a 
new way to display dynamic power flow variations on system diagram; a new way to display 
the critical generators on system diagram, it may need the help of eigenvalue analysis. 
 
(2) How to incorporate an interactive DSA interface into the EMS interface? The DSA data sets 
may need to be integrated into the graphical database of the EMS. The operator should be 
able to modify the DSA power flow on the same interface as in the Operator Power Flow, as 
well as to use the graphical interface to change the parameters of equipments, set the 
contingency, run the simulation and show the results.  
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4.8 State-of-the Art of DSA in Europe: The European OMASES 
Project 
4.8.1 General description 
 
OMASES stands for “Open Market Access and SEcurity assessment System”.  This project involved 
a consortium of Industries, Research Centers, Universities and System Operators and was sponsored 
by the European Union [1]. 
 
The scope was to provide Energy Management System (EMS) operators with a tool for Dynamic 
Security Assessment (DSA) to be used on-line during the normal cycle of real-time operation, in 
operational planning and as a dispatcher training simulator including a simulation of the deregulated 
electric market environment. DSA is realized through different application functions: Transient 
Stability Assessment (TSA), Voltage Stability Assessment (VSA), Training Simulator (TS) and 
Market Simulator (MS), which can also perform independently from each other [2], [3].  
 
The OMASES technical aims were: to provide a transparent methodology to assess the network 
dynamic stability, to increase the power flow on electrical lines by computing dynamically operating 
limits, to reduce the incidents resulting from stability problems by simulating dynamic contingencies, 
to improve the generation allocation by computing the unit commitment in accordance with the 
dynamic limits and the electrical market demand, to adjust emergency protection to more accurate 
values either off line or on line (according to field equipment capabilities), and to provide advanced 




Simply stated, OMASES is a tool including some DSA application functions, making use of a 
powerful training simulator, including market aspects and capable of proposing preventive remedial 
actions.  
 
OMASES can be inserted into an existing EMS or engineered into a new EMS structure. The 
following modes can be activated:  
 
1. Real-time mode. The EMS feeds OMASES with network data and solutions. DSA is synchronized 
with data reception from the EMS and cyclically runs with a period of activation in the range 10-
30 minutes (typically 15 minutes). 
 
2. Engineering mode. It is the off-line application of TSA and VSA studies involving or not the 
market environment. The user launches the execution of OMASES-VSA (TSA) manually. The 
data used may be either the real-time data or saved snapshots retrieved from the historical 
database by the user. A network solution stemming from the EMS state estimator or from a power 
flow program (saved cases) can thus be retrieved from the database dedicated to study mode, and 
used to initialize a VSA (TSA) study. This mode is also referred to as study mode, while an expert 
mode is also available, in which the experienced users can have access to more analysis tools. 
 
3. Training mode. The operator gets used with the DSA tools and power system dynamics, performs 
analysis (future scenarios, post-event analysis, etc.) of the existing electrical system and/or 
experiments. In this mode, market rules can be used to realistically affect on the operational stage. 
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TSA and VSA are quite mature methodologies and techniques at least in the Engineering mode. 
Efforts have been done in this project to make them fully available in the real-time mode and to 
include them into realistic training sessions. TS and MS are very much related to existing power 
system simulator and to specific market. Therefore, within OMASES, the MS is intended to provide 
credible scenarios for subsequent TS and DSA activities. 
 
The OMASES applications run in a distributed WINDOWS environment, with a link to the host EMS 
from which real-time snapshots of the network are obtained. The architecture includes (see Figure 
4-19 ): 
a server hosting any shared information, the relational database, the message system, etc. This server 
is totally separate from the computer system running the EMS platform; 
• an appropriate server (even in parallel computing configuration) for each Application Function 
(TSA, VSA, MS, TS); 
• computers to be used by operation personnel as user interfaces; 





The integration of the OMASES platform into an existing environment is easy. The communication 
between the EMS and OMASES computers is accomplished with text files loaded by the EMS 
computer onto the OMASES server. In fact, the DSA functions are triggered automatically by the 
transfer of data files from the EMS system into a predefined entry directory of the OMASES server. 
The transferred data consist of 14 text files containing the latest network solution computed by the 
state estimator. Each file is a description of a class of EMS components (e.g. substations, nodes, 
buses, lines, transformers, generators, loads, etc.) and corresponds to a table in the relational database.  
 
If the EMS cycle is shorter than the DSA cycle (a very uncommon situation), the DSA process is not 
interrupted; new EMS data set will be loaded as soon as the previous DSA cycle finishes. The DSA 
results are stored in the database when the analysis is completed and a WEB-based user interface is 
























Figure 4-19 OMASES Architecture 
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4.8.3 Functional Components 




SIME (for SIngle-Machine Equivalent), is a hybrid direct-temporal transient stability method [4]. 
 
Basically, SIME replaces the dynamics of the multi-machine power system by that of a suitable One-
Machine Infinite Bus (OMIB) system. By refreshing continuously the OMIB parameters and by 
assessing the OMIB stability via the equal-area criterion, SIME provides an as accurate transient 
stability assessment as the one provided by the multi-machine temporal information and, in addition, 
stability margins and critical machines. In other words, SIME preserves the advantages of the 
temporal description (flexibility with respect to power system modeling, accuracy of transient stability 
assessment, handling of any type of instability (first or multi-swing, plant or inter-area mode)), and, in 
addition, complements them with functionalities of paramount importance. One of them is generation 
control (generation rescheduling for preventive control, generation shedding for emergency control), 
which uses the knowledge of stability margins and critical machines. Indeed, the amount of 
generation to shift (or shed) depends on the size of the stability margin, and the generators from which 
to shift (or shed) are the so-called critical machines.  
 
The temporal information that feeds SIME may be provided either by a Time-Domain (T-D) 
simulation program or real-time measurements. This yields respectively the P-SIME (for “preventive 
SIME” and the E-SIME (for “emergency SIME”). Nevertheless, conceptually, the core of the method 
is the same. In what follows we first assume that SIME is fed sequentially by samples of the multi-
machine swing curves. The intrinsic characteristics of P-SIME will then be described. Finally, 
description of the E-SIME will be given in Section 5. 
 
SIME Method and Features 
 
To analyze an unstable case (defined by the pre-fault system operating conditions and the contingency 
scenario), SIME starts receiving samples of the swing curves as soon as the system enters its post-
fault configuration. At each new sample, SIME transforms the multi-machine swing sample into a 
suitable One-Machine Infinite Bus (OMIB) equivalent, defined by its angle δ, speed ω, mechanical 
power Pm, electrical power Pe and inertia coefficient M. (All OMIB parameters are derived from 
multi-machine system parameters [4].) Further, SIME explores the OMIB dynamics by using the 
equal-area criterion (EAC). The procedure stops as soon as the OMIB reaches the EAC instability 
conditions expressed by 
 
( ) 0=ua tP     ;    ( ) 0>ua tP&      (1) 
 
 
where, Pa is the OMIB accelerating power, difference between Pm and Pe, and tu is the time to 
instability: at this time the OMIB system loses synchronism, and the system machines split 
irrevocably into two  
 
groups: the group of “advanced machines” that we will henceforth refer to as the “critical machines” 
(CMs), and the remaining ones, called the “non- critical machines”, (NMs). The “advanced 
machines” are the CMs for up-swing instability phenomena, while for back-swing phenomena they 
become NMs.  
 
Thus, at tu SIME determines: 
• the CMs, responsible of the system loss of synchronism;  
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uaccdecu MAA ωη −=−=  .     (2) 
 
Figures Figure 4-20 to Figure 4-22   illustrate the above definitions on a stability case of the 88-
machine EPRI system [5], [6], [7]. More precisely, Figure 4-20 portrays the multi-machine swing 
curves provided by the ETMSP program, stopped respectively at “the time to instability”, tu, (unstable 
case) and at the maximum integration period (5 s; stable case). The symbol PC used in the captions 
denotes the total power of the group of critical machines. Time tr indicated in Figure 4-20 is defined 
by the stability conditions 
 
 
( ) 0=rtω     ;    ( ) 0<ra tP .     (3) 
 
 







δη  .      (4) 
 
Figure 4-21 portrays the equivalent OMIB swing curves, while Figure 4-22   represent, in the δ-P 
plane, the evolution with δ of powers Pm and Pe. To simplify, Figure 4-22   (b) displays only part of 
the evolution of the electrical power Pe. 
 
SIME’s salient parameters and properties 
 
1.- Calculation of stability margins, identification of the critical machines and assessment of their 
degree of criticality (or participation to the instability phenomena) are parameters of paramount 
importance. 
 
2.- The “time to instability”, tu, is another important factor. It indicates the time an unstable 
simulation is stopped, and measures its severity.  
 
3.- Similarly, the “time to first-swing stability”, tr, indicates the time where the system is identified 
as first-swing stable. If multi-swing instabilities are not of concern, it can be used as an early 





     
 
(a) Unstable case: PC = 26,162 MW (b) Stable case: PC = 25,377 MW 
 
 Figure 4-20 Multi-machine swing curves. Ctg # 11 applied to the EPRI system [5]. Critical clearing time: 69 ms; clearing time: 95 ms 




      
 












4.- Under very unstable conditions, it may happen that the standard margin does not exist, because the 
OMIB Pm and Pe curves do not intersect (there is no post-fault equilibrium solution). A convenient 
substitute is the “minimum distance” between post-fault Pm and Pe curves. Figure 4-23  illustrates this 
substitute margin under particularly stressed conditions. Note that here the “time to instability” is the 






(a) Multi-machine swing curves (b) OMIB δ-P curves 
 
Figure 4-21 OMIB swing curves. Ctg # 11 applied to the EPRI system [5], [7] 
Figure 4-22   OMIB d-P curves. Ctg # 11 applied to the EPRI system [5], [7] 
Figure 4-23  Example of a severely stressed case: Ctg # 1b applied to the EPRI system [5], [7]. Clearing time = 95 ms; PC 
= 5600 MW 
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5.- A very interesting general property of the stability margins (standard as well as substitute ones) is 
that they vary quasi- linearly with the stability conditions [4]. Figure 4-24  illustrates the margin 
variation with the total generation power of the group of critical machines, PC. The proposed control 
techniques benefit considerably from this property. 
 
Transient stability control: Principle 
 
To stabilize an unstable case (defined by the pre-fault operating conditions and the contingency type 
and clearing scenario), SIME furnishes the following two-part information. 
 
• Size of instability (margin) and critical machines along with their degree of criticality or 
involvement; the degree of involvement of a critical machine is proportional to its angular 
deviation, d, assessed at tu. 
• Suggestions for stabilization. These suggestions are obtained by the interplay between 
OMIB–EAC (Equal-Area Criterion) and time-domain multi-machine representations, 
according to the following procedure: 
 
Stabilizing an unstable case consists of modifying the pre-contingency conditions until the stability 
margin becomes zero. According to EAC, this implies increasing the decelerating area and/or 
decreasing the accelerating area of the OMIB δ-P  representation. Plot (a) in Figure 4-22   (suggests 
that, in turn, this may be achieved by decreasing the OMIB equivalent generation power. Ref. [4] 
derives a relationship between the margin  η and the amount of the OMIB generation decrease, 
ΔPOMIB:  
 
 η = f(ΔPOMIB.).      (5) 
Further, Ref. [4] shows that to keep the total consumption constant, the following multi-machine 









PPPPP                                                (6)  
 
where ΔPC and ΔPN  are the changes in the total power of the group of critical and non-critical 
machines, respectively.  
 
Application of eqs (5) and (6) provides a first approximate value of ΔPC. 
 
Remark. Obviously, generation re-dispatch is corroborated by engineering reasoning: to stabilize a 
system, bring the machines’ angle trajectories closer to each other. However, SIME provides 
Figure 4-24  Typical variation of the standard stability margin and of its substitute with PC. Drawn on the EPRI system. Ctg. # 
1b. [5], [7] 
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important additional information: it quantifies the amount of generation to be shifted and determines 




Recall that the preventive SIME gets information from contingency simulations performed by a time-
domain (T-D) program in order to set up a unified approach to transient stability 
• Analysis 
• Contingency screening and ranking 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• Transient oscillations damping analysis and control 
• Preventive control. 
Analysis, and sensitivity analysis matters are described in detail in [4]. On the other hand, Ref. 
[6] gives an in-depth account of contingency screening and ranking approaches. Below we essentially 
focus on control, which is one of the most important assets of SIME. 
 
Iterative stabilization procedure 
 














For a given negative (unstable) margin η0: 
• decrease the total initial power of the critical machines PC0 by ΔPC0 to get the new power PC1 = 
PC0 - ΔPC0, using either eqs (5), (6) or a small percentage of the initial generation;  
• increase by the same amount the total active power of the non-critical machines; 
• perform successively a power flow to compute the new operating conditions, and a stability 
run to compute the corresponding stability margin, η1, and 
if η1 = 0, stop, otherwise perform a linear interpolation (or extrapolation as appropriate), to 
get a first-guess power limit PCLim , then go to step (i) and decrease or increase the active 
power of the critical machines, as appropriate. 
 
Generation rescheduling patterns 
 
Expression (6) suggests that there exist numerous ways of distributing the total power change ΔPN 
among non-critical machines. In addition, whenever there are many critical machines, there exist 
numerous patterns for distributing ΔPC among them [4], [5]. 
 
Concerning distribution of generation among non-critical machines, the patterns may be dictated by 
various objectives, related to market or technical considerations; for example, one may seek for 
maximum transfer capability on a given corridor. 
 
In the absence of particular constraints or objectives, the total generation power could be distributed 











Figure 4-25  SIME-based stabilization procedure. Ctg #11; conditions of Figure 4-20  
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using an optimal power flow (OPF) program. 
 
Further, instead of stabilizing individually each “unstable contingency” one can design a pattern able 
to stabilize all harmful contingencies simultaneously. The principle is simple: to stabilize 
simultaneously many harmful contingencies having in common (some) CMs, apply the most 
constraining power shift, imposed by the severest contingency, to these common CMs only. The 
simultaneous stabilization may comply with various patterns, just like individual stabilization. 
 
Transient Stability-Constrained OPF 
 
Several attempts have been made to imbed transient stability constraints within OPF. According to the 
way of handling these constraints, two different approaches may be thought of: the “global” and the 
“sequential” one. 
• Global approach. A time-domain (T-D) simulation is run. The power system transient 
stability model is converted into an algebraic set of equations for each time step of this 
simulation. The set of non-linear algebraic equations resulting from the whole T-D simulation 
is then included in the OPF as a stability constraint, forming a (generally huge) single non-
linear programming problem (e.g., see [8], [9]). 
• Sequential approach. A T- D simulation is run. The transient stability constraints are directly 
converted into conventional constraints of a standard OPF program, e.g., active generation 
power. Hence, they do not affect the size of the power system model and the complexity of 
the OPF solution method. They can use any conventional OPF program (e.g., [10]). 
 
SIME-based sequential approach 
 
In principle, the SIME-based transient stability-constrained techniques may comply with either of the 
above approaches. Below we describe the sequential approach for the reasons advocated in [10] and 
for the following additional ones. (i) While in theory this approach cannot guarantee optimality, in 
practice it provides near optimal solutions, thanks to SIME’s multi-faceted information. (ii) The 
sequential approach may easily comply with market requirements thanks to the flexibility of choice 
among CMs and NMs on which generation can be re-dispatched. (iii) The approach can easily be 
adapted to auction market software different from the OPF program. 
 
Figure 4-26 illustrates the principle of the sequential approach. Its various steps are summarized as 
follows.  
 
• The TSA block identifies the harmful contingencies and sends the appropriate information 
(operating conditions along with CMs and margins) to the transient stability control (TSC) 
block for stabilization.  
• This block computes the amount of power to be shifted from CMs, and sends this information 
to the OPF block, which compensates for this change by re-dispatching an almost equal 
generation on NMs.  
• The resulting new operating condition is sent to the TSA block, which tests its stability with 
respect to the contingencies of concern. If the case is found to be still unstable, the 
contingencies and their information (CMs and margins) are sent again to the TSC block; 
otherwise, the procedure stops. 
 
Transient oscillations damping assessment and control 
 
Today, online transient oscillations damping is becoming an issue of great concern, with the trend to 
include damping techniques as part of a transient stability function.   
 
The Prony method (single or multi-channel), may analyze one or several (up to, say, 15) generator 
swing curves at a time. However, the quality of the analysis depends strongly on the number and 
proper identification of the relevant generator curves, whereas, generally, their number may exceed 
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the algorithmic possibilities, and their identification may be far from obvious. This may create serious 
difficulties when dealing with real-world power systems. SIME allows one to circumvent these 
difficulties by applying single channel Prony analysis to the OMIB curve. Besides, by identifying the 
system machines that have a major influence on the oscillatory phenomena, it easily determines the 
dominant modes of oscillation. Last but not least, it provides control techniques, able to improve 
transient oscillations damping.  
 
Reference [11] proposes such a SIME-based analysis and control of transient oscillations damping 
(both plant and inter-area modes). 
 
Functionalities of P-SIME 
 
The tight coupling of the T-D program with the OMIB allows SIME to preserve the assets of these 
programs, namely, 
• Accuracy 
• Flexibility with respect to power system modeling, contingency scenarios, modes of 
(in)stability 
• Compliance with existing operational strategies. 
 
At the same time, the contingency screening techniques allow speeding up the assessment of T-D 
methods, while broadening substantially their possibilities. In particular, by designing preventive 
control actions, thus opening avenues to an issue that has long been considered to be problematic. 
 
Note on “Seconds of T-D integration” (sTDI). By observing that that the computing effort required 
by SIME per se is virtually negligible as compared with the computation of T-D simulations, one 
concludes that the computing effort reduces to the time required by the T-D program to run the 
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Figure 4-26 Transient stability-constrained OPF: sequential approach 
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comparisons of computing performance (almost) independent of the computer used and of the system 
size. 
 
4.8.3.2 Voltage Stability Assessment Computational Methods and Features 
 
Quasi Steady-State simulation 
 
The heart of all computations performed within the VSA part of OMASES is Quasi Steady-State 
(QSS) simulation, a fast time-domain method well suited to the analysis of long-term voltage stability 
phenomena [12]. 
 
The QSS approximation relies on time-scale decomposition. The essence of this method is that faster 
phenomena are represented by their equilibrium conditions instead of their full dynamics. This greatly 
reduces the complexity of the resulting model and hence provides the computational efficiency 
required to meet the constraints of an on-line application. In addition, the amount of additional data 
required by the QSS model is moderate, so that data collection, validation and maintenance are not a 
big issue. 
 
This method, which has been validated with respect to detailed time simulation, offers better accuracy 
and richer interpretations than simple methods based on load flow equations. For instance, in unstable 
cases, the area in trouble is automatically pointed out, while sensitivity-based diagnosis can be 
performed on the unstable system trajectory in order to identify appropriate remedial actions. Even 
when the QSS model involves components and phenomena that could be also accounted for in load 
flow computations, QSS simulations offer advantages over the latter, while preserving computational 
efficiency. 
 
Under the QSS approximation, the short-term dynamics of a synchronous generator, its governor and 
its Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR), are replaced by three nonlinear algebraic equations [12]. The 
latter account for the generation saturation, the AVR steady-state gain and the speed droop. These 
nonlinear equations are solved at each time step, together with the network ones. 
 
For each load, voltage dependent active and reactive powers are assumed at the MV bus behind the 
HV-MV distribution transformer, in parallel with a shunt compensation capacitor. Studies are still 
under progress to improve the modeling of loads. The initial tests reported in this paper have been 
performed with an exponential model, as shown in Figure 4-27 . Different exponents are used 
according to the type of load. Load power restoration mainly comes from the Load Tap Changers 




QSS simulation reproduces the long-term dynamics of LTCs, OverExcitation Limiters (OELs), 
automatically switched shunt compensation, secondary voltage control (if any), protecting devices, 
 
Figure 4-27 Typical Load Model 
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etc. This simulation takes into account the (initial and subsequent) delays in between transformer tap 




Voltage security is analyzed in terms of power transfers, referred to as system stress. The stress is a 
change in load and generation that makes the system weaker by increasing power transfer over 
relatively long distances and/or by drawing on reactive power reserves. A system stress is 
characterized by its direction, i.e. by the participation of each load active and reactive power to the 
overall load increase and that of each generator active power production to the overall generation 
adjustment. 
 
VSA is performed at the current system state, provided by the EMS state estimator, and referred to as 
base case in the remaining of the paper.  
 
Two approaches have been followed for assessing the impact of contingencies, as explained in the 




A loadability limit indicates how much the system can be stressed before reaching instability. To this 
purpose, OMASES-VSA does not resort to (repeated or continuation) power flows, but rather 
simulates the time response of the system to a ramp increase in demand and/or generation. Thus, for a 
load increase, the demand coefficient oiP  of the load model shown in Figure 4-27 is increased linearly 
with time according to: 
 
( ) (0) with 1o oi i i P i
i
P t P a g t a= + =∑                                (7) 
where ia  is a dimensionless participation factor and Pg  is the power increase gradient (MW/s), at 
system level. This parameter is chosen small enough to consider that the system evolves through 
steady states, and large enough to save computing time. The same relationship applies to reactive 
power. All LTCs, OELs, etc. respond with their delays to this increase in demand. Note that in the 
absence of corrective control, the total load power increase over a period tΔ  is smaller than Pg tΔ  
under the effect of LTC deadbands and possibly limits. 
 
Similarly, the active power setpoints of generators can be increased with time. The imbalances 
between load and generation due to losses and the above-mentioned LTC effects are covered by 
primary frequency (governor) control. To this purpose the frequency deviation is computed at each 
time step of the QSS simulation. The presence of this extra variable is balanced by the slack-bus 
phase angle relationship 0slackθ =  as explained in [12]. 
 
Loadability limits are computed in the base case configuration, as well as for a limited set of 
dangerous contingencies, whose identification is explained in the next sections. The later limits are 
referred to as Post-Contingency Loadability limits (PCLL). To this purpose, in the same run, the 
contingency is simulated over a specified time interval, before the ramp increase in demand and 
generation is applied. 
 
Besides power limits, the main outcome of such a simulation comes in the form of system or regional 
PV curves. To this purpose, voltages at key buses are recorded as a function of the total load (power 
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Secure Operation Limits 
 
For a given direction of stress, the Secure Operation Limit (SOL) corresponds to the most stressed 
operating point such that the system can withstand any contingency of a specified list [23]. Unlike a 
PCLL, this limit refers to the current, pre-contingency configuration of the system. 
 
In the SOL computation, the stressed system states are obtained from a (pre-contingency) load flow 
computation, while the effect of a contingency is assessed using QSS simulation, initialized at the 
load flow solution. 
 
The pre-contingency stress assumes full load recovery. Thus, at the i-th bus, the active and reactive 
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where superscript bc denotes base case values, S is the total load power increase and (bi, ci)  are 
participation factors. The active power generation at the j-th bus is redispatched according to: 
(1 ) 1g bcj j j j
j
P P d S with dε= + + =∑                                  (9) 
where dj  is a participation factor and ε  accounts for changes in losses. The reactive power 
generations are rescheduled by letting the machines under AVR control, unless their reactive 
capabilities are reached. 
 
The SOLs are determined by binary search. This simple and robust method consists of building 
smaller and smaller intervals [ ]l uS S  of stress values such that lS  corresponds to an acceptable post-
contingency evolution and uS  to an unacceptable one. At each step, the interval is divided in two 
equal parts; if the midpoint is found acceptable (resp. unacceptable) it is taken as the new lower (resp. 
upper) bound. The procedure is repeated until u lS S−  is smaller than a specified tolerance Δ . To 
make the VSA function automatic, the binary search starts with 0lS = (corresponding to base case) 
and  
 
maxmin ( , )u NS S f S=                                                  (10) 
 
where maxS  is the maximum stress of interest, NS  the maximum stress that can be reached in the 
absence of contingency and  f  is typically equal to 0.9.  NS  is itself determined by binary search, 
considering an ``empty'' contingency. 
 
To preserve computational efficiency in the presence of multiple contingencies, one should avoid 
repeating (pre-contingency) load flow computations relative to the same stress level. The number of 
load flows can be minimized by performing a Simultaneous Binary Search  (SBS), which handles as 
many contingencies as possible at a given stress level. At a given step of this procedure, the 
unacceptable contingencies remaining from the previous step are simulated. If at least one of them is 
unacceptable, the acceptable ones are discarded (since their limits are higher than the current stress) 
and the search proceeds with the unacceptable ones only. For the most severe contingency(ies), the 
SOL is computed with the Δ  accuracy, while for the others, a lower bound on the SOL is obtained. A 
simple example with 4 contingencies is shown in Figure 4-28 . The sequence of tested stresses is 
1 2 3 4, , , ,oS S S S S . Five pre-contingency load flows are thus performed in the course of this SBS. The 
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SOL corresponds to 4S  and relates to contingency no. 1. Contingency no. 4 is discarded at stress oS , 




From there on, it is generally of interest to compute the individual SOLs of dangerous contingencies 
other than the most severe. Individual binary searches are performed to this purpose. 
 
Note that the PCLLs and PV curves described in the previous section are computed for the subset of 
contingencies found with the lowest margins at the end of the SOL determination (which is thus 
performed first). 
 
It is clear that SOLs and PCLLs give different information and call for different interpretations. SOL 
is better suited to quantify the "distance to insecurity" in terms of total system load. Along the pre-
contingency stress we have normal operating points similar to those that operators are used to 
observe. A distance of 100, or 1000 MW in this respect is very meaningful to the operator who knows 
what is the increase he expects in the next hour or so. 
 
The trajectory leading to a PCLL on the other hand, does not consist of “normal” operating points and 
the PCLL is not to be handled as a quantitative measure. Rather, it is valuable to demonstrate the 
system limits through local, regional, system-wide PV curves, which are convenient, widely accepted 
graphical representations. These post-contingency PV curves demonstrate graphically the amount of 
load restoration achieved in each area and in the whole system following the contingency (as well as 
the corresponding transmission voltage), and are thus providing useful information, complementary 




Contingency filtering is an important step of any on-line security assessment application. A form of 
filtering takes place at the first step of the SBS, i.e. at maximum stress, when discarding the 
contingencies that yield an acceptable system response.  However, in spite of the QSS simulation 
speed, it may take too long to simulate the system response to each contingency of a long list. An 
additional pre-filtering may be needed before the SBS is launched. In a majority of systems, post-
contingency load flows can be advantageously used to this purpose. 
 
Load flow equations with constant power loads and enforcement of generator reactive limits 
correspond to the long-term equilibrium that prevails after load voltage restoration by LTCs and 
machine excitation limitation by OELs. Insofar as voltage instability results from the loss of such 
equilibrium, the corresponding load flow equations no longer have a solution and the Newton-
 
Figure 4-28 Example of Simultaneous Binary Search 
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Raphson algorithm diverges. On the other hand, divergence may result from purely numerical 
problems and some dynamic controls that help stability cannot be accounted for in the static load flow 
calculation. Conversely, some system dynamics may be responsible for an instability not detected by 
the load flow. 
 
Keeping in mind the above conflicting aspects, the filtering consists of: (i) performing QSS simulation 
on a subset of contingencies labeled potentially harmful; (ii) identifying the latter as the contingencies 
that cause the load flow to diverge or some voltages to drop by more than a threshold VΔ . 
 
The value of VΔ  must be taken large enough to filter out as many harmless contingencies as 
possible, but not too large to avoid missing a contingency with low SOL. 
 
To make the filtering as reliable as possible, the post-contingency load flow data must closely match 
the QSS model. To this purpose, the reactive power limits of the generators are updated with their 
active power and terminal voltages, while active power imbalances are distributed over them 
according to frequency control. 
 
Furthermore, for filtering purposes, accurate post-contingency voltages need not be computed: 
estimates obtained from linearized load flow equations may be appropriate to filter out the harmless 
contingencies. If needed, the threshold VΔ  can be adjusted to account for the approximation.  
Reference [19] reports on the successful use of linear estimates of the post-contingency voltage drops 
obtained by: 
• first solving a sparse system to update the phase angles; 
• then, assuming constant active power flows in branches, solving a second sparse system to 
update the voltage magnitudes. 
 
This technique yields better accuracy than a single iteration of the full Newton-Raphson method, 
while retaining the sparse structure of a decoupled formulation. 
 
4.8.4 Implementation in OMASES (Illustrated on VSA) 
 
The scope of VSA is the analysis of the impact of significant contingencies and the determination of 
security margins in terms of power transfers or power consumption in load areas. More precisely, the 
application involves: 
 
1. contingency filtering according to the technique of Section 4.8.3; 
2. determining Secure Operation Limits (SOLs) using the technique of Section 4.8.3; 
3. computing the system pre-contingency loadability limit, using the method of Section 4.8.3; 
4. computing Post-Contingency Loadability Limits (PCLLs), by the same method, for the dangerous 
contingencies identified at item 2. 
 
The architecture of the VSA application within OMASES is shown in Figure 4-29  . 
 
OMASES-VSA integrates two VSA software packages developed prior to the project. 
 
The SOL computation and the contingency filtering rely on the ASTRE software developed at the 
University of Liège and used by several power companies [14], [15], [16], [12]. ASTRE itself is made 
up of a load flow program (ARTERE, used for stressing the system and filtering contingencies) and a 
QSS simulator (QSSS, used for simulating contingencies) both “conducted” by the SOLD module 
implementing the binary searches. The former two executables communicate through a shared 
memory for the data and through files for the outputs. 
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ASTRE has been used for several years in Planning and Operational Planning by RTE (the French 
TSO), the TransEnergie division of Hydro-Québec (Canada) and ELIA (the Belgian TSO). It is also 
used in ASD-T, one module of the real-time platform developed by RTE and used in the French 
national and regional control centers. Another real-time implementation is under way at Hydro-
Québec. Furthermore, based on this software, a training simulator has been set up, that is presently 
used at the Hydro-Québec control center to train operators at better controlling the grid voltages in 
normal and emergency conditions [17]. 
 
The computation of PCLLs and the preparation of PV-curves rely on the WPSTAB software 
developed at the National Technical University of Athens [18]. 
 
Within the context of OMASES, data loaders have been devised whose role is to connect (through 
SQL requests) to the relational data base server hosting the Energy Management System (EMS) data, 
the VSA-specific data, the stress specification, the contingency description, and the output curves 
description. The data loaders produce the ASCII files needed by ASTRE and WPSTAB. 
 
Outputs of ASTRE and WPSTAB consist of GIF figures showing plots and ASCII files with 
numerical results. 
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Figure 4-29  Architecture of  VSA application within the OMASES platform 
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• the OMASES Control System, aimed at: queuing and dispatching OMASES messages to the VSA 
task, detecting the presence of new EMS files, loading them into the database through a loader 
script, activating, synchronising and supervising the VSA task automatically, updating its status 
into the database; 
• the Omases User Interface, aimed at: starting and stopping the VSA task, activating it manually, 
making the VSA task status visible to the OMASES user. 
 
Finally, a “front-end” program has been developed in order to: prepare, manage and remove 
dynamically the working environment of a new VSA session, communicate (through messages) with 
the remaining of the OMASES environment, launch the data loaders, call sequentially and supervise 
the ASTRE and WPSTAB programs, collect the GIF figures produced by the latter and assemble 
them into HTML pages, together with ASP scripts, for user-friendly WEB-based display by the HTTP 
server (the latter being used for both controlling the platform and displaying results). 
 
The architecture of the TSA application within OMASES is the same as for VSA illustrated in Figure 
4-29  (only difference is that VSA should be replaced by TSA and ASTRE with SIME). The 
presentation of the results, in case of TSA, is quite similar to that of TSA (assembling GIF figures into 
the HTTP pages and together with ASP scripts enable user-friendly WEB-based displays by the 
HTTP server). 
4.8.5 Performance, Operating Experience and Proven Benefits 
 
Within OMASES two Experimentation Sites have been implemented. One site was the Greek HTSO 
(Hellenic Transmission System Operator) and the other one was the Italian TSO through its 
cooperation with CESI, one of the two OMASES Italian Partners. The Italian Site Experimentation 
was intended to test the performances of the OMASES platform in a real world environment both in 
the Real-time mode (on-line) and in the Engineering mode (off-line). 
 
The OMASES platform installed at the National control centre of the Hellenic Transmission System 
Operator (HTSO) was in trial on-line operation until June 2003, when the project ended. In the fall of 
2004, the on-line VSA function of OMASES has been reactivated with the implementation of user 
recommended modifications and it is used since then as an on-line and study tool at the HTSO control 
center.   The on-going operating experience if on-line VSA in the HTSO control center will be 
described in the Section 4.10. 
 
 
4.8.5.1 TSA of the Italian interconnected system 
 
The Italian test site was installed in December 2002. The experimentation concerned portability 
issues, in particular the operation of the data transfer module between Italian EMS and OMASES 
platform: both the automatic file creation and transfer in real time mode, and the system model 
conversion in the OMASES format were thus checked. The experimentation also regarded the correct 
operation of the platform from a software standpoint, and the output consistency of the DSA 
functions. OMASES TSA and VSA functions have been tested both in the Real-time mode (on-line) 
and in the Engineering mode (off-line) [2], [15]. The TS and MS testing were out of scope of this 
Experimentation Site. 
 
The Real-time mode is mainly concerned with the overall platform testing, and with the 
filtering/ranking capabilities, as it is rare that truly jeopardizing situations occur: in fact the Italian 
power system is usually operated in a conservative manner, with N-1 (and sometimes even N-2) 
criterion being satisfied.  
 
The Engineering mode is more suitable for a systematic validation of the tool capabilities and its 
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tuning. In particular, it makes it possible to check the output of the tool when heavily stressed 
scenarios are concerned. In the Engineering mode, if the initial conditions are “excessively” secure, 
the power system may be stressed in a variety of ways: for instance: by increasing the load or the 
power transfer between areas, by weakening the topology and/or the generation capacity, by creating 
low voltage conditions. The aim is to find the system limits and to compare suggested preventive 
actions with those used in the past or suggested by operator’s experience.  
 
In order to fit the Italian EMS snapshots into the OMASES database, a bridge between the Italian 
EMS and OMASES was implemented at the Italian site. The bridge performs data conversion to the 
OMASES format and can be used for on-line acquisition of the data which are then processed. The 
bridge from EMS data to OMASES data was developed by CESI. The overall importation scheme is 
reported in Figure 4-30  .  
 
For the experimentation, the file transfer was performed on a Wide Area Network (WAN). The final 
installation within a TSO can be on a Local Area Network (LAN), faster than the former solution. In 




















Figure 4-30  Data import from the Italian EMS 
 
 
The Italian Power System 
 
The network under analysis was the complete Italian power system as in 2003, provided by the 
National TSO including the 400 kV and 220 kV transmission lines and the main 150 kV lines and 
stations, along with generators and equivalent loads. It was stored in the OMASES database used in 
the Real-Time mode. Significant figures for the examined grid are: 
• Grid: 1118 Lines; 7234  Nodes – about 1500 Buses 
• The number of buses depends on the actual state of the network whereas the number of nodes 
is a network characteristic. The bus number is related to the actually energized nodes; 5778 
Switches (1018 Bus bar couplers); 
• Machines: 467 Synchronous generators, AVRs, system excitation limits; Hydraulic, Thermal 
(steam and gas) Governors and turbines; 
• Transformers: 1082 two/three windings, 363 ULTC 
• Loads: 1046 Static and dynamic loads. 
 
The grid topology – in terms of network description and operating condition – was imported 
automatically whereas the dynamic description, both for long term dynamics and short term 
dynamics, was provided either by hand or partially automatically downloaded by database, and makes 
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use of different models for TSA and VSA. 
 
TSA systematically performed the following tasks: (a) investigate large numbers (hundreds) of 
(credible) contingencies; (b) extract a subset of those that may threaten system security (contingency 
filtering and ranking); (c) provide possible preventive remedial actions. 
The most important aspect of the TSA validation phase at CESI site concerned its functionality, 
particularly for the FILTRA function [20] that allows selecting potentially harmful contingencies.  
 
A significant aspect of the testing consisted of comparing the simulation outputs of the TSA functions 
with a reference that represents the “real” system behavior. For the Italian power system this reference 
has been the electromechanical and long-term simulator SICRE [21], developed by CESI. As the 
OMASES Application Function TSA used the Eurostag package [22], it was important for the models 
adopted in the OMASES TSA Application Function to be comparable to those implemented in 
SICRE. Proper adaptations to reproduce the models originally used in the Italian simulator were 
required.  
 
For TSA few seconds of simulation are sufficient, since experience suggests that multi-swing 
transient instability phenomena are not likely to occur in the Italian system. This allowed neglecting 
the slow dynamics that a simulator takes into account. For example, the boiler representation (steam 
plants) was highly simplified and LTCs can be assumed fixed.  The most important models related to 
TSA concern, in fact, the representation of synchronous machine, AVR, PSS, and turbine governor. 
Apart from the synchronous machine, the other models were built by means of Eurostag macro-blocks 
reproducing the standard Italian AVR and PSS models. Proper adaptations were made to implement 
turbine governors.  
 
Results from TSA testing 
 
The functionality of TSA has been tested as described in the following. A snapshot of the EMS output 
is correctly transferred to the OMASES database. In the Real-Time mode the following operations 
were automatically performed: 
(1) Dynamic data preparation (TSA folder and configuration file creation) 
(2) Retrieving of contingency and other TSA parameters from the database 
(3) Loading of static system data and execution of load flow  
(4) Execution of FILTRA and CONTROL modules, including the necessary dynamic simulations. 
 
The settings related to TSA FILTRA operation are stored in the TSA database as well as the data for 
dynamic simulation. Different sets of contingencies have been used to verify the TSA function.  
A complete set of three-phase short circuit contingencies followed by line tripping for (N-1) criterion 
analysis in the entire network was initially tested. Critical lines have been identified and mainly 
corresponded to lines connecting, or close to, power plants and specifically for those plants weakly 
connected to the HV grid. Table 4-3 reports a list of contingencies selected for analysis. Further, some 
interconnection lines located in the production areas in the South of Italy have been tested. During 
real-time experimentation, the Italian network did not experience any particular transient stability 
problem. 
 
Figure 4-31  reports some results referring to a real case analyzed during the testing phase. The 
FILTRA parameters were selected as: CT1 = 300 ms, CT2 = 250 ms, CT3 = 200 ms, that represent 
the thresholds for considering a three-phase short circuit contingency respectively “FSU”, “harmful” 
and “potentially harmful”. It can be noted that the list of dangerous contingencies is really small 
compared to the full list of contingencies filtered, as nearly all of the analyzed cases were found first-
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Table 4-3. Partial list of the most representative contingencies for TSA 
 
Line ID Description (faulted line) 
Cont_220 kV_line _16 BIELLA EST-->TURBIGO ST 
Cont_220 kV_line _17 SPEZIA STA-->AVENZA 
Cont_220 kV_line _18 SPEZIA STA-->COLORNO 
Cont_220 kV_line _19 MESE-->GORDUNO 
Cont_220 kV_line _20 SONDRIO-->ROBBIA 
Cont_220 kV_line _28 OSTIGLIA-->BUSS. S.S. 
Cont_400 kV_line _14 TURBIGO ST-->RONDISSONE 
Cont_400 kV_line _16 OSTIGLIA-->DUGALE 
Cont_400 kV_line _17 OSTIGLIA-->FERRARA F. 
Cont_400 kV_line _22 PORTOTOLLE-->FORLI' 
Cont_400 kV_line _29 RAVENNA C.-->PORTOTOLLE 
Cont_400 kV_line _34 MONTALTO-->SUVERETO 
Cont_400 kV_line _42 PRESENZANO-->VALMONTONE 









Figure 4-31 Output of FILTRA module: TSA parameters and list of 
 contingencies ranked in a severity order 
 
One major aspect of FILTRA is the capacity to assess the dangerous contingency faster than the CCT 
calculation, even if the value of the CCT is only approximate. In fact, for example, the contingency 
MM1317 is declared unstable (HS in Figure 4-31 ) with a CCT larger than 290 ms, while the exact 
value calculated is 296 ms. On the other hand the identification of this contingency as a dangerous 
one is correct. In any case, by a particular functionality of the FILTRA module, it is possible to assess 
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very precisely the CCT of each contingency. This powerful facility is more dedicated to the 
engineering mode of the OMASES platform. 
 
One major value of the TSA function is to provide the operator with a list of possible actions to 
stabilize the system against a set of contingencies. The control function suggests how to stabilize the 
contingencies declared harmful by FILTRA and evaluates the power that should be re-scheduled from 
the critical to the non-critical machines. An example of the results of this action related to one harmful 
case is reported in Table 4-4. 
 
Figure 4-32  reports the details concerning the most severe identified harmful contingency for the 
examined case. It is taken from the OMASES User Interface for the Real Time mode. Several pieces 
of information are provided, among which the name of the contingency, the detail of each simulation 
(clearing time, margin, stability judgment, simulated time etc.), the computed CCT and the final rank. 
Table 4-4. Rescheduling of critical machines for a harmful contingency 
 
Rescheduling of  Critical Machine for one specific harmful 
contingency identified by FILTRA 





ANPPG2  73.30 63.56 9.738 
ANPPG3  78.20 68.46 9.738 
BRNNG3  181.20 161.06 20.143 
ROSNG1  296.70 274.85 21.849 
ROSNG2  316.10 294.25 21.849 
ROSNG3  320.00 298.15 21.849 
ROSNG4  304.60 282.75 21.849 
TIMPG4  280.70 258.85 21.849 
TIMPG5  279.40 257.55 21.849 
ISBAGA  159.50 139.25 20.249 
ISBAGC  156.00 135.75 20.249 
SFMPG3  160.00 148.79 11.215 
ROSNGA  88.90 80.63 8.271 
ROSNGC  98.50 90.23 8.271 
ROSNGE  102.00 93.73 8.271 
TIMPGA  110.60 102.33 8.271 
TIMPGC  112.50 104.23 8.271 
BSCNG1  637.00 448.94 188.060 
BSCNG2  652.80 464.74 188.060 
BSCNG3  617.20 429.14 188.060 
BSCNG4  622.40 434.34 188.060 
SFMPG6  244.40 222.55 21.849 
ISBAG1  108.50 91.77 16.731 
ISBAG2  107.30 90.57 16.731 
 
The OMASES TSA function was also tested for heavily stressed system conditions, generated on 
purpose. In this case, the starting point consisted of a real time snapshot, and the stress was 
implemented by a topology change. The considered situation was that of 12/6/2003 at 11:30, 
characterized by a very high demand due to temperature rather higher than usual. A weakening of the 
system was then obtained by opening a line near Brindisi power station (South of Italy).  
 
For this stressed case, the validation phase included comparison of the simulation outputs of the TSA 
function with the electromechanical and long-term simulator SICRE, developed by CESI, taken as the 
reference. A complete comparative analysis is here reported for contingency affecting line NN1322. 
When performing a full simulation with SICRE a dichotomy process was used to assess the CCT 
related to the outage of this line. The approximate value of the CCT computed with SICRE is about 
135-140 ms, against the value calculated by FILTRA, i.e. 142 ms.  
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Figure 4-32  FILTRA output for the modified case 
 
The artificially stressed operating point mentioned above, caused a low critical clearing time (CCT  = 
117 ms) for a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Brindisi–Taranto line (NN1320) close to Brindisi 
power station.  
 
Figure 4-33   shows the identified critical machines of Brindisi power plant. These machines matches 
with the analysis performed SICRE. The OMASES Control function determined the margin and the 
amount of power to be re-scheduled among the non-critical machines in order to make the system able 
to withstand this contingency (NN1320) with an imposed new clearing time of 180 ms, quite larger 
than the previously computed CCT of 117 ms. 
 
 
Figure 4-33   FILTRA results and critical machines of Brindisi power station 
 
 
Table 4-5 presents the final output of the OMASES Control function: it helps the operator to re-
schedule properly the power of the critical machines to non critical machines for a total amount of 
about 468 MW. 
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The amount of power to be re-scheduled is quite large. Therefore to reduce it, the control function was 
run again with a less demanding requirement: the desired clearing time of the system was set at the 
value of 150 ms. Table 4-6 shows that the amount of power to be re-scheduled is drastically decreased 
(257 MW) but, as it is clearly shown, the Critical machines are many more. 
 
Table 4-5. Output of the control function for the stressed case, contingency NN1320 
Rescheduling of  Critical Machine 
Machine name Initial power in MW 




BRNNG3  181.20 160.94 20.265 
BSCNG1  637.00 525.09 111.909 
BSCNG2  652.80 540.89 111.909 
BSCNG3  617.20 505.30 111.899 
BSCNG4  622.40 510.50 111.899 
Table 4-6. Control function output for the stressed case, contingency NN1320 
Rescheduling of  Critical Machine 
Machine name Initial power in MW  




BRNNG3  181.20 175.16 6.043 
TIMPG4  280.70 274.66 6.043 
TIMPG5  279.40 273.36 6.043 
ISBAGA  159.50 153.91 5.594 
ISBAGC  156.00 150.41 5.594 
SFMPG3  160.00 156.90 3.103 
TIMPGA  110.60 108.31 2.289 
TIMPGC  112.50 110.21 2.289 
BSCNG1  637.00 585.88 51.117 
BSCNG2  652.80 601.68 51.117 
BSCNG3  617.20 566.08 51.117 
BSCNG4  622.40 571.28 51.117 
SFMPG6  244.40 238.36 6.043 
ISBAG1  108.50 103.87 4.625 
ISBAG2  107.30 102.67 4.625 
 
The experimentation phase proved that OMASES can effectively be linked to an existing Energy 
Management System, e.g. a proprietary system with its own system model and data format, such as 
the Italian one. The only requirement consists of developing an appropriate bridge for on-line data 
acquisition and conversion into OMASES format.  
 
The real time tests showed the functionality of the on-line platform and, in particular, the 
filtering/ranking capabilities of the tool. Some off-line studies performed on artificially stressed 
scenarios allowed to confirm the ability of the package to correctly identify critical situations and 
provide preventive control countermeasures, such as generation re-scheduling. 
 
Results of the experimental process permitted the tuning and validation of the DSA platform in terms 
of experience and feed-backs for what concerns the effective possibilities of filtering, screening and 
stabilizing contingencies in large electrical power systems. 
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4.9 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Finland - Fingrid 
 
At Fingrid, the issues of voltage stability and angle stability are most important because they are the 
limiting factors for transmission between Finland and Sweden and between Northern and Southern 
Finland.  
 
When the power flows from Sweden to Finland via the AC-lines in the north and on to Southern 
Finland the transmission capacity is limited by the voltage stability. The security of the system can 
then be assessed with help of the contingency analysis of the SCADA/EMS system. The contingency 
analysis is based on a load flow model updated by state estimation with a time interval of 5 minutes. 
The state-estimation is based on a large number of power and voltage measurements made throughout 
the Finnish grid. Also the status of each EHV-line in the model is updated according to the actual 
situation. Only the Finnish power system is modeled in detail whereas the rest the synchronously 
operated Nordic power system (including Sweden, Norway and the Eastern Denmark) is modeled as a 
Thevenin equivalent. 
 
When the power flows from Southern Finland to north and on to Sweden, it is the damping of power 
oscillations that limits the transmission capacity. Because in the critical mode of oscillation (with a 
frequency approximately 0.3 Hz) the generators of Southern Finland are oscillating against the 
generators of Southern Sweden and Norway, a model for the whole Nordic power system is required. 
Such a model exists for the off-line studies but there is at present no way of updating its loading, 
generation and component status data to make it correspond to the continuously changing powerflow. 
The on-line contingency analysis is therefore not yet possible from the angle stability point of view. 
 
If an automatically updated dynamic model existed for the whole Nordic power system, it would still 
be impractical to perform any extensive contingency analysis, because the long simulation time 
required. The dimensioning faults are however most often known beforehand based on off-line 
simulations, which helps to keep the list of relevant contingencies short.  
 
4.9.1 General Description of DSA Implementation 
4.9.1.1 On-line monitoring of power oscillations 
 
Fingrid has tested since February 2004 one system for on-line monitoring of oscillations [1]. The test 
arrangement is based on power measurements at the two 400 kV interconnecting lines between 
Finland and Sweden. These locations were chosen for the measurements because the dominant mode 
of power oscillation in the Nordic power system (0.3 Hz) is always seen on these two lines when they 
are in use. 
 
The power is measured at a sampling rate of 10 samples/s. The measurement data is sent in real-time 
to a server located in the central office of Fingrid. The same server also has the analysis software. 
 
4.9.1.2 The state estimator  
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At Fingrid the network data used in the state estimator of the SCADA/EMS-system is largely the 
same as in the powerflow model used for off-line studies. Only the 110 kV network is partly reduced, 
which does not significantly affect performance of the contingency analysis from the system point of 
view.  
 
The Finnish power system is represented by a set of hierarchical pictures in the SCADA/EMS system. 
The example of the Figure 4-35  represents the 400/220 kV transmission grid. 
 
In the contingency analysis applied at Fingrid in the context of voltage stability it is assumed that all 
loads have constant power, which is the worst case in terms of voltage stability. 
 
Fingrid does not have Special Protection Schemes (SPS) relevant to the voltage stability assessed by 
the contingency analysis. They have therefore not been included in the contingency analysis. Load-
shedding schemes will however be utilized in the future, which will make it necessary to include them 
also in the contingency analysis. 
 
At Fingrid the outputs of most generators including the largest ones are measured directly and fed to 
the SCADA/EMS system and are therefore available also for the contingency analysis. Loads are 
estimated by the state estimator.  
 
The rest of the synchronously operated Nordic power system is modeled as a Thevenin equivalent 
with a constant impedance. This causes some error for contingencies involving the interconnecting 
lines between Finland and Sweden. The error will be bigger in cases where there is a power line 
outage on the Swedish side and close to the interconnecting lines. To make the contingency analysis 
cover all cases a more detailed model of the Swedish power system would be required or the 
Thevenin impedance should at least be updated based on real-time estimation of that impedance. 
There are techniques available for that. Such techniques are used for instance in the Voltage 
Instability Predictor which estimates the equivalent impedance of the feeding side of a corridor and 
compares that to the impedance of the load side of the same corridor. 
 
 
4.9.1.3 Real-time monitoring of reserves 
 Real time state estimation 
(PNA, Power Network Applications) 
Network Configurator (CE) 
Complete Model Estimator 
(CME) 
State Estimator (SE) 
The model of the power grid 

























Figure 4-34 The state estimator 
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The issue of frequency stability is common for Finland, Sweden, Norway and the Eastern Denmark 
even if Sweden and Norway have the main responsibility for the frequency control. The goal is to 
maintain the frequency stability by making sure there are sufficient reserves available that are 
activated by under-frequency. There are agreements concerning this between the TSOs of the Nordic 
countries. A simple way of monitoring frequency security is to monitor the amount of reserves in real-
time. Fingrid has already implemented this.  
 
4.9.2 Operating experiences 
4.9.2.1 On-line monitoring of power oscillations 
 
The on-line monitoring system [1] has five adjustable frequency bands. The upper frequency limit of 
a band is always the lower limit for the next band. There cannot be gaps between the bands and the 
bands cannot be overlapping. There are adjustable warning and alarm thresholds for the damping time 
constant, the amplitude and frequency of the oscillation. These can be set separately for each of the 
five bands. 
 
The warning and alarm thresholds were set in such a way that the number of warnings and alarms 
could be kept reasonable. The messages given by the monitoring system [1] have not yet been linked 
to the SCADA/EMS-system, because there do not exist any known rules concerning the required 
course of action by the operator if a warning or alarm is issued by the monitoring system. 
 
The only mode of oscillation that is known to limit the transmission capacity from Finland to Sweden 
 
Figure 4-35 An example  figure of the Finnish transmission grid represented in the SCADA/EMS system. 
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is that of approximately 0.3 Hz. That is also the only mode the damping of which can be affected by 
control actions in Finland. The monitoring of the other modes is however potentially useful as it can 
reveal previously unknown features of the Nordic power system and help to verify the simulation 
model. 
 
The details of the estimation algorithm [1] are not known to Fingrid, but it is based on the assumption 
that the random variations of loads taking place in the system act as white noise perturbing a linear 
system. The measured power oscillation is treated as the output of that linear system and is used to 
identify the dynamics of the system and to give estimates of mode amplitudes, frequencies and 
damping time constants. 
 
The estimation algorithm [1] sees many modes of frequency in each frequency band, not just one. The 
algorithm chooses the one having the highest amplitude and uses its frequency, amplitude and 
damping time constant as representative for the whole band. When the amplitude of oscillation is 
small and the damping is good there are several modes inside one single frequency band that have 
approximately the same amplitude. In that case the one happening to have the highest amplitude 
varies all the time resulting in a constant variation of the mode frequency, amplitude and damping 
time constant given by the algorithm. 
 
If there is a clearly dominating mode of oscillation but it happens to have a frequency close to the 
border line of two neighboring bands, the frequency associated with the highest amplitude may fall in 
turn on any of the two bands. The amplitude, frequency and damping estimates associated to the two 
bands then change abruptly each time the frequency of the dominating mode passes the border line 
between the bands. To avoid this, the frequency limits of each band should be set carefully based on 
the expected mode frequencies so that the dominating modes always remain inside the same 
frequency bands. This requires some prior knowledge of the modes of oscillation present in the 
system. 
 
The on-line monitoring of power oscillation has performed reasonably well as a software, but the 
damping estimates have not proved to be useful. There is a large scatter in the estimated damping time 
constants even when the power flow of the system remains largely the same. The scatter can be 
reduced by averaging but even a long averaging window of 45 min gives a seemingly random and 
high variation of damping estimates.  
 
The correlation between the estimated damping and the proximity of the transmission capability limit 
is poor (see Figure 4-36 ). The averaging window used in the figure 3 was 45 min. The correlation is 
worse if non-averaged damping time constants are used. The poor correlation makes it impossible in 
practice to assess the proximity to the transmission capacity limit based on the on-line estimation of 
damping.  
 
There are also inherent limitations in the method of on-line monitoring of damping. The damping 
estimation is based on small perturbations in the system assumed to be a linear one and can 
consequently only give estimates of the small-signal damping. The transmission capacity is however 
limited by the damping of high-amplitude oscillations which can be much worse due to the non-
linearity of the power system. Another limitation of the method is that it naturally only can estimate 
the damping of the system in its current state, whereas the transmission capability is usually 
determined by the damping after a contingency (e.g. the n-1-criterion). A simulation model of some 
kind is needed to predict the damping after the contingency. It will be too late to estimate it by 
measurements, if the damping is too poor and the system becomes unstable after the contingency. 
 
4.9.2.2 Operating experience of the contingency analysis 
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The contingency analysis has been in use since 1997. There have been periods of time when the state-
estimator has failed thus making even the contingency analysis impossible. There have been several 
reasons for the failure of the state-estimator including the following: 
 
- Failure of communication has lead to missing measurements. 
- The topology of the grid has been such that the estimator has failed to solve the state of the system. 
- The server and its back-up server have both failed (approximately once per two years). 
 
The state-estimator has been out of operation in total approximately 5 % of time.  
 
The contingency analysis has mostly worked well, when the state-estimator has been able to provide 
the necessary power flow case. An exception is a busbar fault contingency involving the other 400 kV 
interconnecting lines between Finland and Sweden. The load flow solution fails to converge in that 
contingency due to an over-simplified equivalent of the Swedish power system. 
 
The voltage limit for voltage instability has been set to 370 kV for the 400 kV grid. There have this 
far been no need to reduce transmission based on the violation of that limit. The reason is that the 
transmission is kept in the capacity limits based on off-line simulations using the same voltage limit 






























Figure 4-36 The estimated damping time constant vs. the transmission in corridor limiting the transmission capability. The P1-
corridor is located between the Southern and Northern Finland. 
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4.9.3 Proven benefits 
 
4.9.3.1 Benefits of the on-line monitoring of oscillations 
 
Even if the on-line estimation of damping does not seem to be a promising technique for direct 
monitoring of the security of the power system it does have certain benefits. First of all it is a step 
forward to have a means to observe the oscillations continuously. In the past the measurements have 
been limited to those given by oscillation recorders triggered by a major event in the power system.  
 
Continuous measurements of power oscillations facilitate a learning process in which persons 
responsible for the operation and planning of the power system become familiar with the normal 
behavior of the power system. That normal behavior can then compared to the behavior during 
abnormal situations after major contingencies and to the behavior predicted by a simulation model in 
normal and abnormal conditions. The comparisons can help to make the simulation model more 
accurate, to identify components not performing optimally in terms of damping and to improve the 
control systems to give better damping. 
 
The estimated mode frequencies look more useful information than the damping time constants, 
because the frequency can be measured with better accuracy even in the presence of noise. Based on 
simulations and previous measurements it is known that the dominating mode of oscillation in the 
Nordic power system has a frequency of approximately 0.3 Hz. The monitoring done by the on-line 
monitoring system [1] has supported this and has increased the confidence on the simulation model in 
this respect.  
 
The on-line monitoring system [1] has however identified such a mode of poorly damped oscillation 
that cannot be produced by simulations. That mode has a low amplitude and a frequency of 
approximately 0.5 Hz. It is not known yet what is the origin of this oscillation and whether it is a 
potential risk to the system security. The same mode of oscillation with equally low amplitude has 
been measured also in the Swedish and Norwegian power systems by Phasor Measuring Units (PMU) 
installed by other TSOs and research institutes. 
 
The fact that the 0.5 Hz mode has exhibited a poor damping for long periods of time without leading 
to significant amplitudes suggests that the mode can be harmless. The estimated amplitude is at least 
one decade smaller than that of the continuously present dominant mode of 0.3 Hz. Since the origin of 
the 0.5 Hz mode is not yet explained, there is a reason to continue investigations by monitoring and 
by examining the behavior of different control systems to find an explanation.  
 
4.9.3.2 Benefits of the contingency analysis 
 
The transmission capacity valid for the intact grid is calculated by off-line simulations. There is 
however from time to time planned and unplanned outages affecting the transmission capacity and 
even the number of generators running varies. The contingency analysis uses the current state of the 
system in assessing the security of the system from the voltage stability point of view. It is therefore 




[1] Douglas H. Wilson: Managing Oscillatory Stability using On-line Dynamics Measurement, 
 Power Systems Conference and Exposition, New York, October 2004. 
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4.10 State-of-the-Art in DSA in Greece: OMASES Operating 
Experience 
 
This section summarizes the follow-up of the OMASES project, the continuing in service operation of 
the on-line VSA application in the Control Center of HTSO in Greece since the end of 2004 and some 
typical results from this application period. 
4.10.1 VSA of the Hellenic interconnected system 
 
The Hellenic Interconnected System includes the generation and transmission systems of mainland 
Greece and some adjacent islands. The main production center is located in the northwest part of the 
country close to the lignite mines, which is the basic fuel source, while the main center of 
consumption lies in the southern part including the metropolitan area of Athens. The installed 
generation capacity of the interconnected system in 2004 was about 10700 MW with 48% lignite, 
29% hydro, 14% natural gas, 7% oil and 2% renewable. The generation capacity at the southern part 
of the country is close to 2860 MW, installed mainly at the power plants of Lavrio, Ag. Georgios 
(both near Athens), Aliveri in Central Greece and Megalopolis (in Peloponnese). 
 
The transmission system operates mainly at the levels of 400 and 150 kV with a very limited number 
of 66 kV connections. There are 5 AC interconnection lines with the neighboring countries in the 
north (with a net transfer capability of 700 MW) and a DC interconnection with Italy via a submarine 
cable (with a maximum capacity of 500 MW). Depending on topology the system consists on the 
average of 800 buses, 1100 branches and 70 generators.  
 
As already mentioned, the geographical imbalance between generation and consumption leads to bulk 
transmission in the North-South direction. This transfer is continuously increased due to the high 
increase of the yearly peak loads mainly in the south; such peaks occur during the summer period and 
they are mainly due to air-conditioning and other cooling devices. The delays in the implementation 
of planned transmission projects (mainly due to public protest) makes the situation even worse. Thus 
occasionally the Hellenic system faces critical operational conditions regarding voltage stability. Such 
incidents have been experienced since 1996. The most severe and recent disruption occurred on July 
12th, 2004, when the southern part of the country suffered a blackout lasting for two hours. 
 
This subsection presents a sample of typical VSA outputs available to the HTSO operators. 
 
4.10.1.1 Secure Operation Limits 
 
The contingencies resulting in the most constraining SOLs are listed in a table format as seen in Table 
4-7 , together with the corresponding margins (computed with a tolerance Δ = 10 MW). 
 
Note that the first five contingencies of Table 4-7 have a zero margin, meaning that the occurrence of 
any of these at the specific time that the snapshot was taken would result in unacceptable post-
contingency conditions. However, all these contingencies have very local effects and refer to areas of 
the system where transmission upgrades were already under way. In particular the first three 
contingencies refer to breaking the loop of cables feeding the island of Kerkyra resulting in an 
abnormally long radial path to a relatively large load and, hence, in an excessive voltage drop. The 
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Table 4-7 Secure Operation Limits 
no. Contingency name  Margin (MW) 
254 LINE_CON_ΚΕΡΚ2-ΚΕΡΚ1.1 0 
312 LINE_CON_ ΜΕΣΟΓΓ-ΚΕΡΚ2.1 0 
296 LINE_CON_ ΜΟΥΡΤ-ΜΕΣΟΓ.1 0 
299 LINE_CON_ KARD-ELBA400.1 0 
228 LINE_CON_ ΚΘΕΣ-ΣΧΟΛΑΡ.1 0 
61 GEN_CON_ Κ_ΛΑΥΡΙΟ.GFIC.UN 40 
51 GEN_CON_ ΛΑΥΡΙΟ.GFIC.GEN2.UN 79 
 all other contingencies > 316 
 
The first contingency with really serious system wide effect is no. 61 referring to the loss of a 
combined cycle plant in Lavrio. A similar loss of generating units in Lavrio is contingency no. 51, 
with slightly larger margin. All other contingencies have margins above 316MW. 
 
The snapshot of the above Table corresponds to the system configuration during the winter of 2003 
(trial operation of OMASES) where one natural-gas power station (Ag. Georgios) in the Athens area 
was not in operation. This left the Athens region with little reactive support.  Although the total load 
was quite light at the time, contingency no. 61 had a very small margin of 40 MW. This is a typical 
case where the system operator should ask the missing unit to start (if available) for security reasons.  
 
As seen, the contingencies with small margin are not all equally dangerous. The extent of the 
problems caused to the system by an unacceptable contingency is easily assessed from the “voltage 
profiles” automatically produced by the SOL computation and described in the sequel.  
 
4.10.1.2 Voltage profiles  
 
A voltage profile shows the number of buses with voltages below a certain level. The voltages 
correspond to a snapshot of the collapsing system at the marginally refused level of stress during SOL 
computation. The affected area is identified from the names of typical buses. 
 
For instance, Figure 4-37 shows the voltage profile corresponding to a contingency with very 
localized effect (no. 299 in Table 4-7 ). As can be seen, very few buses with very low voltages exist in 
this case, while almost all buses remain above 0.9 pu voltage. By examining such voltage profiles, it 
is easily seen that all contingencies with zero margin in Table 4-7 result in local problems. 
 
In contrast, Figure 4-38 shows the voltage profile of a system-wide dangerous contingency. As can be 
seen, the disturbance is widely spread, even though the focal point (lowest voltages) can be located in 
a specific area, namely Central Greece, just to the north of Athens metropolitan region. This picture is 
typical of the South system instability mode, which was endemic in the Hellenic system before its 
upgrades after July 2004 [19]. 
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Figure 4-37 Voltage profile for a contingency with local effect 
 
 
Figure 4-38 Voltage profile for a contingency with system-wide impact 
 
4.10.1.3 Voltage Evolutions 
 
Another output readily available for interpreting results is the post-contingency time evolution of the 
transmission voltage with the largest drop after the contingency. This is displayed at the marginally 
accepted and marginally refused stress levels of SOL computation respectively. The final voltages are 
compared to a lower acceptable value, typical of a voltage collapse, to decide whether the system 
evolution is acceptable or not. 
 
Figure 4-39 shows the voltage evolution for a case of unacceptably low voltage. As can be seen, the 
marginally refused simulation does not correspond to a voltage instability, but merely to final voltages 
that are a little below the assumed 0.7 pu threshold. Hence, for this contingency, the SOL should not 
be interpreted strictly as a voltage stability limit. In later on-line operation during 2005 a threshold of 
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Figure 4-40 Post-contingency voltage evolutions near a stability limit 
0.75 was adopted for refusing a contingency. 
 
Figure 4-39 Post-contingency voltage evolutions: low but stable voltages 
 
A quite different situation is shown in Figure 4-40 , which shows the voltage evolution corresponding 
to a contingency leading to a voltage instability and collapse. Here, the marginally unstable simulation 
ends up in a collapse and loss of synchronism at t=880s. This evolution is clearly very different from 
the one of Figure 4-39 . 
 
The final collapse shown in Figure 4-40  can be explained as a loss of synchronism occurring at the 
Aliveri power station. In order to demonstrate this, the post contingency loadability limit for this 
contingency is computed and, for this run, the simulated rotor angle curves of the two generators of 
Aliveri station are plotted in Figure 4-41  , together with that of a generator in Northern Greece, for 
comparison purposes. 
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Figure 4-37 to Figure 4-40 illustrate the type of information that can be retrieved from unstable post-
contingency system evolutions obtained by QSS simulation. In the case of Figure 4-40 , for instance, a 
standard load flow would have merely diverged, providing no further information. 
 
4.10.1.4 Regional and National PV curves 
 
The regional PV curves are plots of the simulated voltage of a critical bus in each area as a function of 
the total system load actually consumed in the area, whereas the national PV curve shows the total 
load consumed in the system versus the voltage of a representative 150-kV bus located in Athens. 
 
In the absence of any contingency, PV curves are obtained through QSS simulation of a ramp increase 
in demand, as already mentioned. An example of national PV curve without any contingency is shown 
in Figure 4-42 . This result tells the operator how far the system could go without incident. In this 
example, the load could increase by more than 500 MW with an acceptable voltage level. 
 
Figure 4-42 National PV curve without contingency 
 
 
PV curves relative to a post-contingency situation, on the other hand, include the effect of the 
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contingency followed by the demand increase. Figure 4-43  shows the national PV curve 
corresponding to a very severe contingency, namely the loss of a large combined cycle plant at Lavrio 
power station calculated from historical data of Summer 2002. As seen in this figure, the total load is 
barely able to restore to its pre-contingency consumption even after the demand ramp. This is due to 
the exhaustion of the regulating range of the LTCs in the affected area, where the power received by 
consumers is reduced due to low distribution voltages. Note that due to the non-restoration of load, 
the PCLL implied in Figure 4-43  should not be compared to the SOL margin, for which the stress is 
applied prior to the contingency assuming full restoration of load power. 
 
 
Figure 4-43 National PV curve after severe contingency 
 
 
The regional PV curve of the area of Central Greece for the same contingency is shown in Figure 4-44 
. Clearly, in this case, the load power is severely reduced after the contingency and the demand 
increase cannot lead to increased consumption. Inspecting the various PV curves clearly demonstrates 
that the most affected region by the specific contingency is Central Greece. Customer service in this 
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4.10.2 Operating experience 
In this section, results from two characteristic real-time operation cases are presented, together with 
their analysis and evaluation [3]. The first case refers to a winter 2005 day and the second to the 
summer 2005 day with the yearly maximum load conditions.  
 
4.10.2.1 Winter 2005 case 
Peloponnese is a peninsula in southern Greece that is connected electrically to Athens area with 5 
high voltage (150 kV) transmission lines through Korinth substation and to Western Greece through a 
pair of high voltage submarine cables in the area of Patra. The cables normally import power to 
Peloponnese from the Kastraki hydro generating station that consists of four units with a maximum 
capacity of 320 (4x80) MW. During high load conditions in Peloponnese, the usual practice is to split 
this station with two of its units connected to a bus supplying the cables and the other two units on a 
different bus interconnected to Western Greece. The objective is to control the current flow through 
the cables with the generation level at Kastraki. 
 
 
Table 4-8 Voltage Security Margins (Feb.15th 2005, 18:30) 
Contingency Name    MW 
Line Megalopolis-Kalamata 0 
Line Patra-Lapa 10 
Unit GEN2 Kastraki 42 
Unit GEN4 Kastraki 42 
 
 
     (a) Voltage evolution after the loss of                                                      (b). System voltage profile after    
                    the line Patra-Lapa                                                                        the loss of the line Patra-Lapa. 
Figure 4-45 
 
On February 15th of 2005, real-time VSA showed a large difference in voltage security margins 
between the results of the 17:30 and 18:30 timestamps of the periodic execution. Although the 
security margins table of 17:30 did not include any contingency with a margin less than 1000 MW 
(with the exception of a few known outages with very local effect), the table of 18:30 included some 
contingencies at Kastraki and Peloponnese with zero or low margin, as shown in . No other indication 
of a problem (such as low voltages) appeared in the EMS SCADA or real-time state estimator results. 
An investigation on the validity of the above results showed that the reason was the opening of a 
Kastraki circuit breaker (bus coupler) at 17:45 that had separated the two units feeding Peloponnese 
for the afternoon high load period, as described above. The Peloponnese load increased between those 
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timestamps from 620 to 706 MW. Also, in February 2005, a high voltage transmission line in 
Peloponnese from Patra to Korinth was open at the Xilokastro substation, somewhere in the middle of 
the distance, due to a transmission expansion project, resulting in a longer electrical way from Korinth 
to Xilokastro and western Peloponnese.  
 
Figure 4-45(a) illustrates the voltage evolution at the Xilokastro substation after the outage of the 
Patra-Lapa line for the marginally stable and unstable cases. The voltage collapse in the unstable case 
is evident. The corresponding system voltage profile (Figure 4-45(b)) indicates that the area affected 
is close to Patra and extends to northern Peloponnese and the area of western Greece radially 
connected to Peloponnese. 
 
The interpretation of these results led to a change in the way of operating the Kastraki station circuit 
breaker. Afterwards, when the station is electrically divided in two parts, three (instead of two) units 
feed Peloponnese through the submarine cables, providing a larger generation reserve to that area, and 
thus resulting in higher voltage security margins. 
 
4.10.2.2 Summer 2005 case 
Voltage security problems have appeared in the Greek interconnected system in its southern part 
mainly during the summer, when the load reaches its maximum and the power transfer from North to 
South is high. After the blackout of summer 2004, several transmission reinforcements were 
introduced in the system as described in the next section. Therefore, the summer of 2005 was a crucial 
period for testing the limits of the upgraded system and monitoring its voltage security margins in 
real-time. On August 3rd, 2005 at 13:55, maximum load occurred in the system with a value of 9642 
MW. On that day (as well as the previous days) the real-time VSA results were closely monitored in 
order to spot contingencies resulting in voltage stability problems and indicate the nature of the 
problem and the available security margin. Based on that information, decisions could be made 



































































                         Figure 4-46.  Evolution of voltage security margins on August 3rd, 2005. 
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                        (a) PV curve for the double unit outage                                 (b) PV curve for the outage of  combined  
                             at Megalopolis (units 3,4).                                                      cycle at Komotini. 
                                                                                                  Figure 4-47 
 
All the contingencies that used to cause security problems in the Athens area (see next chapter), 
including those responsible for the July 2004 blackout, had in the Summer of 2005 an SOL larger than 
500 MW.  Figure 4-46 illustrates the evolution of the security margins, during that day, for the 
remaining three critical contingencies, namely generator outages in the power plants of Megalopolis 
(Peloponnese area) and Komotini (North-Eastern Greece). The value of 800 MW in the graph 
practically indicates margins larger or equal to 800, since this value is the maximum security margin 
considered in the analysis. The smallest margins appear during periods of high load conditions e.g. 
12:00-15:00 and 20:00-22:00. The N-2 contingency that involves the loss of units 3 and 4 at 
Megalopolis had a zero security margin for several hours during that day. Peloponnese has become 
the most vulnerable part of the grid regarding voltage security and thus, several transmission projects 
are planned for this area in order to reinforce the system. The contingency at plant Komotini (loss of 
all three units of the combined-cycle) has also zero security margin for a timestamp very close to 
maximum load.  Figure 4-47(a) and (b) show the regional PV curves for the contingencies at 
Megalopolis and Komotini (with zero margin close to maximum load). It can be seen that the 
Megalopolis contingency results in voltage instability in Peloponnese, since the load cannot be 
restored, while the Komotini contingency results in a marginal voltage instability in North-Eastern 
Greece. In general, operating conditions corresponding to such results, were considered satisfactory 
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Electricity Supply Board (ESB) is Ireland’s state owned electricity utility.  ESB’s National Grid is 
responsible for the dispatch of generation and the operation of the transmission system and electricity 
market.  It operates the National Control Centre (NCC) and a standby Emergency Control Centre 
(ECC), both located in Dublin.  In early 2001, ESB commenced a project to replace the main 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) / Energy Management Systems (EMS) at these 
locations and also to replace the associated Operator Training Simulator (OTS) and obsolescent 
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) equipment.  This section describes the architecture and main functions 




The new EMS is based on a distributed architecture with identical hardware and software components 
at both the NCC and ECC.   A simplified representation of the NCC system is provided in Figure 4-48  
, a replica of which is installed at the ECC.   The hosts are Intel based Windows 2000 servers and the 
clients are Windows XP workstations.    
 
 
Figure 4-48  National Control Centre Overview 
 
 
4.11.3 Power Applications 
For the purposes of this paper the power applications are divided into two groups.  The first group 
covers the traditional applications such as power flow, contingency analysis and reactive power 
management.  The second group covers the stability applications specified to meet the operational 
requirements of the ESB power system. 
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4.11.3.1 Traditional Applications 
 
State Estimator, Power Flow, Short Circuit Analysis (both single-phase and three-phase), Optimal 
Power Flow (OPF), Contingency Analysis, Security Enhancement and Voltage Var Dispatch (VVD) 
have been delivered as an integral part of the new EMS, each of which can be run in real-time and 
study modes.  Security Enhancement uses linear programming based OPF techniques to provide 
control strategies to the operator for the purposes of alleviating security violations and reducing 
operating costs.  Security constraints on both current state and simulated post-contingent states are 
addressed by providing several control strategies.  VVD is also an OPF based tool and it provides 
control recommendations to maintain system voltages within prescribed limits.  These 
recommendations are automatically computed as part of the real-time network analysis sequence and 
can be directly implemented in the power system via SCADA or can be made available to the 
operators as advisory recommendations.  
 
4.11.3.2 Stability Applications 
 
Two third party stability applications running on a dedicated server are integrated with the new EMS : 
  
- Voltage stability Analysis (VSA) : A VSA tool has been delivered to assist with the management 
of voltage stability issues which have arisen in recent years due to the significant growth in 
system demand (28% in 5 years) and the limited investment in network infrastructure.  The tool 
can operate in both real-time and study modes.  In real-time mode the application analyses data 
provided by the EMS via a dedicated utility know as ‘Dynamic Case Preparation’ (DCP) and 
returns alarms to the EMS if specified criteria are broken.  The operator can retrieve additional 
information from the VSA tool directly, if necessary, such as the MW margins to a collapse 
situation. The VSA tool also supports a workstation based study mode. 
 
- Transient Stability Analysis (TSA) : The requirement for dynamic analysis has been driven by 
the increasing flows on the 275kV inter-connector between the ESB system and Northern Ireland 
Electricity (NIE) system.  Currently, faults on either system can cause low frequency (1 to 1.5 Hz) 
damped oscillations on the inter-connector.  In order to manage the continued growth in system 
demand it is important to maximize imports across the inter-connector.  The new TSA tool will 
assist in the management of dynamic stability issues that could arise from this growth.  In a 
similar manner to VSA, TSA is provided with EMS data by the DCP utility enabling it to perform 
a base case analysis which assesses the secure operation of the current system condition under a 
set of credible contingencies.  The tool can also perform a transaction analysis which assesses the 
secure operation of a future system condition, defined by a power transaction under a set of 
credible contingencies. The security of the system is indicated by the specified security indices for 
the base case analysis, and the power transfer limit for the transaction analysis. The latter can 
further be used, together with the thermal and voltage security limits, to determine the Total 




ESB’s new EMS is equipped with a range of network and generation applications, specified to cope 
with the challenges of operating Ireland’s power system.  The system is based on industry standard 
hardware, a flexible web based GUI and communications technology that will facilitate improvements 
in the reliability and speed of telemetry acquisition.  The delivery of the new EMS has presented an 
opportunity to rationalize data interfaces to corporate systems and to standardize on a centralized data 
hub architecture.   
. 
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4.12 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Japan – TEPCO 
 
4.12.1 Scope 
The Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is one of ten electric power companies, which are 
responsible for the system operation of their own jurisdictions in Japan. TEPCO’s jurisdiction 
includes the metropolitan Tokyo area, and the peak demand as of this date is 64.3 GW recorded on 
July 24, 2001. 
 
The operation of this large and complex power system poses a considerable challenge for system 
operators. Transmission capacities in the EHV network are more frequently limited by transient 
stability constraints than by thermal limit constraints, and thus the implementation of TSA facilitates 
the stable and secure operation while minimizing the generation cost. 
 
As for voltage stability, TEPCO has built transmission lines to reinforce its EHV network and has 
installed static and dynamic reactive power sources since it experienced a massive blackout caused by 
voltage collapse in 1987. Therefore, credible contingencies don’t pose a serious threat to the TEPCO 
network in a daily operation. The implementation of VSA, however, has helped system operators 
monitor the security of the power system, considering extreme contingencies that are more severe 
than credible ones. 
 
TEPCO also has been developing a powerful transient screening program for the on-line DSA system. 
Name of this screening program is TEPCO-BCU. While TEPCO-BCU is still under development to 
apply to on-line DSA systems, TEPCO-BCU already has enough capability to screen out critical 
contingencies from a large number of contingencies in a very large power system in an off-line 
situation. For example, the TEPCO network planning section has installed a useful transient stability 
verification system that is based on TEPCO-BCU. This system can greatly reduce the effort required 
for transient stability analysis. 
 
4.12.2 Description of VSA Implementation 
4.12.2.1 Architecture 
 
The first version of the TEPCO VSA started its operation, just after the voltage collapse. It has been 
updated periodically, and now, the function runs on a set of EWS and client PCs. The architecture of 
current version of the TEPCO VSA is shown in Figure 4-49 . 
 
The terminal PCs in the figure are the MMI (Man Machine Interface) for VSA. By the terminal PCs, 
users can view the result of the on-line analysis, change settings for the calculation, and perform 
maintenance on equipment data. The terminal PCs are installed in the Central Load Dispatching 
Office, which is responsible for the generation-demand control, and in two System Load Dispatching 
Offices, which are responsible for the operation of the EHV network. 
 
4.12.2.2 State Estimation 
State estimation is carried out by the on-line voltage security monitoring EWS in the System Load 
Dispatching Office. The EWS obtains power flow data from the real-time database of EMS and 
produces input files for the voltage stability analysis through the state estimation function. 








































Figure 4-49 -Architecture of the TEPCO VSA 
 
 
The TEPCO system operating at 154 kV and above is modeled into the input files, which includes 
approximately 1,500 nodes, 1,500 branches, and 150 generators. (The system operating at 66kV and 
below is reduced as loads at the LV side buses in the 275/66 kV and 154/66 kV substations.) Almost 
all CB status, disconnector status, bus voltages, and power flows in the transmission lines are 





In order to realize the functions of the TEPCO VSA, the on-line voltage security monitoring EWS in 
the System Load Dispatching Office works with other systems and PCs. It repeats the following 
procedure on a 10-minute interval: 
 
• Obtains on-line data from real-time database of EMS 
• Obtains the actual generation schedule from the generation scheduling server 
• Carries out state estimation 
• Simulates a set of contingencies to obtain the post-contingency states 
• Increases total demand by 10% from post-contingency states, using the actual generation 
schedule 
• Draws P-V curves from 10% increased demand and present demand 
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The set of contingencies is selected before the procedure starts, and up to six contingencies can be 
included in the set. Since the TEPCO VSA assesses the voltage stability under 10% increased 
demand, it allows enough time for system operators to respond to the voltage stability results and take 
preventive measures. 
 
4.12.2.4 Results Visualization 
 
Figure 4-50 shows an output example of the TEPCO VSA. The result of the on-line analysis can be 
viewed at the terminal PCs installed in the three load dispatching offices, and is expressed by the P-V 
curves. The terminal PCs alert system operators when required margin for demand and voltage cannot 




4.12.2.5 VQC Simulation Program 
 
For the TEPCO VSA to simulate the demand increase of 10%, the automatic voltage controllers in the 
power system need to be modeled into the simulation program. EHV substations in the TEPCO 
network are equipped with Voltage and Reactive Power (Q) controllers (VQC) in order to regulate 
HV and LV side bus voltages, by controlling tap positions, shunt capacitors and shunt reactors [20]. In 
addition, most of generators in the TEPCO EHV system are equipped with Power System Voltage 
Regulators (PSVR) to regulate HV side voltage of step-up transformers [20]. These automatic voltage 
controllers, as well as AVR and SVC, are modeled in detail in the VQC Simulation program, 
developed by TEPCO, and the TEPCO VSA uses this program to simulate the demand increase. Data 
flow is shown in Figure 4-51  
 
The on-line voltage security monitoring EWS generates required input files for the VQC Simulation 
program, and sends these files to the eight PCs (PC1, PC2, ···, PC8) shown in Figure 4-49 . The VQC 
Simulation program is executed in these PCs, each of which is responsible for each pre-set 



















Figure 4-50 - Output example of the TEPCO VSA 
 




4.12.2.6 Off-line Function 
 
Last 400 days of captured and simulated data are stored in the TEPCO VSA and can be used for off-
line studies. Basic functions for off-line studies are same as those for on-line studies. 
 
4.12.3 The TEPCO-BCU: One of the most promising transient stability 
screening technique for powerful DSA system 
 
4.12.3.1 Introduction 
Modern energy management systems periodically perform the tasks of on-line power system static 
security assessment and control for ensuring the ability of the power system to withstand a set of 
credible contingencies (disturbances). The assessment involves the selection of the set of credible 
contingencies and then the evaluation of the system’s response to contingencies. Security control and 
optimization are concerned with the selection of control actions to ensure the system operating in the 
secure state. Various software packages for security assessment and control have been implemented in 
modern energy control centers. These packages provide comprehensive on-line security analysis and 
control based almost exclusively on steady-state analysis, making them applicable only to static 
security assessment and control [1]. These results currently are not executed in a closed-loop manner; 
instead they are presented to the operator, who accepts, modifies, or ignores them based on his/her 
engineering judgment.  
 
For many utilities around the world, there has been considerable pressure to increase power flows 
over existing transmission corridors, partly due to economic incentives (a trend towards deregulation 









































Figure 4-51 -Data flow 
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plants and transmission lines (environmental concerns). This consistent pressure has prompted the 
requirement for extending EMS to take account of dynamic security assessment (DSA) and control. 
Such extension, however, is a rather difficult task and requires several breakthroughs in measurement 
systems, analysis tools, computation methods and control schemes. Indeed, on-line DSA, concerned 
with power system stability/instability after contingencies, requires the handling of a large set of 
nonlinear differential equations in addition to the nonlinear algebraic equations involved in the static 
security assessment. The computational efforts required in on-line DSA is roughly three magnitudes 
higher than that for the SSA (static security assessment). This explains why dynamic security 
assessment and control has long remained in off-line activity. 
 
Hence, current power system operating environments have prompted the need to significantly enhance 
time-domain stability analysis programs to meet new requirements. For instance, it is often desirable 
in practice to perform many power system stability studies to examine the effects of different fault 
locations and types, various operating conditions, different network topologies, and control device 
characteristics. In addition, it is becoming advantageous to move transient stability analysis from the 
off-line planning area into the on-line operating environment. There are significant financial benefits 
expected from this movement. It appears that there is always significant incentive to find superior 
approaches for stability analysis and control. 
 
After decades of research and development in the direct methods, it has become clear that the time-
domain method approach in stability analysis cannot be completely replaced. Instead, the capabilities 
of the direct methods and the time-domain method should be used to complement each other. The 
current direction of development is to combine a direct method and a fast time-domain method into an 
integrated power system stability program to take advantage of the merit of both methods. The 
TEPCO-BCU is developed under this direction by integrating BCU method, improved BCU 
classifiers, and BCU-guide time domain method. TEPCO-BCU has been evaluated on several 
practical power system models. The evaluation results indicate that TEPCO-BCU works well with 
reliable transient stability assessment results and accurate energy margin calculations on several study 
power systems including a 12,000-bus test system. 
4.12.3.2 Dynamic Contingency Screening 
The strategy of using an effective scheme to screen out a large number of stable contingencies and 
capture critical contingencies and to apply detailed simulation programs only to potentially unstable 
contingencies is well recognized. This strategy has been successfully implemented in on-line SSA. 
The ability to screen several hundred contingencies to capture tens of the critical contingencies has 
made the on-line SSA feasible. This strategy can be applied to on-line DSA. Given a set of credible 
contingencies, the strategy would break the task of on-line DSA into two stages of assessments [2,3]: 
 
Stage 1: perform the task of dynamic contingency screening to fast screen out contingencies which are 
definitely stable from a set of credible contingencies 
 
Stage 2: perform detailed assessment of dynamic performance for each contingency remaining in 
Stage 1. 
 
Dynamic contingency screening is a fundamental function of an on-line DSA system. The overall 
computational speed of an on-line DSA system depends greatly on the effectiveness of the dynamic 
contingency screening, the objective of which is to identify contingencies which are definitely stable 
and thereby avoid further stability analysis for these contingencies. It is due to the definite 
classification of stable contingencies that considerable speed-up can be achieved for dynamic security 
assessment. Contingencies which are either undecided or identified as critical or unstable are then sent 
to the time-domain transient stability simulation program for further stability analysis.  
 
Several methods developed for on-line dynamic contingency screening have been reported in 
literature. These methods can be categorized as follows:   the energy function approach, the time-
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domain approach and the artificial intelligence (AI) approach. The time-domain approach involves the 
step-by-step simulation of each contingency for a few seconds, say 2 or 3 seconds, to filter out the 
very stable or very unstable contingencies. This approach may suffer from accuracy problem in 
identifying multi-swing stable or unstable contingencies. The artificial intelligence (AI) approaches, 
such as the pattern recognition technique, the expert system technique, the decision tree technique and 
the artificial neural network approach, all first perform extensive off-line numerical simulations 
aiming to capture the essential stability features of the system’s dynamic behavior. They then 
construct a classifier attempting to correctly classify new, unseen on-line contingencies. As such, the 
AI approach is likely to become ineffective for on-line application to current or near-future power 
systems if little correlation exists between on-line operational data and presumed off-line analysis 
data. 
 
The following requirements are essential for any candidate (classifier) intended to perform on-line 
dynamic contingency screening for current or near future power systems [3]: 
1) (Reliability measure) absolute capture of unstable contingencies as fast as possible; i.e. no 
unstable (single-swing or multi-swing) contingencies are missed. In other words, the ratio 
of the number of captured unstable contingencies to the number of actual unstable 
contingencies is 1. 
2) (Efficiency measure) high yield of screening out stable contingencies as fast as possible, 
i.e. the ratio of the number of stable contingencies detected to the number of actual stable 
contingencies is as close to 1 as possible. 
3) (On-line computation) little need of off-line computations and/or adjustments in order to 
meet with the constantly changing and uncertain operating conditions. 
4) (Speed measure) high speed, i.e. fast classification for each contingency case. 
5) (Performance measure) robust performance with respect to changes in power system 
operating conditions. 
 
The requirement of absolute capture of unstable contingencies is a reliability measure for dynamic 
contingency screening. This requirement is extremely important for on-line DSA. However, it is due 
to the nonlinear nature of the dynamic contingency screening problem that this requirement can best 
be met by a method with a strong analytical basis. The third requirement asserts that a desired 
dynamic contingency classifier is one which relies little on off-line information, computations and/or 
adjustments. This requirement arises because under current and near future power system operating 
environments, the correlation between on-line operational data and presumed off-line analysis data 
can be minimal or, in extreme cases, the two can be irrelevant to one another. In other words, in a not-
too-extreme case, off-line presumed analysis data may become unrelated to on-line operational data. 
This uncorrelated relationship is partly attributed to the imminent bulk power transactions resulting 
from deregulation. The first four requirements should not be degraded by different operating 
conditions as dictated by the requirement for robust performance. 
 
The current power system operating environments call for a great need to develop a dynamic 
contingency screening scheme which satisfies the above five essential requirements. The existing AI-
based methods for dynamic contingency screening all rely tremendously on extensive off-line 
simulation results. These methods unfortunately fail to meet the on-line computation requirement and 
cannot guarantee the reliability requirement. It is also not clear whether the time-domain based 
approach can meet these requirements. In this regard, the energy function based method can meet the 
requirements [2,3].  
4.12.3.3 The Architecture of TEPCO-BCU  
The TEPCO-BCU is an integrated package developed under joint multi-year efforts between Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, Tokyo, Japan and Bigwood systems, Inc., Ithaca, NY, USA, for fast and yet 
exact stability assessment and control (including accurate energy margin calculation and controlling 
UEP calculations) of large-scale power systems for on-line mode or on-line study mode, or off-line 
planning mode [4,5,6]. The algorithmic methods behind TEPCO-BCU include BCU method [7,8], 
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BCU classifiers [3,9], improved energy function construction [12], and BCU-guide time domain 
method [4]. Several advanced numerical implementations for BCU method have been developed in 
TEPCO-BCU. The improved energy function construction has been developed to overcome the long-
standing problem associated with the traditional numerical energy function which has been suffering 
from severe inaccuracy. 
The main functions of TEPCO-BCU include the following: 
• Fast screening of highly stable contingencies 
• Fast identification of insecure contingencies  
• Fast identification of critical contingencies 
• Computation of energy margin for transient stability assessment of each contingency 
• BCU-based fast computation of critical clearing time of each contingency 
• Contingency screening and ranking for transient stability in terms of energy margin or critical 
clearing time. 
• Detailed time-domain simulation of selected contingencies 
TEPCO-BCU performs dynamic security screening primarily through its (improved) BCU 
classifiers. The core techniques behind BCU classifiers are the BCU method [7,8]. Descriptions of the 
BCU method can be found in books such as [14-18]. The theoretical foundation of BCU method has 
been established in [7,11,13]. Another distinguished feature of TEPCO-BCU is that it provides useful 
information regarding derivation of preventive control against insecure contingencies and of 
enhancement control for critical contingencies. 
TEPCO-BCU is an integration of dynamic contingency screening and a fast time-domain stability 
program for performing on-line dynamic security assessments and control is shown in Figure 4-52 .  
 
There are two major components in this architecture: a dynamic contingency screening program made 
up of a sequence of BCU dynamic contingency classifiers and a fast and reliable time-domain 
transient stability simulation program. In this architecture, the function of the state monitor is to 
determine the need to initiate a new cycle of DSA based on the present state, network topology and 
the predictive data of the power system,. When a new cycle of DSA is warranted, a list of credible 
contingencies, along with information from the state estimator and topological analysis, are applied to 
the dynamic contingency screening program whose basic function is to screen out contingencies 
which are definitely stable. Contingencies which are classified to be definitely stable are eliminated 
from further analysis.  
 
It is the ability to perform dynamic contingency screening on a large number of contingencies and 
filter out a much smaller number of contingencies requiring further analysis that would make on-line 
DSA feasible. Contingencies which are either undecided or identified as unstable are then sent to the 
time-domain transient stability simulation program for detailed stability analysis. The block function 
of control actions decisions determines if timely post-fault contingency corrective actions such as 
automated remedial actions are feasible to steer the system from unacceptable conditions to an 
acceptable state. If appropriate corrective actions are not available, the block function of preventive 
actions determines the required pre-contingency preventive controls such as real power re-dispatches 
or line switching to maintain the system stability should the contingency occur. 
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Figure 4-52 An architecture for on-line dynamic security assessment and control 
 
 
In this architecture, a fast and yet reliable method for performing dynamic contingency screening 
plays a vital role in the overall process of on-line DSA. It is imperative that a dynamic contingency 
screening program satisfies the five requirements listed above. A sequence of BCU classifiers for on-
line dynamic contingency screening has been developed in [3]. A sequence of improved BCU 
classifiers for on-line dynamic contingency screening has been developed in [9]. The main design 
objective of BCU classifiers is to ensure that the five requirements listed above for on-line 
contingency screening are met. Contingencies which are classified as definitely stable at each 
classifier of BCU classifiers are eliminated from further analysis. The conservative nature of the BCU 
method ensures that the results obtained from BCU classifiers are also conservative (i.e. no unstable 
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cases are mis-classified to be stable). Classifying a stable contingency, either first-swing or multi-
swing, as unstable is the only scenario in which the BCU classifiers give conservative classifications. 
4.12.3.4 Evaluation of TEPCO-BCU 
To evaluate TEPCO-BCU program, we consider a large-scale power system consisting of more than 
12,000 buses and 1,300 generators. In this test data, the system was modeled by a network-preserving 
network representation. Of the 1,300 generators, 25% are classical modeled generators while 75% are 
detail-modeled generators with excitation system. A contingency list composed of 200 contingencies 
are considered 
 
Under on-line operating environments, it is generally true that a great majority of contingencies are 
stable and only a few contingencies are unstable. Indeed, the majority of contingencies in a 
contingency list associated with a well-planned power system should be highly stable in the sense of 
large CCTs (critical clear times). For highly stable contingencies, one may not be very interested in 
the their degree of stability or their accurate energy margins; instead the assurance of the assessment 
that they are indeed highly stable is the focus. On the other hand, all unstable contingencies and 
critical contingencies in the sense that its corresponding CCT and fault clearing time are close to each 
other must be all correctly identified.  
 
Of the 200 contingencies, 2 are unstable, about 20 are critically stable while the others are stable. The 
capture of unstable contingencies by TEPCO-BCU is 100%, i.e. no unstable (single-swing or multi-
swing) contingencies are missed. In other words, the ratio of the number of captured unstable 
contingencies to the number of actual unstable contingencies is 1. The ratio of the number of stable 
contingencies screened out by TEPCO-BCU to the number of actual stable contingencies is about 
86%. The average time per contingency by TEPCO-BCU on a single processor is 1.18 second. 
4.12.3.5 Development of Parallel TEPCO-BCU 
To meet the on-line dynamic contingency screening for large power systems, TEPCO-BCU needs to 
be implemented on a parallel processing architecture. Parallel processing is the simultaneous 
execution of the same task (split up and specially adapted) on multiple processors in order to obtain 
faster speed. The parallel nature can come from a single machine with multiple processors or multiple 
machines connected together to form a cluster. It is well recognized that every application function 
benefit from a parallel processing with a wide-range of efficiency. Some application functions are just 
unsuitable for parallel processing.  
 
The test bed system is made up of two IBM 236 IBM eServer xSeries Servers interconnected by a 
Gigabit Ethernet Switch. The configuration for each of the IBM 236 eServers is a follows: CPU:Xeon 
3.6 GHz – (Dual processors) with 2 MB L2 cache per Processor, Hyper-Threading Technology and 
Intel Extended Memory 64 Technology, 1 GB DDR II SDRAM - ECC - 400 MHz - PC2-3200, 
Storage Control: SCSI (Ultra320 SCSI) - PCI-X / 100 MHz (Adaptec AIC-7902), RAM: 1 GB 
(installed) / 16 GB (max) - DDR II SDRAM - ECC - 400 MHz - PC2-3200. 
 
TEPCO-BCU was run on the test data to determine the average time needed to process a contingency 
for each configuration tested. Two tests were ran, first using a single compute-node and then using 
two compute-nodes. Time was marked at the beginning of the test and again when TEPCO-BCU 
completed the screening to give the duration of the test or the wall clock time. Table 4-9 presents the 
average time per contingency per node and the average time per contingency per processor. The test 
shows that the parallel implementation of TEPCO-BCU cut the average processing time per node by 
50% when a second compute-node was added. This indicates that the reorganization of the TEPCO-
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Table 4-9 The average time per contingency per processor and the average time per 






















61 seconds 0.31 second 4 CPUs 1.22 second 
  
Table 4-10  presents data that was collected during the tests to record the total CPU time spent during 
the TEPCO-BCU run on processing of the contingencies. The average time per contingency per 
processor and the average time per contingency per node calculated from the total CPU time are also 
presented in the table. 
 
The following observations should be noted. 
• The average time per contingency per processor should remain essentially unchanged 
irrespective of the number of processors given uniform testing conditions.  
• The 2-node and 4-node test comparison is provided to observe the small degree of variation. 
Table 4-10 The average time per contingency per processor/per node 






















209.3 seconds 1.046 second 2 nodes 0.523 second 
  
Table 4-11 The wall clock time calculated to process 3,000 contingencies. The 
timings for the 1-node and the 2-node configurations are calculated for the 3,000 
contingencies directly from the test results. 
# of Compute Nodes 
 
Reference Wall Clock Time 
1 node Test results 29.5 minutes 
2 nodes Test results 15.5 minutes 
10 nodes Conservative Estimate 3.1 minutes 
  
The timings for the 1-node and the 2-node configurations are calculated for the 3,000 contingencies 
directly from the test results. A 5% overhead was used in the estimation of the 10-node timing, despite 
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the fact that the testing showed overhead to be in the vicinity of 3%, in order to be on the conservative 
side (Table 4-11 ). In addition, since the test dataset resulted in a high number of unstable and critical 
stable cases, it is likely that datasets that produce a more typical percentage of stable cases will result 
in even faster performance results for the TEPCO-BCU fast screening. 
4.12.3.6 Development of Security Constrained OPF Based on TEPCO-BCU  
Fast screening out of critical contingencies from a contingency list can be performed TEPCO-BCU 
system.  However, an operator may prefer not only stability assessment but also control solutions to 
instability problems.  In order to provide such solutions, a preliminary dynamic security constrained 
OPF algorithm, which is realized by applying the TEPCO-BCU engine, was proposed by [6].   
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To take dynamic stability constraint into account, we define a energy margin sensitivity as a function 






∂  (2) 
Sensitivity of (2) is calculated by TEPCO-BCU. To consider dynamic stability constraint, the 
following inequality constraint is sufficient because the energy margin mE  calculated by TEPCO-
BCU is conservative. 
  
    0t mE E− ≤   (3) 
where : Threshold value for energy margintE  
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0 : initial value of energy marginmE  
Applying the Lagrangian relaxation method to the above equations, the objective function with the 
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where : weight coefficientω  
 
The above optimization problem can be solved if the weight coefficient ω  is determined. To this end, 






































: initial generator output






 The dual variable vector λ  for constraint can be obtained by solving the above problem. Note 
that λ  means sensitivity of cost to energy margin; the sensitivity of cost to generator output  can be 





λ ∂∂  (7) 
Dynamic stability constraint can be considered as long as the cost coefficient β  of generators as 
described in equation (1) is modified.  




β β λ ∂= + ∂  (8) 
Consequently, security constrained OPF can be performed by using 'β  instead of β  in (1).  The 
proposed overall solution algorithm (SCOPF) for solving the transient security constrained OPF 
algorithm is shown as Figure 4-53  .  
 
We applied the SCOPF to a sample system shown in Figure 4-54  .  (Threshold Energy margin: 0.2, 
Maximum iteration: 10, initial cost coefficient β : (G1,G3)100.0, (G2,G4)110.0). 
 
A feasible solution was found in 3rd iteration.  Figure 4-55 lists the objective function value (fuel 
cost) and energy margins at each iteration.  The value on 1st iteration means a solution without 
dynamic security constraint.  We can see that an increase of energy margin is accompanied by an 
increase of fuel cost.  The additional cost can be explained as the `price’ to pay for satisfying the 
transient security constraint.    
 
The proposed technique is very useful because it can consider the dynamic security constraints as well 
as conventional constraints of OPF. To apply the proposed technique to EMS, there are several issues 
to be addressed; for example, the improvement of energy margin and its sensitivity calculation  is 
needed. 
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4.13 State-of-the Art of DSA in Malaysia – Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
 
Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB) is the national electricity utility company of Malaysia, with installed 
generation capacity of over 11 GW and a transmission grid operating at 500 kV, 275 kV, and 132 kV. Its 
power system is interconnected with Thailand (EGAT) through HVDC and interconnected with Singapore 
through 230 kV submarine cables. 
 
Voltage and transient stability has been a security constraint in the TNB transmission system. As a solution 
to this, TNB is in the process of deploying a real-time Dynamic Security Assessment System (DSAS). It is 
expected that DSAS will become a necessary and critical dispatch tool to improve TNB system reliability 
and to make system operations more economical. 
 
TNB’s DSAS is implemented by Powertech with assistance from TNB. The system is built on TNB’s 
existing EMS data platform with computation engines and user interface from Powertech’s DSAToolsTM 
software package. 
 
4.13.1 Requirements  
4.13.1.1 Scope  
 




TNB has strict static security requirements for the operation of its transmission system with the following 
criteria: 
 
• Thermal loading on transmission lines and transformers 
• Pre- and post-contingency voltage limits 
 




TNB performs voltage security assessment (VSA) based on the concept of the voltage stability margin using 





TNB performs transient security assessment (TSA) using the conventional time-domain based simulation 
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4.13.1.2 Performance Requirements 
 
DSAS is installed in a dedicated computer system at the TNB control center and operates in real time to 
provide TNB system operators and study engineers with critical information regarding the voltage security 
and transient security of the TNB system, including, 
 
(1) Voltage security and transient security status of a given system condition subject to all criterion 
contingencies. 
 
(2) Power transfer limits at key interfaces subject to voltage security and transient security constraints. 
 
(3) Effectiveness of corrective actions (i.e., relays and special protection systems) implemented at TNB 
for certain critical contingencies. 
 
The real-time DSAS has the following performance requirements: 
 
(1) Assessment cycles. A complete real time dynamic security assessment cycle is completed within 15 
minutes for both basecase and stability limit analysis (refer to the descriptions below for these 
terms). 
 
(2) System size. The current TNB real-time network models have about 800 buses and 110 generators. It 
is however recognized that such models will be expanded, as sub-transmission network will be 
gradually included in the real-time system models. 
 
(3) Models. The stability analysis modules include the following models:  
 
• Complete reactive capability models for major generators. 
• All dynamic models included in the existing TNB planning studies. 
• The HVDC model interconnecting TNB and EGAT. 
• Relay models and Special Protection Systems (SPS) that are critical for maintaining the system 
frequency, voltage, and transient security within the study time frame. 
 
(4) Contingencies. Within an assessment cycle, up to 1,000 contingencies are analyzed for the current 
system condition (this is referred to as the basecase analysis). These include N-1, selected N-2, and 
some special contingencies. For transient security analysis, each contingency includes a 10-second 
time-domain simulation. 
 
(5) Stability limit analysis. Within an assessment cycle, stability limits at 2 key interfaces are computed 
with any or all security criteria. Determination of each stability limit may be done with either of the 
following schemes: 
 
• If all contingencies are found to be secure for the current system condition, power transfer will 
be increased, with pre-specified powerflow dispatch methods, to a level beyond which the 
system will be insecure for at least one contingency. This gives the secure operation boundary 
for the system condition within which the system may be dispatched to meet the operation 
requirements. This is referred to as forward stability limit search. 
 
• If one (or more) contingency is found to be insecure for the current system condition, power 
transfer will be reduced, with pre-specified powerflow dispatch methods, until the system is 
secure for all contingencies. The required powerflow dispatches will then be presented to the 
system operators for immediate actions. This is referred to as backward stability limit search. 
 
For stability limit analysis, a reduced set of contingencies (about 250) is applied. 
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(6) Corrective action verification. The applicable under-frequency load shedding (UFLS), under-
voltage load shedding (UVLS), and special protection systems (SPS) are included in the security 
assessment to verify the effectiveness of these schemes for the deign contingencies and system 
conditions. 
 
(7) Software/hardware platform and interface. DSAS software operates on the MS Windows platform. 
User interface is fully graphical, and compliant to common Windows standards. 
 
4.13.2 DSAS Architecture 
4.13.2.1 Hardware View 
 



























Figure 4-56: TNB DSAS hardware view 
 
 
This system consists of several components: 
 
• Real-time DSA clients (2). These are 3.6 GHz dual CPU Xeon servers. The dual client structure is 
used to provide redundancy and failover protection, and to allow on-line system maintenance. At 
any given time, only one client is utilized; the other may be in live backup mode or in off-line 
maintenance mode. 
 
• Real-time DSA servers (5). These are 3.6 GHz dual CPU Xeon servers. These servers provide the 
computation power to perform security assessment. Computational scenarios are prepared and 
submitted to servers by the client. After the computations are finished, all results from each server 




.  .  .  .  .  .
User’s workstations 
Application Administrator: access DSA Manager through Terminal Service




• Off-line study servers
Data server
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• Off-line study server (1). This is a 3.6 GHz dual CPU Xeon server. This server is intended for the 
off-line studies that can be performed by engineers using either the archived real-time data or off-
line prepared planning cases. 
 
• Data server. The data server stores three types of data: 
 
(1) Real-time input data (such as powerflow and contingencies) sent from EMS. 
 
(2) Fixed input data for security assessment (such as generator dynamic data) that does not change 
for every real-time case. 
 
(3) Archived real-time analysis cases including all results. The current data server is set to store 
about 10 days of full DSA results as well as up to three months of the archived real-time cases. 
 
• User workstations. These are users’ regular desktop or laptop workstations. They can be used to 
monitor DSAS in real-time mode and also perform off-line studies. 
 
4.13.2.2 Software View 
 
As mentioned earlier, DSAS is driven by DSAToolsTM software package. Specifically, the following 
programs in DSAToolsTM package are used: 
 
• PSAT (Powerflow & Short-circuit Analysis Tool): this is used to perform powerflow solution for 
the incoming EMS SE powerflow data as a sanity checking tool. 
 
• VSAT (Voltage Security Assessment Tool): this is used to perform voltage security assessment. 
 
• TSAT (Transient Security Assessment Tool): this is used to perform transient security assessment. 
 
• DSA Manager: this consists of two applications that work together: 
 
? DSA Service: this manages all real-time DSA functions such as input data processing, 
computation task management, case archiving, etc. 
 
? DSA Manager (or DSA Monitor): this includes display and visualization functions for DSAS 
results. It can also be used to configure and customize DSAS features and functions. 
 
In addition to the above standard DSAToolsTM modules, a custom developed tool, Data Preparation Tool 
(DPT), was developed to interface with TNB EMS data platform and DSAToolsTM. 
 
The DSAS software operation is illustrated in Figure 4-57 
 
As shown in the figure, the DSAS software operates in the following manner: 
 
• The real-time system condition is captured by SCADA and passed to the Westinghouse EMS. This 
data is processed by the custom-built state estimator to provide the solved powerflow. This is a 
standard function in the EMS. 
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Figure 4-57 DSAS Sofwtare View
• DPT obtains the solved powerflow and converts it to the format accepted by DSAToolsTM. In 
addition, DPT creates other real-time data required by DSAS (such as contingencies). Once all real-
time data is ready, DPT sends it to the DSAS data server at a pre-set interval (currently at 30 
minutes) with a specified data exchange protocol. 
 
• The core software of DSAS is DSA Service running in the DSA client. Once DSA Service detects a 
new set of real-time data on the data server and DSAS is available (i.e., not case is being processed), 
a DSA computation cycle will be started. The operation of DSA Service can be customized by DSA 
Manager (also running in the DSA client) and can be monitored by DSA Monitor which can run on 
any authorized workstations in the network. 
 
• After computational cases for VSA and TSA are prepared by DSA Service, they are passed to 
VSAT and TSAT Client Services running in the DSA client. These services perform case/data 
integrity and consistency checks, and if no problems are found, the cases are sent to the DSA servers 
where they are picked up by VSAT and TSAT Server Services to go through the security 
assessment. 
 
• The computation results obtained in the DSA servers are sent by VSAT and TSAT Server Services 
back to the DSA client where they are assembled by DSA Service in the formats that can be 
displayed in DSA Monitor and stored in the Data Server. 
 
For the current TNB real-time network model and for the computational tasks described in Section 4.13.1.2, 
a DSA cycle can be completed in 10 minutes with the hardware described in Section 4.13.2.1. This meets 
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4.13.3 General Features 
 
In addition to achieving the performance requirements, the DSAS installed at TNB has a number of general 
application features, as outlines below. 
 
Security assessment options 
 
A wide range of security criteria is available for security assessment of the power system. These include, 
 
• Thermal loading 
• Static voltage limits 
• Voltage stability margin 
• Reactive power reserve margin 
• Transient stability margin 
• Damping of low frequency oscillations 
• Transient voltage violations 
• Transient frequency violations 
• Relay margin 
 
Application of these criteria is totally customizable. For example, when assessing voltage stability margin, 




In addition to the conventional models necessary for security assessment, advanced modeling is available to 
ensure the adequacy and accuracy of the on-line DSA results. One of such modeling capabilities is to 
represent the Special Protection Systems (SPS) employed in the TNB system. A sample SPS model is 
described in the next section. 
 
Data integrity and consistency check 
 
DSAS performs many data integrity and consistency checks, and applies appropriate fixes if necessary, to 
resolve possible problems from the real-time data captured. This is necessary as human intervention is not 




DSAS has comprehensive functionality to present the security assessment results including, 
 
• Voltage and transient security of the system for the given condition (basecase analysis): 
 
? Overall status of the system (secure or insecure) 
? Security trend analysis 
? Security history display 
? Potentially insecure contingency list (with contingency details such as fault location and 
circuits/units lost) 
? Security indices for potentially insecure contingencies 
? Responses (P-V curves, swing curves, etc.) of user-specified quantities for potentially 
insecure contingencies 
 
• If stability limit analysis is performed, limits (or security boundary) at key interfaces, the limiting 
powerflow dispatches, limiting security type, and the limiting contingencies. 
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• Full results of all archived history cases can be browsed easily. 
 
Some of the key DSAS results are also posted on TNB’s Intranet. Figure 4-58 shows a sample overload 
report. Such reporting capabilities make it convenient for operators, planners, and other personal to access 






























Robustness and reliability 
 
The use of the dual client and multiple server structure in DSAS helps provide superior robustness and 




DSAS uses the distributed computation technique to handle large amount of computations. This allows for 
the easy customization of the system for different computation performance requirements. For example, 
fewer servers can be used in a training system, or additional servers can be added to the production system 




DSAS has two levels of security measures for controlling its operation and accessing the computation 
results: 
 
• The first level manages the right for on-line system configuration changes with password-protected 
log-ins. Only authorized personnel (application administrators) can configure on-line system 
parameters such as security criteria. 
 
Figure 4-58  DSAS overload report on TNB’s Intranet 
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• The second level determines who can access the computation results by network broadcasting 
control. Only the designated users can receive on-line computation results and also gain access to 
the archived history case data. 
 
Data storage and case archiving  
 
Real-time cases analyzed can be archived in the data server using user-defined rules. An archived case 
contains full input data and computation parameters, as well as computation results. It is therefore possible 
to retrieve an archived case to 
 
• View details of the results obtained from real-time analysis 
 
• Perform additional off-line voltage security (with VSAT) or transient security (with TSAT) analysis 
using history data to investigate various study scenarios. 
 
Off-line study capabilities 
 
DSAS is integrated with Powertech’s off-line security assessment tools (programs in the DSAToolsTM 
package). These tools can be started from DSAS with options to open a selected archived real-time history 
case, or any off-line cases that the user has prepared. 
 
4.13.4 Special Modeling Features 
 
As mentioned earlier, TNB employs a number of Special Protection Systems (SPS) to protect its power grid 
following severe events (such as loss of multiple circuits). An SPS usually uses a look-up table to determine 
the necessary actions (generator, load, and/or circuit tripping) when the designed events occur. The look-up 
tables are obtained using off-line studies and updated periodically. It is therefore possible that the system 
conditions used in the look-up table computations are very different from a real-time system condition for 
which the SPS is armed. This calls for an important function for an on-line DSA system to validate (or even 
update) the SPS look-up tables for the real-time system conditions. Real-time SPS validation was one of the 
requirements for the on-line DSA system at TNB. Real-time updating of the look-up tables is currently 
considered as a future option for DSAS. 
 
The major issue in considering SPS in an on-line DSA system is its modeling, particularly the inclusion of 
look-up tables. Since such tables may be updated from time to time, it is not desirable to have a hard-coded 
model that is mostly machine readable. Rather, some degree of flexibility is required to allow data 
examination and change. In DSAS, this is handled by using the user-defined modeling approach. This is 
illustrated here with the FGTS scheme. 
 
The FGTS scheme is concerned with the PAKA power plant in the eastern TNB system. This power plant 
(with 12 units) is located in a region that is connected to the rest of the system through two transmission 
paths (Figure 4-59): 
 
• East corridor: this consists of six 275 kV circuits 
• PGAU–TMGR: this consists of two 275 kV circuits 
 
Under a rare common-mode failure scenario, the six circuits on the East Corridor may all be lost. If PAKA is 
in the high export mode, only the PGAU–TMGR path is available to take the power export to the rest of the 
system. This could cause system instability. The FGTS scheme is implemented to prevent such instability by 

































Figure 4-59: PAKA power plant and the neighboring region 
 
 















From Table 4-12, the number of units at PAKA armed for tripping by the FGTS scheme depends on the total 
MW flow on the two transmission paths (PGAU–TMGR and East Corridor). For example, when the total 
flow is between 900 and 1000 MW, 4 PAKA units are armed. If all six East Corridor circuits do get lost in a 
contingency, these armed units will be tripped. This look-up table is subject to update as the loads, 
generators, and transmission system in the region changes. 
 
This scheme is incorporated in DSAS with a user-defined model which has three components: 
 
1. Determination of the number (N) of units armed for tripping (Figure 4-60). 
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This component takes the initial MW flow on the two transmission paths and goes through some 
logic operation to determine the number of armed units according to the look-up table. For example, 
if the initial MW flow sum is 950 MW, it is clear that this logic will result in an output of 4 (that’s, 4 






















Figure 4-60: Determination of the number of armed units 
 
2. Detection of the tripping condition (C) (Figure 4-61). 
 
This component detects the status of all six circuits on the East Corridor. If they are all lost, the 








Figure 4-61: Detection of SPS tripping condition 
 
 
3. Tripping logic (Figure 4-62). 
 
This component does two things: 
 
• Rank the outputs of all 9 PAKA units that may be tripped so that units with higher outputs are 
tripped first if required. 
 
• Once the tripping condition is met (C is true), all armed units (those with ranking number 
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Figure 4-62: SPS tripping logic 
 
 
The SPS model created using the above method has the following advantages: 
 
• The entire model is in the format of TSAT user-defined model. It can be maintained easily with the 
graphical UDM Editor as shown in Figure 4-63. To use this model in TSAT simulations, simply 
specify it as one of the data files. 
• The model can be used for any system conditions and any contingencies. No tripping action is 
issued if the arming and/or tripping conditions are not met. 
• There is no need for any programming. 





























Figure 4-63: FGTS scheme viewed from TSAT UDM Editor 
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4.13.5 Operation Experience and Application Plan 
 
TNB’s DSAS is currently going through the full evaluation and trial operation stage. The VSA function is 
already being used for the day-ahead operational planning and also as the backup tool for system operators. 
 
The following are among the expected applications once DSAS is in full operation:  
 
• Remedial measure arming 
• Load forecasting 




TNB’s DSAS was designed and implemented in response to TNB’s requirements for the improved power 
system security and reliability. This system takes full advantages of the comprehensive off-line security 
assessment package DSAToolsTM and is completed with necessary features for on-line real-time operation. It 
is anticipated that this system will become a necessary and critical dispatch tool for TNB system operation 
once it is in full operation. 
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4.14 State-of-the-Art of DSA in New Zealand – Transpower 
 
Transpower (TP)  is the transmission Asset Owner and the System Operator in the New Zealand electricity 
supply industry. The System Operator group (SO) within Transpower provides the services of an 
Independent System Operator under contract to the Electricity Commission which oversees and controls the 
operation of the New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market.  The national grid owned and operated by 
Transpower includes voltage levels ranging from 220 kV down to 33 kV AC and a 1040MW HVDC link 
operating at 257 and 342 kV DC between North Island and South Island of new Zealand. 
 
The New Zealand Wholesale Electricity Market is a gross pool design market with a  peak demand of 
approximately 6500 MW. The SO provides a security constrained economic dispatch of the pool at five 
minute intervals using an n-1 security constrained DC OPF based dispatch engine (SPD). 
 
4.14.1 General Description 
 
Static Security  
 
The SO  is responsible  for operating the offered power system assets (transmission and generation) in a 
secure manner. In terms of the static security of the system, this requires that no item of plant should be 
operated beyond the rated capability determined by the asset owner.  
 
The SO uses industry standard EMS Contingency Analysis programs to analyze static security. In this 
analysis every credible contingency is analyzed for the components within SO’s oversight. Overloads on 
lines and transformers, over-voltage and under-voltage conditions, as well as maximum angle difference are 
all monitored during the contingency analysis. Some critical n-2 contingencies are also examined where 
these are considered credible contingencies.  
 
The monitored limits can be categorized as:  
 
• Thermal ratings of lines and transformers and terminal equipment  
• Over-voltage ratings  
• Under-voltage limits  
• Node pair angle difference limits  
• Interface flow limits (these limits tend to represent other dynamic forms of stability limits)  
The thermal constraints used for transmission circuits in SPD are designed to allow a 15 minutes off-load 
time for contingency loaded circuits..  
 
Voltage Security  
 
There are a number of voltage instability issues in  both islands in the New Zealand power system. The SO 
started using the voltage security assessment tool  (VSAT) developed by Powertech  from 2005 to address 
these voltage stability problems. The tool is used both on-line (realtime) and off-line (planning and 
investigation) applications for assessing voltage stability limits. VSAT has been integrated with the SO’s 
EMS systems from AREVA for real-time use. VSAT uses user Specified Scenario Definition, and performs 
Contingency Screening, Security Assessment, Transfer limit, and  Modal analysis (optional). For  on-line 
application, Areva has provided DCP (Dynamic case Preparation) and the data transfer takes place through 
the DCP. The input files it uses are: 
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− Source (dispatch group) and Sink (load area at risk) 
− Transaction - transfer from source to sink to find limit 
− Interface (Inflow) 
− Monitoring group 
− Contingency group 
− Calculation Parameters 
− Case Definition  
− Files can be common to more than one scenario 
 
The output files it uses are  
 
− VSA Power Transfer Limit Search 
− VSAT Limit Margin Summary 
− VSAT Scenario Overview 
 
The voltage stability constraints are then built in terms of interface flows and the transfer limits and applied 
in the SPD. 
 
 
Transient  and Small signal Security  
 
In the New Zealand power system there are a number of transient and dynamic instability issues. At present 
a large number of off-line studies are performed to determine the post-contingent stability response and 
damping response of the power system. These studies are used to derive constraints which define the stable 
operating limits. The constraints are then applied in the dispatch process (SPD). 
 
 
Frequency Security  
 
The SO needs to  maintain frequency to satisfy required frequency operating standards within each island in 
NZ Electricity Market.  
 
The SO calculates the instantaneous reserve required for N-1 generator , N-2 generator and HVDC pole 
outage contingencies using the reserve management tool (RMT), close to real time. The RMT interacts in 
real-time with the SPD, and  uses the cleared generations from the SPD to determine the net free reserves 
(NFRs) for different kinds of contingencies. The results of these studies (NFRs)  are embedded into the risk-
reserve constraints in SPD. SPD co-optimises the dispatch of energy and instantaneous reserve. The 
instantaneous reserve cleared through the co-optimisation will satisfy each of the constraints so that the 




   4-123
 
4.15 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Panama - ETESA 
4.15.1 General Description 
Panama’s bulk transmission network is longitudinal and encompasses several substations on the high voltage 
side of the grid (230 KV). In 2005, the maximum demand was approximately 957 MW. The load is 
concentrated mostly in Panama City, approximately 50% of it being supplied by generators situated in the 
west side of the country at about 250 miles away from the city.  
Reactive compensation is provided by three reactor banks and four capacitor banks. The reactors are 
strategically located in the central and western regions in order to prevent over voltages during low demand 
periods. The capacitors are used to raise the voltage during the maximum demand period and are located in 
the substation Panama near the load center. 
Although the real-time and study-mode network analysis and stability assessment tools used at the National 
Dispatch Center (CND) of Empresa Electrica de Transmision (ETESA)  since May 2002 have prevented 
major disturbances so far, nearly critical situations did occur, e.g. on August 22, 2002 when the system 
experienced low voltage conditions [2] that could have deteriorated into a blackout. 
The situation was quickly identified and successfully acted upon by the system operator and security 
engineers. The real-time stability analysis tool was successfully used in study-mode with historical data that 
reconstructed the system states during the event to assess the incident. The simulation results correctly 
indicated that the system was indeed approaching conditions that could have caused a blackout and were 
subsequently used in a report presented to the agents of the Panamanian Electricity Market. 
With the advent of the coordinated operation in Central America, it was further felt that the impact of the 
MW transfers in the region will have to be continuously monitored in order to detect and prevent the risk of 
blackouts. Since operators and security engineers must rely on the predicted distance to instability, CND 
considered important to validate the accuracy of the results computed by the voltage and steady-state 
stability application by comparing them with results from simulations conducted with the PSS/E load-flow 
and transient stability programs. 
The computations were performed at CND [5], [6]. The load-flow model covered the entire interconnected 
system in Central America, but the stability calculations focused only on the actual transmission network of 
ETESA. The study assumptions were based on the actual operating guidelines adopted at CND. The load 
modeling options of the stability tool were set to replicate the way PSS/E represents the load in load-flow 
calculations.  
Although the main benefit derived from the fast stability application is the ability to detect operating 
conditions that may lead to voltage collapse, it is felt that both the insight gained from the post-facto analysis 
of the August 22, 2002 near-blackout event, and the methodology deployed to validate the accuracy of the 
real-time voltage and steady-state stability assessment tool, are worth being presented to the community of 
experts interested in detecting and preventing the risk of blackout. The Panamanian experience in this area is 
briefly summarized in the following. 
4.15.1 Architecture 
4.15.1.1 Operational Environment and Integration with the Real-Time System 
CND is responsible for both the dispatching of the electric power system and the operation of the electricity 
market. The system dispatching tool consists of a SCADA/EMS Ranger™ implemented by ABBNM in 
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2001. The system encompasses a collection of Compaq (now HP) Alpha processors in dual redundant 
configuration running under Compaq Unix. 
Supported applications include conventional SCADA functions, load shedding, generation control, such as 
AGC and reserve monitoring, and real-time and study-mode network analysis, such as state estimation and 
dispatcher’s power flow. The SCADA/EMS also includes a Historical Information System (HIS) which 
stores the complete SCADA snapshot at every scan cycle and provides the ability to subsequently 
reconstruct past cases by using the state estimator in study mode. 
Seamless integrated with the Ranger SCADA/EMS Real-Time Network Analysis Sequence is a fast voltage 
and steady-state stability assessment tool (QuickStab [7]). This capability become fully operational in 2002 
and has been used on a daily basis to monitor the risk of voltage collapse. In addition, ETESA is also using 
the off-line PSS/E software provided by Siemens PTI to perform load-flow and transient stability analysis. 
The fast voltage and steady-state stability application was recompiled under Compaq Unix by ABBNM and 
runs on the Compaq Alpha server. It is not triggered automatically after each state estimation cycle, but it 
can be invoked manually at any time to evaluate the most recent state estimate. In addition, it can be 
executed in conjunction with the Dispatcher’s Power Flow, is available on the Dispatcher Training 
Simulator (DTS) and can be triggered in conjunction with cases reconstructed in study-mode from the HIS. 
4.15.1.2 Functional Description 
The real-time stability application is predicated on steady-state stability analysis and uses the method 
pioneered by Paul Dimo [1] and extensively described in the technical literature, e.g., [4] and related 
references. In a nutshell, the program starts from a load-flow solution or state estimate of the Central 
American interconnected network modeled in the SCADA/EMS and: 
? Computes the system-wide maximum loadability and safe system loading of the Panamanian transmission  
network for a user-defined security margin 
? Identifies the generators that may cause instability and ranks them, along with the tie-line injections, in 
the order of their impact on system’s stability 
? Computes the MW generation schedules for the system-wide critical and security margin states, as well 
as for an ideal, or hypothetical, state where the maximum loadability would be maximum. 
These calculations are performed on a system-wide basis. A more recent off-line version of the stability 
application is also used at CND and provides additional capabilities, e.g., voltage and steady-state stability 
analysis on a bus level, i.e., for any load-bus specified by the user.  
4.15.2 Distinguishing Features 
In addition to its computational speed, an important feature of the real-time stability analysis capability 
implemented by ABBNM in Panama is its seamless integration with the real-time system. On one hand, this 
provides the benefit of a single, consistent and uniform user interface. On the other hand, the user can run 
this application: with the most recent state estimate; with a load-flow case solved by the Dispatcher’s Power 
Flow; from the DTS; or with data retrieved from HIS. The later capability is best illustrated in the following.  
4.15.2.1 Post-Facto Analysis of August 22, 2002 Near-Blackout Event 
On August 22, 2002, Panama’s electrical grid experienced a major disturbance that started with a phase-to-
ground short-circuit and brought the system near voltage collapse. Neither significant frequency excursions nor 
transient phenomena took place, but the bus voltages throughout the system fell to critical levels. 
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The blackout was eventually averted, but the event had to be reported and explained to the Market Agents. The 
system’s behavior during the disturbance was reconstructed and analyzed, and a stability evaluation of the 
system conditions prior and during the event was performed. The data used for reconstructing the events were 
retrieved from HIS and the stability analysis was conducted with the real-time version of the voltage and 
steady-state stability application running on Ranger. 
Sequence of Events 
15:14:37.560 hours 
After a lightning strike on the PANAMA II - Bayano transmission line (Figure 4-65 - left), the phase C 
conductor remains hanged on the metallic pole and turns the fault into a permanent short-circuit. Line 
protections work correctly and open the line at both ends. Due to the rapidly changing real-time status 
indications and analog value readings, the state estimator’s execution is suspended and the real-time stability 
application is left without real-time input.  
15:15:00 hours 
Twenty-three seconds later, the COPESA generators trip also (Figure 4-65 - right). The frequency drops to 
59.79 Hz and the voltage reaches 211 KV. The primary regulation responds immediately and the system’s 
frequency goes back to normal (Figure 4-64 ). 
15:18:43 hours 
Approximately three minutes later the three PANAM power plant generators trip and the frequency and 
voltage drop to 59.71 Hz and 216 kV, respectively. The reduction of reactive supply is severe. Prior to 
tripping, each unit was generating approximately 6.36 MVArs for a total of 19.09 MVArs. Considering the 
8.43 MVArs lost from COPESA, the reactive power deficit now amounts to 27.52 MVArs. As a result, the 
system can’t meet the reactive demand from the distribution network and the voltage profile remains low. 
15:21 to 15:25 hours 
Since no generators are available to supply reactive power to the load center, the distribution companies are 
alerted of the situation and the system operator asks them to shed approximately 20 MW each. As shown in 
Figure 4-64 , the load reduction helped the frequency but didn’t solve the voltage problem. Therefore, the 












Figure 4-64 - Frequency and voltage excursions 
during the event 
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15:26 – 15:27 hours 
The three PANAM generating units that had tripped at 15:18:43 hours come back on line and are used to 
produce MVArs. 
15:30 hours 
The voltage profile begins to improve due to the reactive power supplied by the PANAM generators. 
Analysis 
The CND engineering group in charge of system security analyzed this event by using historical data from 
HIS. Since the state-estimator had been suspended during the event and couldn’t converge in study mode 
with snapshot data either, the last successful run before the event was taken as reference (Case 1). Then, two 
additional load-flows (Cases 2 and 3) were calculated with data taken from the real-time snapshots stored in 
HIS. These cases were subsequently analyzed with the real-time voltage and steady-state stability tool 
running in study-mode.  
The Case 1 indicated that the Panamanian grid was operating within acceptable security margins (Figure 
4-68). The generating units were up and running as scheduled. The total reactive demand was 229.49 
MVArs and the voltage levels were acceptable. 
The Case 2 was built from data retrieved immediately after the tripping of the line 230-2A and the loss of 
COPESA generation. The distance to steady-state instability is depicted in Figure 4-67. At that time, the 
network was relatively close to the security margin but the disturbance was in progress and the transmission 
grid was entering the “alert” zone (shown on the speedometer chart with yellow color). It’s important to 
note, however, that although the stability reserve (distance to instability) was acceptable, the operating point 
was slowly moving towards instability, i.e., the system’s critical state (shown in red). Note, also, that the 
total reactive demand had increased to 237.5 MVArs. 
In the third and last case of our analysis, the two PANAM units that had actually tripped during the event were 
outraged from the base case. As clearly shown in Figure 4-66, this caused the system to quickly approach the 
steady-state stability limit. The total reactive demand increased to 250.65 MVArs. These results are fully consistent 
with the real-time readings shown in the event’s chronology, where the loss of the third PANAM unit caused the 
voltage profile to reach near-critical values. 
 
The 22 August 2002 event brought the Panamanian high voltage transmission grid to near-blackout conditions 
due to a significant loss of reactive power supply near the load center. The post-facto steady-state stability 
analysis was performed with the real-time version of the stability tool by using historical data. The assessment 
indicated that after the COPESA and, subsequently, PANAM generators tripped, the system was operating in 
an unsafe region and was getting dangerously close to voltage collapse. The analysis also revealed that the 




Figure 4-68 Steady-state stability 
conditions before event 
Figure 4-67 Conditions after tripping 
of COPESA generation 
 
 
Figure 4-66 Getting closer to instability 
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4.15.3 Performance and Accuracy Testing of the Real-Time Voltage and Steady-
State Stability Tool 
4.15.3.1 Methodology 
The real-time stability tool used at the CND performs fast voltage and steady-state stability calculations that 
are predicated on the algorithm described in [4]. Given a state estimate or a solved load-flow, the program 
computes, in addition to several other indicators, the total system loading and the MW generation schedules 
for the: 
? Critical state where voltages collapse and units may get out of synchronism 
? Security Margin state that corresponds to a user-defined security margin, typically 15% below the 
critical state. 
Accuracy Testing of the Critical State Predictions 
If a load-flow calculation were executed with the MW generation schedules computed for the critical state, 
one of the following mutually exclusive outcomes would be expected: 
a. The load-flow solution was found critically stable, i.e., by further increasing the load, the system 
would become unstable 
b. The load-flow solution was found unstable by the stability tool 
c. The load-flow diverged and the generated MW would be reduced until a solution is obtained. 
The critical MW loading is not a fixed constant. It changes depending upon the topology, reactive compensation 
and voltage schedules in the base case. The critical MW is higher if the base case entails large amounts of reactive 
sources, and is lower when voltages are lower and reactive sources are fewer in the base case.  Therefore, the idea 
was to compare the stability limits predicted from the base case with those computed for a load-flow solution near 
instability -- and to repeat the procedure for different system MW and voltage levels. The first step of the 
procedure entailed solving a base case load-flow, called Case 1, for peak-load level conditions. 
The second step entailed running the stability tool to compute the: 
? MW output of the generators for the critical state 
? MW output of the generators for the security margin state corresponding to a steady-state stability reserve of 
15%. 
The third step consisted of executing a load-flow calculation with the generators’ MW computed by the 
stability tool for the critical state in Case 1. If the load-flow would converge, then: 
? Run the stability tool with the results of this “critical state load-flow” -- it was expected that the stability 
tool would find this new case either unstable or critically stable 
? Calculate new load-flows by maintaining the critical state MW schedules and increasing the slack-bus 
generation in small steps until the load-flow program diverges 
? Run again the stability tool for the last load-flow that converged -- this case should be found unstable by 
the stability assessment tool. 
If the “critical state load-flow” would diverge, reduce the slack-bus generation in small increments until 
convergence has been reached, then: 
? Run the stability tool again -- this case should be found either unstable or critically-stable 
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? Reduce by 1% the total generation and run a new load-flow, then execute the stability tool -- this case should 
be found either critically stable or stable but close to the stability limit. 
Repeat Steps 1 through 3 for scenarios with lower MW load and different levels of reactive compensation, 
e.g., medium-high and, respectively, medium-low load levels, then: 
? Calculate “security margin load-flows” by using the generators’ MW schedules determined by the 
stability tool for the security margin state in the peak, medium-high and medium-low load cases 
? Run the stability tool for the “security margin load-flows” and compare the results. 
Testing the Security Margin Predictions 
The security margin state corresponds to a “safe” MW system loading, referred to as security margin, such 
that, for any system state with a stability reserve smaller than this value, no contingency would cause 
transient instability [1], [3]. Just like the critical MW loading, the security margin, which is expressed as a 
percentage below the critical MW loading, is not a universal constant. It depends upon the specific 
combination of topology, loads, generators and reactive compensation, and must be determined and 
periodically reassessed for each particular transmission system through extensive transient stability 
simulations. The expected outcomes of such transient stability calculations are as follows: 
d. For load-flow cases with MW loadings higher than the security margin, at least one fault or 
contingency should result in transient instability 
e. For load-flow cases at the critical MW level, all the faults and contingencies cases should be 
unstable 
f. For load-flow cases where the system MW load is equal to, or below the security margin, all the 
fault and contingency cases should be stable. 
Since transient stability calculations are time consuming and require significant person power to prepare the 
data and set-up the study cases, and, also, in order to keep the stability tool accuracy testing effort to a 
reasonable level, the following procedure was followed: 
? Identify a small number of faults and contingencies known a prior to correspond to the worst case 
scenarios 
? Perform transient stability calculations for the base case and security margin state load-flow solutions 
for peak-load level conditions -- skip the critical state because, most probably, all the faults and 
contingencies would result in transient instability 
? Repeat the procedure for the medium-high and medium-low load level scenarios and, for these cases, 
run transient stability simulations also for the critical state. 
Accuracy Testing for Line Contingency Cases 
The theory predicts that during line contingencies the system gets closer to its stability limit -- when lines 
trip, the overall system reactance increases and, accordingly, the steady-state stability reserve decreases. If 
the procedure for testing the accuracy of the critical state predictions were repeated for a contingency case, 
one should except that the critical MW in the contingency case would be lower than the critical MW in the 
base case, i.e., the contingency case would have a smaller steady-state stability reserve -- and the same is 
true for the security margin, too. In order to verify the accuracy of the stability tool predictions for a 
contingency case, the complete validation suite was executed by starting from a load-flow base case that 
simulated a major line contingency at the medium-high load level scenario. 
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4.15.3.2 Load Level Scenarios 
The validation suite that was used to compare the stability tool calculation results with PSS/E load-flow 
computations included the following load-level scenarios: 
? Maximum Expected Demand – in this scenario, all the shunt capacitors are on-line, the shunt reactors are 
disconnected, and a small unit that normally is not needed to generate MW is brought on-line to generate 
MVArs. These reactive compensation sources ensure that the highest possible MW load can be met 
without risk of voltage collapse 
? Medium-High Demand – in this scenario, several steps are taken to reduce the reactive compensation: 15 
MVArs in capacitor banks are taken off-line; 40 MVArs in shunt reactors are reconnected; and the 
machine used to generate MVArs is not activated. These provisions in the load-flow set-up emulate the 
operating procedures at lower MW levels where the amount of reactive compensation is reduced to 
ensure that the system voltages would not violate the higher limits  
? Medium-Low Demand – this scenario is similar to the Medium-High scenario, but at a further reduced 
MW load level and 15 MVArs less in capacitor banks. 
4.15.3.3 Results 
? The outcome of the voltage and steady-state stability assessment tool accuracy testing performed at 
CND has been extensively documented [5] and will not be repeated herein. In order to provide a feeling 
of the experiment, however, we reproduce in the following the series of bar charts that illustrate the 





Figure 4-69 Accuracy testing results 
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Two important conclusions become instantly apparent: 
? The stability margins predicted by the stability tool are verified with great accuracy 
? The stability limit where voltages may collapse and units may get out of synchronism seams to shift 
upwards when the system MW loading increases. 
This conclusion is 100% consistent with the: 
? Study assumptions -- when the system moves from the medium-low demand towards the expected 
maximum demand, more and more reactive compensation is added the fore increasing the network’s 
maximum transfer capability 
? Computational algorithm used by the stability tool -- as shown in [4], during the “case worsening” step 
of the solution technique, the topology is assumed to be fixed, which, obviously, cannot reflect structural 
network modifications such as transformer tap changes, adding capacitors, and removing shunt reactors. 
But the maximum demand case also shows that when all the system reactive resources are used, i.e., when 
the network is in a state that cannot be improved any longer, the prediction of the distance to instability is 
very accurate -- in other words, the fast voltage and steady-state stability assessment tool performs better 
when it really counts. 
4.15.3.4 Performance 
For practical purposes, all the simulations performed with the stability tool converged instantly, which was 
expected both because the program is intrinsically fast and because the network area evaluated for stability 
encompassed only about 200 buses, out of approximately 1000 buses in the load-flow model of the Central 
American interconnected power system. 
In order to evaluate the performance of both system-wide and bus-level voltage and steady-state stability 
calculations for a large network, a 3289 bus power transmission system was modeled and analyzed. The 
system-wide calculations completed in 1 second, and the bus-level calculations converged at the rate of 
approximately 1 second per bus, on a PC equipped with Intel Pentium 4 running at 2.8 GHz. 
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4.16 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Romania - Transelectrica 
4.16.1 General Description 
4.16.1.1 Background 
The Romanian power system engineers have been aware of the need to evaluate the stability conditions of 
the electric power system, and to do it as often as possible, for a very long time. As early as the late 1950s, 
Paul Dimo and other Romanian experts had developed techniques for fast steady-state stability assessment 
by quantifying the distance to instability via the steady-state stability reserve indicator, and by identifying a 
security margin, i.e., a safe distance to the state where voltages may collapse and generating units may get 
out of synchronism. Starting with the early 1960s, this solution technique has been extensively documented 
in the European literature and used, on a daily basis, in operations and planning [6], [7], [8], [9]. In fact, the 
Special Report of CIGRE Group 32 prepared by M. Magnien in 1964 stated explicitly that “any network that 
meets the steady-state stability conditions can withstand dynamic perturbations and end in a stable operating 
state” -- where “…meets steady-state stability conditions” was meant to imply that the steady-state stability 
reserve of the operating point would be big enough for the network to remain stable for any credible 
contingency [14]. 
Of course, at that time there was no question of doing this kind of computations in real-time, but the 
technique pioneered by Paul Dimo was introduced in the United States in the early 1990s [23], [29] as a 
strong candidate for real-time implementation and, just a few years down the road, it started to gain 
acceptance -- initially off-line [10], and then, after 2002, in real-time SCADA/EMS installations[20], [21], 
[22], [30]. Then there’s another venue where the Romanian experts have pioneered the development of fast 
technologies aimed at assessing the risk of blackout -- the detection, evaluation and ranking of transmission 
paths, or links, between “source” and “sink” areas that have stability limitations and, if the MW transfer 
between the two areas at each side of the link exceeds a certain value, may cause instability [17], [18], [24]. 
These techniques form the background for the real-time and off-line stability assessment tools used by 
Transelectrica S.A. (Transelectrica). An enhanced version of Paul Dimo’s fast stability assessment method 
[20] has been seamlessly integrated by AREVA T&D on the SCADA/EMS solution delivered to 
Transelectrica. The voltage and steady-state stability application, known as QuickStab [30], is executed 
automatically after each successful state estimate. 
The real-time monitoring of the distance to instability, both on a system level and across critical area 
interfaces, represents a first, and very efficient, line of defense against blackouts. The next step consists of 
periodically performing detailed off-line simulations predicated on what-if scenarios. This functionality is 
supported by two off-line stability assessment applications -- Eurostag, developed by Tractebel, and SAMI, 
which is a stability analysis application developed by Romanian engineers based on the technique published 
in [4]. 
4.16.1.2 Computational Methods and Features 
In the context of electricity market operations, a primary concern is the ability to transfer power across large 
interconnected networks while meeting a broad range of operating reliability constraints. A common 
scenario consists of compensating load increases and/or generation outages in a system area by raising the 
generation elsewhere. These energy transactions typically encompass vast multi-area systems and may cause 
parallel flows, excessive network loadings and low bus voltages. Under certain conditions, such degraded 
states may lead to blackouts. The analysis of recent blackouts due to instability revealed that most of them 
follow a similar pattern: 
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? Large MW blocks get transferred from areas with inexpensively priced energy toward areas where the 
load demand has increased due to an actual increase in load, or perhaps because one or several local 
generating units are scheduled for maintenance, or simply because the local generation is too expensive 
? As a result, certain transmission paths get loaded closer and closer to their stability limits and their 
stability reserves get smaller and smaller 
? At this moment, a generation or transmission outage takes place. Typically, such incidents evolve into 
cascading outages 
? Since the link was already operating with a small stability reserve, the physical phenomena leading to 
blackout are triggered and the wide-spread disturbance becomes unavoidable. 
In order to ensure that the grid does not get too close to its stability limits, one should evaluate both the risk 
of steady-state instability and voltage collapse and the maximum transfer capability across the transmission 
paths that interconnect the areas involved in such transactions. In order to provide for an effective defense 
against blackouts, this assessment should be performed continuously, which obviously leads to the need to 
monitor the stability limits in real-time. 
Distance to Instability 
Traditionally, the operating reliability studies encompass: 
? Load-flow and contingency evaluation 
? Stability assessment. 
An important goal of stability assessment is to determine whether the system can withstand a set of large, yet 
credible, contingencies. This is the realm of transient stability analysis.  An equally important objective is to 
evaluate the risk of approaching instability in small steps, e.g., via small load changes accompanied by slow 
bus voltage changes that may trigger a voltage collapse, or by gradual load changes that may eventually 
cause one or several generators to get out of synchronism. Traditionally, this topic has been addressed by 
steady-state stability analysis. At the present time, the industry refers to it as “voltage stability analysis”, but 
this terminology is neither uniformly understood nor universally accepted. In order to avoid confusion, 
throughout this section we will say voltage and steady-state stability analysis. 
There is no way to handle all the aspects of stability at once. Each one requires detailed models and adequate 
tools tailored to the physical phenomena being evaluated. The problem becomes even more complex when 
the target is a vast interconnected system. The sheer amount of data, the large computing times, and the 
technical skills needed to interpret the results render the analysis difficult. 
The latter point is not academic. Even if computational speed is achieved and the stability calculations are 
performed in real-time, or, as a minimum, off-line with real-time data, the end-users may have neither the 
time nor the background needed to assess the results. This opens the door for fast methods that not only are 
based on sound modeling assumptions but also produce the output in formats that are easy to interpret and 
understand. 
On the transient stability venue, much work was done to develop “transient stability indices” and other tools that 
would determine the “degree of stability” [31]. These techniques provide for a comprehensive analysis but are 
hampered by computational burden and non-convergence of load-flow calculations near instability. Voltage 
stability analysis tools, on the other hand, are quite popular but have their own limitations. 
To begin with, the results are affected by the assumptions made about the load. Ionescu and Ungureanu [16] 
demonstrated that if the loads were modeled as constant impedances, successive load increases would first cause 
the generated MW to increase until the point of maximum power transfer -- and then, beyond that point, the total 
generated power would get smaller and dual power states (same power at different voltages) would be obtained, 
which is the reason for the “nose” shape of the PV curves. But dual states cannot happen in real life and more 
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realistic load models lead to P-V graphs that stop at the point of instability. Also questionable is the practice of 
“assessing” voltage stability by running load-flows at successively increased load levels and stopping when the 
load-flow diverged [19], [28, pp. 1380]. 
As shown in the following, however, a fast and reasonably accurate solution to the problem of 
quantifying the distance to instability and performing the calculations in real-time comes from the realm 
of steady-state stability. Conceptually, the “stability limit” is a local property of the system state vector: for 
each new solution of the system of equations that describe the system state there is a new stability limit. 
Each time static capacitors and shunt reactors are switched, the reactive compensation varies and the voltage 
profile and stability conditions change. Likewise, each transformer tap change, line switching, load variation and 
generator trip may affect the distance to instability. Simply stated, “stability limits” exist, are not fixed, and 
change with the system’s loading, topology and voltage profile. It is precisely this changing nature of the 
“stability limits” that makes it necessary to recompute them after each state estimate and after each load-flow 
computation. 
The Steady-State Stability Connection 
Steady-state stability is the stability of the system under conditions of gradual or relatively slow changes in 
load  [5]. Accordingly, the Steady-State Stability Limit (SSSL) of a power system is “a steady-state operating 
condition for which the power system is steady-state stable but for which an arbitrarily small change in any of 
the operating quantities in an unfavorable direction causes the power system to loose stability” [32]. 
Voltage collapse, units getting out of synchronism, and instability caused by self-amplifying small-signal 
oscillations are all forms of steady-state instability. Empirically, the risk of steady-state instability is 
associated with low real/reactive power reserves, low voltage levels, and large bus voltage variations for 
small load or generated power changes. Recurring “temporary faults” where breakers trip without apparent 
reason, i.e., are disconnected by protection without being able to identify the fault, might also be indicative 
of steady-state instability. Breaker trips can happen when loads increase due to “balancing rotors” of 
generators that operate near instability trip, and then get back in synchronism.  
The importance of computing the SSSL for any given state does not stem from an improbable wish to operate at 
such a dangerous limit -- knowing this limit is important 
because it allows determining the steady-state stability 
reserve, which is a system-wide index that quantifies the 
distance between the operating state and the system loading 
near instability. 
Also, the SSSL makes it possible to define a safe system 
loading, or security margin, as a percentage of SSSL such 
that, for system conditions below this margin, transient 
instability is unlikely to occur [14]. Simply stated, the 
concept of security margin allows identifying a "stability 
envelope" that is very similar in nature to the TRM.  
The security margin, which is expressed as a percentage of 
the SSSL, depends upon the specific combination of 
topology, loads, generators and reactive compensation. It  must be determined and periodically reassessed 
via off-line studies, perhaps once or twice a year, for each particular transmission system. For example, 
extensive studies conducted in Romania in the 1960s and 1970s on the power system as it was at that time 
recommended that the security margin be set at 15% for normal operating conditions and at 8% for 
contingency cases [8]. These values are still used today in system dispatching but they are re-evaluated on a 
yearly basis. There is no mathematical formula relating the security margin and the SSSL, but an empirical 
approach has been developed [27] based on the following heuristic: 
 
 
Figure 4-70  The "stability envelope" concept 
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1. Start with a base case load-flow for peak load conditions and compute the SSSL and related security 
margin. 
2. Run an extensive suite of transient stability simulations. If no instability has been detected, go to Step 5. 
If at least one contingency (fault) case was found to be unstable, go to Step 3. 
3. Use the Step 1 security margin MW generation schedules to calculate a new base case load-flow. 
4. For the load-flow computed in Step 3, run an extensive suite of transient stability simulations. 
5. If no instability has been detected, repeat Step 4 for successively increased MW levels until at least one 
contingency causes transient instability. The steady-state stability reserve for the immediately precedent 
state is the security margin of the system under evaluation. 
6. If the stability calculations in Step 4 detected at least one contingency (fault) that would cause 
instability, build a new load-flow case for a slightly reduced load level and repeat the transient stability 
checks. If no instability has been detected, recalculate the SSSL and the steady-state stability reserve, 
which is the security margin of the system under evaluation. 
The importance of this concept resides in the fact that, once a percent value of the security margin has been 
determined and accepted, the computation of the MW value of the security margin becomes a by-product of 
the fast voltage and state-state stability assessment algorithm.  
Stability Constrained Links 
For vast interconnected systems it is essential to assess stability when large blocks of power are transferred 
across the network. This, in turn, requires evaluating the maximum transfer capability across “links”, i.e., 
between the areas that get involved in the transactions, when a reduction in generation in one area is 
compensated by raising the generation elsewhere. In this context, and without diminishing the importance of 
conventional voltage, small signal and transient stability analysis, it becomes clear that the assessment of the 
maximum loadability of a transmission system for a given operating state should encompass both the: 
? Computation of the system-wide3 steady-state stability reserve and security margin, and the 
? Evaluation of the maximum power transfer capability and related steady-state stability reserve across 
certain links, or transmission corridors, when large blocks of MW are transferred between system areas. 
A link identifies a group of transmission lines that form a topological cut-set, i.e., their removal splits the 
network in two areas, one on each side of the link. The maximum power that can be transferred across a link 
is limited by thermal and stability constraints. In a sense, the concept of "stability constrained link" is similar 
to the concept of “congestion path”, with the difference that the former is concerned with stability, rather 
than thermal, violations. "Stability constrained links" may appear in any multi-area power system where 
large MW blocks are transferred between weakly interconnected areas. 
For example, the populated areas and industrial zones in Romania are aggregated in concentric areas divided 
by the Carpathian mountain chain. In the center there is a highly meshed 110 kV network sustained by a 220 
- 400 kV backbone. Around the center there is an outer ring of major power plants that inject their output 
into a strong 220 - 400 - 750 kV transmission system. The power flows from south-southwest towards the 
center, from south-southeast towards the northeastern part of the outer ring, and from the northern part of the 
central area towards the northeastern part of the outer ring. 5 stability constrained links have been identified. 
The sub-areas circumscribed by these links are not necessarily disjoint, and some of them overlap. They are 
not fixed, either, and change depending upon the pattern of load, generating reserves, transmission outages, 
line flows, voltage levels and reactive resources. 
 
                                                     
3  In the case of large multi-area networks, "system-wide computations" should be understood as computations performed at the level of 
one or several areas, or sub-areas 
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Fast Voltage and Steady-State Stability Assessment 
As shown in [20], [21], [22], approaching the “stability limit” from the perspective of steady-state stability 
analysis brings promising results. 
First, the SSSL of the system as a whole is mathematically definable and does represent an operating limit. 
Then, SSSL can be quantified: it is the maximum MW loading of the transmission system, including both 
internal generation and tie-line imports, right before instability. In other words, it is possible to measure how 
far from SSSL is a given operating state. Known as steady-state stability reserve, this metric has been used 
in Europe since 1950s [6], [7], [8], [15] and it can be expressed as a percentage of SSSL. Most importantly, 
it is also possible to quantify a “safe” amount of stability reserve, referred to as security margin, such that, 
for any system state with a steady-state stability reserve smaller than the security margin, no contingency, no 
matter how severe, would cause instability. 
Each system has its own security margin. For example, for the power system of Romania, as it was in the 
1960s and 1970s, Paul Dimo and his colleagues were recommending a 20% security margin [8]. Reference 
[27] describes the procedure used by ETESA, Panama, to validate the value of the security margin (15%) 
that is currently used in conjunction with its real-time stability assessment application.  
The fast and versatile voltage and steady-state stability assessment technique developed by Paul Dimo [6], 
[7], [9] was predicated on this background. Its validity and usefulness for real-time applications were 
demonstrated in the EPRI Research Project RP2473-43 [29] and presented in various US and international 
publications [10], [20], [23].  In a nutshell, this technique uses the: 
? Short-circuit currents transformation to convert the meshed network to a radial scheme of short-circuit 
admittances 
? Bruk-Markovic reactive power stability criterion dΔQ/dV to evaluate stability 
? Classic representation of generators via a constant e.m.f. behind the transient reactance x'd 
? Zero Power Balance Network to aggregate the system loads into a single load-center 
? Case worsening procedure, instead of a succession of load-flow computations, to stress the system until 
it becomes unstable. 
The reader interested in further details is directed to [6], [9], [20], [29] and related references. The following 
sections focus upon the approach taken by Transelectrica and AREVA T&D (AREVA) to implement this 
technique in real-time and to deploy it to continuously monitor the power system’s distance to instability -- 
by using real-time data, performing split second computations and presenting the results on user-friendly 
charts and diagrams. 
4.16.2 Architecture 
4.16.2.1 Hardware and System Environment 
The dispatching of the electric power system and the operation of the electricity market in Romania are 
supported by an integrated information system that creates and maintains an extensive raw data and 
processed information reservoir available, based on appropriate access jurisdiction, to all the electricity 
market agents in Romania. This information architecture encompasses a Hierarchical SCADA/EMS and a 
Balancing Market System. Both systems are operated by Transelectrica and are located at the National 
Dispatch Center (DEN). 
Transelectrica’s SCADA/EMS encompasses an extended array of system dispatching support applications: 
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? SCADA applications, such as: analog, status & accumulator data processing; limit checking; value 
replacement; calculations; historical data recording; intersite data processing; tagging; controls; and load 
shedding 
? Generation Control and Scheduling applications, including: AGC; reserve monitoring; AGC 
performance monitoring; historic loss model update; transaction scheduling; transaction evaluation; load 
forecasting; market interface 
? Network Analysis applications such as: topology processing; state estimation; real-time stability 
monitoring (QuickStab); monitored element processing, bus load  model  update; loss  sensitivities; 
contingency analysis; security enhancement; power flow; optimal power flow/voltage VAr dispatch; off-
line short-circuit analysis; and off-line stability analysis (Eurostag). 
4.16.2.2 Functional Description 
The Romanian network sustains MW transfers between parties situated beyond its geographical borders and, 
to further complicate things, consists of electrical areas interconnected through stability constrained links. 
The system operation is quite complex and, in order to maximize the use of the grid while avoiding 
blackouts, the dispatchers continuously monitor the: 
? Distance to the voltage and steady-state stability limit and the safe operating margin of the system as a 
whole 
? Stability reserve across the interfaces between system areas separated by stability constrained links. 
The calculations are performed both for the entire interconnected system of Romania and for the areas on 
each side of the "stability constrained links" that were identified via off-line studies. The "stability 
constrained links", or weak transmission paths where the primary limitation comes from stability 
considerations, rather than thermal limits, are dynamically reconfigurable. 
The configuration of the stability constrained links  is periodically re-assessed off-line with an application 
that identifies, for a given load-flow solution, all the links in the network and computes the steady-state 
stability reserve index for each link [17], [18]. The security constrained links are then ranked in the 
descending order of their steady-state stability reserve and the most critical five are selected. This procedure 
is executed twice a year. 
Since the actual stability limits across the links may differ substantially from those computed off-line for the 
postulated conditions, the problem is solved in real-time by QuickStab which computes the stability reserves 
both for the entire system and for the areas separated by the most severe constrained links in the network. 
4.16.2.3 Seamless Integration of the Real-Time Stability Function with the Network 
Analysis Subsystem  
Figure 4-71 illustrates how the fast voltage and steady-state stability application was seamlessly integrated 
in the real-time network analysis sequence of Transelectrica’s SCADA/EMS. After a successful state 
estimation run, a snapshot file in a standard format (PSS/E) is created and, together with a dynamic 
generator data file is used as input by QuickStab. The application predicts the maximum power transfer (or 
MW loadability) of the transmission network and computes the distance to the critical state where steady-
state instability occurs. The distances to the stability margin state (user specified margin) and the optimal 
state (re-dispatching of generation to maximize the distance to critical state) are also evaluated. 




4.16.2.4 Off-Line Stability Assessment with Real-Time Data 
In addition to real-time stability monitoring, which supplements the conventional real-time and study mode 
network analysis, Transelectrica also performs off-line stability assessment by using load-flow and state 
estimation cases from the real-time system. The off-line stability assessment is performed with Eurostag, 
from Tractebel, and SAMI, which is an off-line stability application developed in-house based on the 
solution technique described in [4]. The data interfaces between the real-time system and Eurostag and, 
respectively, SAMI are shown in Figure 4-72. 
 
 
 Figure 4-71 Integration of QuickStab with the real-time network analysis sequence 
 
 
Figure 4-72  Off-line integration of Eurostag and SAMI with the Transelectrica’s SCADA/EMS 
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4.16.2.5 Other DSA Tools Supported by AREVA 
In the frame of its other EMS projects, AREVA has implemented real-time and study interface between its 
Energy Management System (e-terraplatform®) and the following Dynamic Stability Assessment (DSA) 
packages: Voltage Stability Assessment Tool (VSAT) and Transient Stability Assessment Tool (TSAT) 
from Powertech Labs (Figure 4-73). 
The interface between EMS and DSA packages is provided through the following components: 
? Stability scenarios definition and validation on the EMS platform using the Dynamic Case Preparation 
(DCP) application 
? Data exchange between the EMS and the VSAT/TSAT server 
? Stability analysis output results and visualization on the EMS platform 
4.16.3 Distinguishing Features of the Real-Time Stability Application 
The results are posted on intuitive graphics, including the industry-unique real-time stability trending chart. 
The trend of the stability indices over several hours provides very useful information about the stability 
evolution over time, as shown in Figure 4-74. The information that is relevant to the system dispatchers is 
summarized in a results table display and in a bar chart providing a graphical indication of the current 
stability reserve as displayed. Furthermore, after each analysis an alarm is sounded if the stability reserve 
percentage is below a user-specified danger level. 
This approach to visualizing the computational results in a user-friendly manner allows the operator 
to continuously monitor, on standard SCADA trending displays, the evolution of the stability 
reserve both for the interconnected system and for the areas separated by stability constrained links. 
At the present time, the real-time monitoring of the distance to instability at Transelectrica is 
 
Figure 4-73 DSA integration with e-terraPlatform® 
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performed both via conventional flat panel monitors and on the video projection system installed in 
the control room. 
 
4.16.4 Performance and Reliability 
The performance of Transelectrica’s real-time stability application is best illustrated by saying that, after 
each successful run of the state estimator, 6 (six) real-time stability calculations are performed -- one 
stability calculation for the entire Romanian transmission system, which encompasses approximately 1000 
buses, and 5 additional stability calculations for each area that is connected with o the rest of the system via 
stability constrained links. Each real-time stability calculation is performed in less than 1 (one) second. The 
complete set of 6 real-time stability runs is executed in 3 to 4 seconds, depending upon the loading of the 
SCADA/EMS servers. 
No reliability problems have been detected. Of course, in order for the system to work, a converged state 
estimate is needed in the first place, which, in turn, requires that a minimum set of RTUs be available to 
ensure sufficient status and analog data redundancy -- but these are sine qua non conditions that apply to any 
real-time network analysis system and are not specific to the stability assessment functionality. 
 
Figure 4-74 Real-time stability monitoring display (left) and trending charts (right) at Transelectrica 
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4.16.5 Operating Experience Benefits 
Transelectrica has a track record of successfully using the stability assessment technology developed by 
Dimo, as summarized in the previous sections and further described in detail in [10], [13], [25] and related 
references. The steady-state stability reserve concept was formally introduced in operations and planning in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s [12], [20], it has been used ever since, and its computation is a standard 
component of the operational and planning studies conducted at Transelectrica. The fast voltage and steady-
state stability assessment application described herein was first implemented off-line in 2003 [1], then it was 
implemented in real-time in 2005 and became fully operational in early 2006. 
Today, the real-time monitoring of the risk of blackout is one of the key software tools used at DEN. It helps 
anticipate critical system conditions that may lead to instability and allows the system dispatchers to 
maintain and enhance the operating reliability of the Romanian transmission system.  
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4.17 State-of-the-Art of DSA in Russia 
 
Although no current Russian Cigre member was available as a contributor to this report, contributors were 
available whom had previously worked in the Russian (formerly USSR) system and were able to provide 
some insight, through selected publications [1-5], into the use of DSA the that region of the world. 
 
4.17.1 Overview of the Russian Power System 
 
The Unified Electric Power System (UPS) of Russia has been touted as the worlds largest centrally 
controlled power system interconnection which boasts of high reliability (annual outage duration of 5-6 




The UPS has a number of distinguishing 
features which make security assessment 
and control a significant challenge [1]. 
 
1. A number of the UPS subsystems are 
connected by heavily loaded weak ties 
operating at  voltages of 220, 330, 500, 
and 750 kV.  Consequently, following 
disturbances associated with these 
links, the system is prone to instability 
unless special measures are taken. 
 
2. The maximum flows throughout the 
system can vary widely over the course 
of a day. 
 
3. The capacity transmission lines rated at 
or above 330 kV is limited generally by stability rather than over-current. 
 
4. Increases in transfers over the very long transmission lines results in a significant increase in losses. 
 
5. The total reactive compensation is less than 30% of the total load, and the total reactive power from 
adjustable compensation devices is less than 3%. 
 
4.17.2 Approach to Ensuring Security 
  
The Russian philosophy, based on many years experience, is that most widespread blackouts are a result of 
insufficient emergency control systems.   As a result,  a focus of Russian power system engineering has been 
on the design and operation of diverse and robust emergency control systems in which both off-line and on-
line DSA are necessary components.  In the UPS of the former USSR, two types of centralized systems were 
implemented [3], 
Type 1: Designed to maintain stability in relatively small control areas where it may be difficult to separate 
problems of dynamic and steady-state stability in the post-contingency condition. The Type 1 system relies 
largely on off-line calculations the results of which are stored in the central computer.  However, some 
functions are performed on-line, including identification of the condition of the present calculation cycle and 
selection of the corresponding stability regions stored in the central computer (look-up). 
Figure 4-75: Structure of the UPS of Russia 
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Type 2 : Designed to operate on a vast control area considering the interdependencies of stability conditions 
in different parts of the control areas. In the Type 2 system, practically all problems, including stability 
estimation, selection and optimization of control actions, are solved on-line.   The system uses information 
about the current system state, together with a list of the emergency contingencies, and a list of available 
control actions.  Stability regions are not computed, but rather, the stability (and associated required control 
actions) for the specific condition are computed.  All required calculations are performed within a 1 –2 
minute cycle time using specifically designed high-performance software for system equivalencing, steady-
state stability estimation, selection of control schemes.    
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The electric industries in the world are transitioning to more competitively structured systems. The load 
demands are increased and market economics have pushed the operation of the system closer to all of the 
operational limits. That’s all making the operation of the real time power systems increasingly difficult and 
more complex. Rrecent system outages in North-eastern United States and Europe have brought an 
awareness of the vital need for reliable operations. The system-wide and local monitoring and control of 
large scale power systems and efficiently detecting and preventing the system instability or the system 
collapse are the challenges for the most power system control centres. The real time DSA has not been so far 
put in practical use in the most of control centers. The off-line stability assessment is used in the system 
operations, which may cause incorrect operations.  
 
PJM transmission system is the largest centrally dispatched control area in North America by coordinating 
the movement of electricity in all or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of 
Columbia. As additional members joined PJM market. PJM operates the largest competitive wholesale 
electricity market in the world. Transient stability has been a security constraint in the PJM transmission 
system, and it often results in reduced transfer limits at key interfaces. As the PJM’s footprint extends to 
include ComEd, AEP, DPL, this problem will become more critical, due to the transient stability constraints 
in the Midwest areas. As a solution to this, PJM planed to deploy a real time Transient Stability Analysis and 
Control (TSA&C) system. The TSA&C system will become a necessary and critical dispatch tool to 
improve PJM system reliability and to make system operations more economical. 
 
This section describes a Real Time Transient Stability Analysis and Control (TSA&C) system for on-line 
Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA). 
 
4.18.2 Objectives and requirements 
 
The objective of a real time TSA&C system is to provide PJM system operators with critical information 
regarding the transient security of the PJM system, including, 
 
(1) Transient stability of the system subject to credible contingencies. 
 
(2) Transfer limits at key interfaces subject to transient stability constraints. 
 
(3) Transient stability control measures required to prevent the system from losing transient stability for 
potentially unstable system condition and/or contingencies. 
 
The real time TSA&C system will meet the following performance requirements: 
 
(1) Assessment cycles. A complete real time TSA&C assessment cycle will be completed within 15 
minutes. 
 
(2) System size. The current PJM EMS model has about 13,500 buses and 2,500 generators. With the 
planned model expansion, the system size may grow to 25,000 buses and 3,000 generators in the 
near future. The TSA&C system will be designed to handle the current system size with the 
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capability, by increasing the computation power, to accommodate the planned PJM EMS model 
expansion. 
 
(3) Models. The stability analysis modules will include the following models:  
 
• Generator: classical to two-axis 6th order modals 
• Excitation system: all IEEE standard exciter/AVR and PSS models and common extended 
models 
• Speed governing system: all IEEE standard models and common extended models 
• Load: ZIP model, voltage/frequency dependent model, induction motor, discharge lighting 
model 
• Relay: under-voltage/frequency load shedding, switchable shunts, distance relay 
• User-defined modeling 
• FACTS models: SVC, TCBR, STATCOM, TCSC, SSSC, TCMCT, TCPST 
• HVDC model: two and multi terminal HVDC models, converter based FACTS models 
 
(4) Contingencies. Within an assessment cycle, 3,000 contingencies will be processed as the full set of 
credible contingencies. The contingency types will initially include three-phase fault with primary 
clearance and eventually cover single-line-to-ground fault with backup clearance. The following 
modeling capabilities will be available in contingency analysis: 
 
• Faults may be at buses or anywhere on lines 
• For unbalanced faults, fault impedances can be specified or computed with sequence network 
data provided 
• Branch (single or three phase) tripping and reconnection, shunt switching, adding or modifying 
branch 
• Generator tripping 
• Load shedding, load ramping 
• Pre-simulation circuit outages and powerflow dispatches 
• Dependent contingencies 
 
(5) Transfer limit computations. Within an assessment cycle, transfer limits at up to 10 key interfaces 
will be computed if necessary. Each transaction might be done with either of the following schemes: 
 
• If all contingencies are found to be stable for the current system condition, transfers will be 
increased, with pre-specified powerflow dispatch methods, to a level beyond which the system 
will be unstable for at least one contingency. This gives the transiently secure operation 
boundary for the system condition within which the system may be dispatched to meet the 
operation requirements. This is referred to as forward stability limit search. 
 
• If one (or more) contingency is found to be unstable for the current system condition, transfers 
will be reduced, with pre-specified powerflow dispatch methods, until the system is stable for 
all contingencies. The required powerflow dispatches will then be presented to the system 
operators for immediate actions. This is referred to as backward stability limit search. 
 
The number of contingencies considered for each transaction analysis will be reasonable (no more 
than 20). 
 
(6) Transient stability control measure determination. A preventive control measure was required for 
insecure contingencies. 
 
(7) Software/hardware platform and interface. The TSA&C software will be developed on the MS 
Windows platform. User interface will be fully graphical, compliant to common Windows 
standards. 
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Figure 4-76 TSA&C Computation Flow Chart
4.18.3 Overview of Transient Stability Analysis and Control (TSA&C) system 
 
Computation Flow Chart of TSA&C 
 
This real time TSA&C system has been designed and implemented by PJM and Powertech Labs Inc., and 
installed at PJM control center. It is primarily based on the following components in the DSAToolsTM 
software suite offered by Powertech: 
 
• TSAT (Transient Security Assessment Tool) 
• DSA Manager (the on-line interface module) 
 
In addition, the powerflow analysis module, PSAT, of the DSAToolsTM suite is also integrated with the 
TSA&C system in the off-line study mode. 
 
The computation flow chart of TSA&C is shown in Figure 4-76 . A computation flow starts when a real-
time system snapshot is available and ends when all computations are done and results are stored/displayed. 
The following main data/result processing and computation steps are involved in a computation flow. 
The features of this TSA&C system are described as following sections. 
 
 
4.18.3.1 Data Processor 
 
Operation of TSA&C includes handling of different sets of data (both input and output) as shown in Figure 
4-77 . 
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Input Data 
 
A number of input data sets are required by TSA&C to perform DSA: 
 
• Powerflow: this data can be in any format supported by Powertech TSAT (including PFB, PSS/E, 
PSLF). Powerflow data is prepared using the real-time system snapshot and passed from EMS system. 
• Dynamics: this data can be in any format supported by Powertech TSAT (including TSAT, PSS/E, 
PSLF). Dynamic data matches the real-time powerflow and passed from EMS system. 
• Contingency: this data is in Powertech TSAT format. The contingency data matches the powerflow 
data in the same way as the dynamic data and passed from EMS. 
• Stability limit: this data can be in either native Powertech TSAT format or special TSA&C format, but 
for on-line analysis only data in TSA&C format is supported. Stability limit data is prepared together 
with the powerflow data in real time and passed from EMS system Stability limit data matches the 
powerflow data in the same way as the dynamic data. 
• Monitor: this data is in Powertech TSAT format. The monitor data matches the powerflow data in the 
same way as the dynamic data. 
• Powerflow solution parameters: these are in Powertech TSAT format. Powerflow solution parameters 
are optional for the real-time TSA&C system operation. 
• Computation parameters: these parameters are stored in TSA&C client servers in a format internal to 
TSA&C. 
• Real time plot specification: this data is stored in TSA&C clients in a format internal to TSA&C. 
 
All input data is parsed and processed for sanity check and validation. Fixable data problems are 
automatically corrected. 
 
 Output Data 
 
All output data from a real-time case is stored in the output folder specified in the TSA&C configuration. 
This data can be used in various ways: 
 
• Displayed in DSA Manager or DSA Monitor Operator Console 
• Loaded in TSAT or PSAT for off-line studies 

























•Real time case archives
•Real time plot archives
•Event/messages logs
 
Figure 4-77 - Relationship of different data sets 
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4.18.3.2 Fast Contingency Screening 
 
A fast contingency screening tool is included in the design and is currently under development. 
 
4.18.3.3 Time Domain Integration  
 
The heart of the TSA&C system is the Powertech TSAT program which uses the following techniques for 
Transient Security Assessment. 
 
Nonlinear time-domain simulations 
 
This is the core technology of Powertech TSAT and is used in every analysis function in the TSA&C 
system. Powertech TSAT uses a numerical integration algorithm [1] with these features: 
 
• Support to all modeling requirements 
• Choice of integration algorithm, such as second order or fourth order Kunge-Kutta method 
• Efficient solution of the network algebraic equations 
 
Transient stability margin 
 
Transient stability margin is a key element in a TSA&C application. There are three options to choose from 
in the TSA&C system: 
 
• Power swing-based energy margin (SM): this is a stability margin based on the energy exchange in 
each power swing during transients. The algorithm is based on the method described [2]: 
 
• Power angle-based margin (AM): this is a stability margin based on the power angle separation of 
the generators during the simulations.  
 
• Critical clearance time (CCT) of fault: this applies only for contingencies involving faults. The 
longest fault clearance time without losing stability is computed and served as a margin to measure 
the degree of stability. The determination of stability while computing CCT can be based on either 
SM or AM. Computationally, CCT is obtained using a binary search within a specified range of 

























Figure 4-78 - Computation of CCT 
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This refers to the damping ratio of the worst oscillatory mode following a contingency. Poorly damped, 
sustained, or growing oscillations in the system can be detected using this index which is computed with a 
multi-channel Prony algorithm from the time-domain simulation results. The frequency at which the worst 
damping occurs, and other modes identified from the Prony algorithm are also available. 
 
Descriptions on the Prony method can be found in [3] 
 
Other transient security criteria 
 
These include transient voltage violations, transient frequency violations, and relay margins. These are all 
computed from the time-domain simulation results. 
 
Early termination of simulations 
 
In order to meet the speed requirement of the real time TSA, the assessment of contingencies must be done 
as quickly as possible. A scheme is implemented in the TSA&C system to speed up the contingency analysis 
by terminating the simulation of a contingency once it can be definitely classified as stable or unstable. Early 
terminated stable contingencies are ignored for further process and result visualization.  
 
4.18.3.4  Stability limit computation 
 
TSA&C includes a stability limit computation module that determines the limit of a power transfer subject 
to a set of relevant contingencies and security criteria. This works as follows: 
 
• A power transfer is defined using the source/sink concept and a set of relevant contingencies is 
assigned to the transfer. The security constraint is defined using any or all of the security criteria 
available.  
 
• Depending on the security status of the assigned relevant contingencies from the basecase analysis, 
either a forward search or backward search can be performed, as shown in Figure 4-79  . A number 
of search strategies can be used to find the limit, including curve-fitting based automatic search, 
binary search, and fixed step search.  
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4.18.3.5 Preventive control measure (PCM) determination 
 
For each contingency with security violation (insecure contingency) at the base system condition, PCM, in 
terms of possible generation dispatch schemes, can be determined so as to keep the system in the secure 
region should the contingency happens.  
 
4.18.3.6 GUI visualization 
 
TSA&C has comprehensive result visualization tools to provide key information to Dispatchers and 
operation engineers. These include, 
 
• Transient security of the system for a real-time condition (basecase analysis results), 
 
? Overall status of the system (secure or insecure) 
? Security trend 
? Critical contingency list with contingency details such as fault location and circuits lost 
? Security violation details with information such as critical cluster of generators, frequency of 
critical oscillatory mode, etc. 
? Security indices for complete set of fully assessed contingencies 
? Histogram of all enabled security indices for customized time window 
? Customized real-time plots of selected quantities showing critical time-domain system responses 
? Access to full simulation results with TSAT ResultView 
 
• If PCM option is enabled and performed, recommended PCM (in form of powerflow dispatches) for 
all insecure contingencies. 
 
• If stability limits are computed, information for each transfer: 
 
? Base MW values of the source variable and monitored interfaces 
? Limit MW values of the source variable and monitored interfaces 
? Stability limit trend 
? Limiting factor 
? Limiting outage 
? System dispatch details at the limiting condition 
? Histogram of all transfer limits for customized time window 
 
4.18.3.7  TSA&C Real Time Mode and Study Mode 
 
TSA&C has two modes: Real Time mode and Study mode 
 
• Real time mode: For the designed model size and computation features, a real time TSA&C 
assessment cycle will be completed within 15 minutes using the recommended hardware 
architecture. 
 
• Study mode. It is used to perform off-line studies. An off-line study mode is available with access to 
standard off-line versions of Powertech TSAT and PSAT programs with full graphical user 
interface. Any archived real-time case or other off-line case can be directly loaded in off-line 
programs. The TSA&C system operation and results can be accessed by remote users.  
 











Figure 4-80 -TSA&C hardware structure 
4.18.3.8  Hardware 
 
The TSA&C installation at PJM consists of the hardware as shown in Figure 4-80 . In the figure, 
 
• An IBM blade center hosts the main computation power. It consists of two chassis, each containing 
7 blade servers. 
 
? 2 blade servers are designated as TSA&C clients (backup of each other) 
? 10 blade servers are used as computation servers (for distributed processing) 
? 2 blade servers are configured as off-line study servers (also as backup computation servers) 
 
• 2 standalone clustered servers to run data server and also FTP. 
 
? A San storage is connected to these as TSA&C data server 
 




4.18.4 Conclusions and Remarks 
 
• The TSA&C was integrated with PJM real time system in Jan. 2006, receiving real time data 
including State Estimation solution with network model, dynamic data, contingency data and data 
for stability limit calculations and running in real time sequence about every 15 minutes, to process 
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3000 contingencies and calculate 16 interface stability limits. Based on the operational testing, PJM 
TSA&C system is approved as a critical real time transient stability monitoring tool to improve PJM 
system security and reliability. PJM is preparing using these real time stability limits to replace the 
existing stability limits calculated by off-line models. 
 
• This is the first version of PJM TSA&C. The new development of TSA&C is under way , which 
includes a fast screening method, improvement of the preventive and corrective control schemes. 
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On-line security assessment requires evaluating the static as well as dynamic effects of hundreds or even 
thousands of credible contingencies on power systems.  Static security assessment (SSA) checks all relevant 
static constraints of post-fault (post-contingency) steady states. From a computational viewpoint, SSA needs 
to solve a large set of nonlinear algebraic equations.  Dynamic security assessment (DSA) requires the 
handling of a large set of nonlinear differential equations in addition to the nonlinear algebraic equations 
involved in the SSA. The task of performing on-line DSA is a rather challenging task. On-line voltage 
security assessment (VSA) ensures the ability of the power system to withstand a list of credible 
contingencies against voltage collapse. From a computational viewpoint, on-line voltage security assessment 
needs to solve a large set of nonlinear algebraic equations and among other functions, calculate the load 
margins to static security limits. It should be pointed out that the existing tools developed for on-line SSA 
are inadequate for on-line voltage collapse assessment. 
 
A majority of modern energy management systems do not perform on-line VSA and on-line DSA to ensure 
the ability of the power system to withstand certain credible contingencies. Indeed, it is increasingly difficult 
for power system operators to generate all the operating limits against voltage collapse and voltage 
instability for all possible operating conditions under a list of credible contingencies. For many utilities 
around the world, there has been considerable pressure to increase power flows over existing transmission 
corridors. This consistent pressure has prompted the requirement of extending EMS to perform on-line VSA 
and DSA; even real-time VSA and DSA. Such extension, however, is a rather difficult task and requires 
several breakthroughs in analysis tools, computation methods and control schemes 
 
Real-time voltage security assessment and enhancement, VSA&E is an integrated computer package 
developed by Bigwood Systems, Inc. Ithaca, NY for voltage security assessment, enhancement and 
preventive control of large-scale power systems in real-time mode. This tool, which is designed for large-
scale interconnected power systems in the FERC’s open-access transmission, has been successfully 
evaluated on several power systems ranging from 2,000 buses to 50,000 buses. Another version of Real-time 
VSA&E is designed for on-line study mode. 
 
The integrated package, including two embedded patented technologies, provides the following analysis and 
control functions with respect to voltage stability, thermal limits and voltage limits. The package handles the 
full AC nonlinear model of the study power system under a comprehensive contingency list. It takes the 
general characteristics of power system operating environments and the effects of control devices into 
account. Many aspects of power system operational characteristics are modeled in the package; such as 
generator capability curve, limits of real power generations, the sequence of generator pick-up, generator 
participation factor, user-defined priority of employing control devices, and the physical limitation of control 
devices. The major features of VSA&E are the computational speed of the package, the accuracy of 
simulation results, the innovation of control action design and the reliability of its simulation engine.  
 
The current version of the package can handle power systems up to 100,000 buses. It can accept power flow 
data files in the following formats: PTI (up to version 30), EPRI and IEEE. The modeling capability of 
VSA&E is very comprehensive including SC, ULTC, phase-shifter, reactive power capability curve, 
nonlinear loads, DC Transmission Lines and FACTS. The integrated package provides the following voltage 
stability analysis and control functions with respect to a contingency list under single or multiple power 
transactions: 
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4.19.1 On-line Analysis and Look-ahead Analysis 
To make on-line voltage security assessment feasible, it is essential to significantly reduce the computational 
burden required without sacrificing analysis accuracy. The strategy of using an effective scheme to screen 
out a large number of secure/stable contingencies and to identify a number of potentially insecure/unstable 
contingencies and to apply detailed simulation programs only to potentially insecure/unstable contingencies 
is widely adopted in power industry. We note that the voltage collapse load margin with respect to a 
contingency can be negative. Under this situation, the study power system will undergo voltage collapse 
should the contingency occur. This contingency is hence termed as an insecure contingency.  
 
This strategy has made on-line SSA a routine task in EMS. This strategy is composed of two stages of 
assessment. Stage I is usually a screening and ranking stage while Stage II entails the application of detailed 
analysis to insecure or critical contingencies identified at Stage I. It is fair to state that the success of the 
two-stage strategy for on-line applications depends largely on the effectiveness of the screening and ranking 
of Stage I.  
 
The strategy of using an effective scheme to screen out a large number of secure contingencies and to 
identify a number of potentially insecure contingencies and to apply detailed simulation programs only to 
potentially insecure contingencies can be applied to on-line voltage security assessment as described in the 
following 
 
Stage 1: performs the task of static contingency screening to screen out contingencies, which are definitely 
secure in the voltage stability sense, and to identify and rank insecure and critical contingencies, from a set 
of credible contingencies  
Stage 2:  performs detailed voltage stability analysis to each insecure or critical contingency identified in 
Stage 1. 
 
4.19.2 Load Margin and Sensitivity 
VSA&E includes contingency selection and screening and provides a list of the most severe contingencies, 
in terms of voltage stability margins, from a full, comprehensive contingency list. These most severe 
contingencies contains insecure contingencies and critical contingencies. The VSA&E load margin 
calculation determines the voltage stability margin in megawatts (MW) and megavar (MVAR), between the 
voltage collapse point and the current power system operation point.   Mathematically speaking, the nose 
point of P-V curve, or Q-V curve, or P-Q-V curve with respect to a load-generation vector can be due to 
either the saddle-node bifurcation point or the Q-induced limit point. Physically speaking, in the context of 
transfer capability evaluation, the saddle-node bifurcation is closely related to the transfer capability limit of 
the study power system with respect to the load-generation vector. On the other hand, the Q-induced limit 
point is closely related to the reactive power generation limit of one or some generators involved in the 
power transfer. 
 
The integrated package accurately computes the following points and computes their corresponding load 
margins and sensitivities  
• Saddle node bifurcation point (nose point) 
• Q-induced limit point (nose point). 
 
The program also accurately calculates the voltage violation points and the thermal limit violation points. 
Sensitivity calculations at these points (violation points, bifurcation point or limit point) provide a variety of 
valuable information. Information of these points allows the calculation of three system load margins 
described below. 
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Given a load demand vector (i.e. real and reactive load demands at each load bus) and a real generation 
vector (i.e. real power generation at each generator bus), one can compute the state of the power system (the 
complex voltage at each bus) by solving the set of power flow equations. Let digii PPP −≡  and 
digii QQQ −≡ . The lowercase g  represents generation and the lowercase d  represents load demand. The 
set of power flow equations can be represented in compact form as 






−≡     (1) 
where the vector P (respectively, Q) represents the real (respectively. reactive) power injection at each bus.  
 
Next, it will be explained how one can examine the power system steady-state behaviors under slowly 
varying loading and real power redispatch conditions. For example, if one needs to trace the power system 
state from the base-case load-generation condition specified by the following vector [ ]000 ,, gdd PQP  
to a new load-generation condition specified by the following vector [ ],,, 111 gdd PQP  
 
then one can parameterize the set of power flow equations as the following parameterized power flow 
equations 
                                      ( ) ( ) 0,,, =−≡ buxfuxF λλ                     (2) 
 









b       (3) 
 
It is clear that the set of the parameterized power flow equations (2) become the base-case power flow 
equations when 0=λ , 












And when 1=λ , the set of parameterized power flow equations describes the power system steady-state 
behavior at the new load-generation condition [ ]111 ,, gdd PQP  and is described by 










Thus, one can investigate the effects of varying real power generations as well as varying load demands on 
power system steady-state behaviors via solving the set of parameterized power flow equations (2). In fact, 
one can parameterize any change in PQ loads in conjunction with any change in P generations by selecting 
an appropriate vector b.  
 
We next apply the above general setting to the problem of computing the available load margin of the base-
case interconnected power system. In this application, the vector b  is used to represent one or several of the 
following power transactions and transmission service: 
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•  Point-to-point MW transaction - the real power at one load bus of the receiving area varies while the 
others remain fixed and the real power at one generator bus of the sending area varies while the others 
remain fixed,  
•  Slice-of-the-system sale - both the real and reactive power demand at a load bus of the receiving area 
vary and the real power generation at some collection of generators of the sending bus varies while the 
others are fixed,  
•  Network service - the real and/or reactive power demands at some collection of load buses of the receiv-
ing area vary and the real power generation at some collection of generators of the sending bus varies 
while the others are fixed. 
 
We shall call the vector b  the proposed power transaction vector when the parameterized power flow 
equations (2) is used for ATC evaluation, and the scalar λ , the load-generation margin. The proposed power 
transaction vector b  can be used to represent a power transaction involving simultaneous power transfers by 
summing each power transaction vector, i.e. 1bb Σ= , 1,2,...=i  where the vector 1b  represents the ith 
power transaction.  
 
Definition: The voltage collapse load margin of a power system under a contingency with respect to a load-
generation vector is the distance (in terms of MW and/or MVAR) from the current operating condition to the 
nose point of the parameterized power system subject to the contingency. 
Definition:  The voltage-limit load margin of a power system under a contingency with respect to a load-
generation vector is the (minimum) distance (in terms of MW and/or MVAR) from the current operating 
point to the state vector, of the parameterized power system subject to the contingency, at which the voltage 
constraint at some bus is violated.  
Definition: The thermal-limit load margin of a power system under a contingency with respect to a load-
generation vector (3) is the (minimum) distance (in terms of MW and/or MVAR) from the current operating 
point to the state vector, of the parameterized power system subject to the contingency, at which the thermal 
limit constraint of some transmission line is violated. 
 
These three load margins are defined under the following conditions: Given (i) the current operating 
condition (obtained from the state estimator and the topological analyzer), (ii) a set of proposed power 
transactions, (iii) a list of credible contingencies, the three look-ahead schemes are developed for estimating 
the load margins, along the proposed power transactions, with respect to voltage stability limit (nose-point 
load margin), bus voltage limit, line flow thermal limit, for the power system with the proposed power 
transactions, subject to the list of credible contingencies. 
  
The following analysis functions are implemented in real-time VSA&E. 
• Contingency screening and ranking of a large set of credible contingencies, say 3,000 contingencies, in 
terms of load margins to voltage instability 
• Identification of insecure contingencies with zero or negative load margins 
• Identification of critical contingencies with small load margins 
• Computation of P-V, Q-V, and P-Q-V curves for base-case and selected contingencies with a variety of 
load and/or generation variations 
• Computation of the exact load margin to voltage collapse for the base case and each top-ranked 
contingency 
• Detailed Look-ahead Analysis 
 
4.19.3 Preventive Control and Enhancement Control  
 
The VSA&E package also provides the operators and reliability engineers enhancement control and 
preventive control along with the load margin and sensitivity information with respect to voltage collapse, 
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voltage violation and thermal limit violation. In particular, the integrated package provides the following 
reinforcement control functions with respect to voltage collapse under single or multiple power transactions: 
• Preventive control against voltage collapse of all insecure contingencies 
• Enhancement control to increase margin to voltage collapse of critical or selected contingencies 
 
When the load margin to voltage collapse for the base case or each highly ranked contingency is not 
sufficient, the integrated package determines effective enhancement controls to increase the load margin by 
exercising the following level-1 control actions before resort to load shedding. 
 
Level-1 Control selects from the following controls: (1) reactive power-compensating devices, (2) ULTC, 
(3) phase-shifters, (4) real generations and (5) generator terminal voltage. 
 
Level-2 Control: (6) placement of new reactive power-compensating devices (i.e. optimal locations to install 
new reactive power-compensating devices and amount to be installed), (7) load-shedding (i.e. optimal 
locations to perform load-shedding and amount of load-shedding to be performed). 
 
When one or multiple insecure contingencies are identified (note that the load margin to voltage collapse for 
each insecure contingency is negative), the integrated package determines effective preventive controls to 
avoid voltage collapse, should any of insecure contingencies occur, by exercising the above level-1 control 
actions before resort to level-2 control actions. 
 
Priority-based Control Schemes 
Both the enhancement control schemes and the preventive control schemes developed and implemented in 
the integrated package are practical and yet innovative. They are practical from users’ viewpoint and 
innovative from control theory viewpoint. These two schemes allow users to set priority on the selection of 
different controllers in level-one control actions. In addition, they allow users to set desired properties of 
control actions based on the following two criteria: 
 
• Minimum-number of control actions; or 
• Minimum-amount of control actions; or 
• Minimum-cost of control actions 
 
4.19.4 Contingency and Power Transactions 
This tool supports various types of contingencies and power transactions. A contingency is composed of a 
single or multiple items. Line, transformer, shunt, load and generator outages are considered in the 
contingency. Multiple outages of up to 30 pieces of equipment are allowed in a contingency. The tool 
supports multiple power transaction definitions described by the power transfer including: between bus and 
bus, between area (zone) and area (zone), between bus and area, sequential generator pick-up list and hybrid 
definition; in particular, the package supports the following power transactions: 
 
• Point-to-point MW transaction - the real power at one load bus of the receiving area varies while the 
others remain fixed and the real power at one generator bus of the sending area varies while the others 
remain fixed,  
 
• Slice-of-the-system sale - both the real and reactive power demand at a load bus of the receiving area 
vary and the real power generation at some collection of generators of the sending bus varies while the 
others are fixed,  
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• Network service - the real and/or reactive power demands at some collection of load buses of the 
receiving area vary and the real power generation at some collection of generators of the sending bus 
varies while the others are fixed. 
 
 
4.19.5 Real-Time Voltage Stability 
As actual system conditions become more severe and load demand in the system increases, system operators 
require a powerful tool to evaluate voltage security of the system based on the ebb and flow of actual system 
operating conditions. Indeed, increasing real and reactive load demand, net power interchange, and/or a 
configuration change (contingency) can result in voltage collapse. VSA&E analysis and control 
recommendations provide the system operators a quantitative view of where voltage problems lie ahead, the 
proximity of the system operating point to the problem and what operations can be taken to steer the system 
into highly secure operation regions. 
 





The VSA&E voltage stability capability secures safe voltage stability load margins by using controls 
such as: (1) reactive power-compensating devices, (2) ULTC, (3) phase-shifters, (4) real generations, (5) 
generator terminal voltage and (6) load-shedding by location and load amount. 
 
The Preventive Control Table above shows the output of Preventive Control processing by VSA&E. The 5 
recommended control actions shown in the table when taken will mitigate all 4 insecure contingencies 
identified by the Contingency Ranking Analysis, see Table 4-13 . The load margins of the 4 insecure 
contingencies, which are zero or negative before the preventive control, are all raised such that the load 






Using the same set of available controls as the preventive control, the enhancement control of VSA&E 
allows the operator to specify a desired (target) amount in MW of increase in load margin for a contingency 
or the base case. Enhancement control returns a priority-based, minimum set of control actions to execute 
the desired load margin increase. Suppose the target load margin increase is 200 MW. VSA&E identifies 4 
    Contingency Ranking & Estimated Margins   
    Session: __buildin.ses  Conting. List: __buildin.ses  Run Date:  6/6/06 18:00   
   Contingency Margin 
Rank Number Name P Q 
1 18550  0.000 0.000 
2 18520  0.000 0.000 
3 6820  0.000 0.000 
4 18180  0.000 0.000 
5 18250  2429.753 235.050 
6 18010  2579.699 249.556 
7 6780  2658.051 257.135 
8 18730   3062.834 296.293 
9 18020  3081.472 298.096 
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control actions that meet the target value and satisfies their physical limits. The output table below shows 
that by executing the 4 recommended control actions the load margin is enhanced by 207 MW increasing the 
margin from 2710 MW to 2917. 
 
 
Table 4-14 VSA&E identifies Preventive Control to mitigate the 4 insecure contingencies so that after the 5 controls are executed all 

















We emphasize that it is imperative in determining the load margin to voltage collapse to take into account all 
the credible contingencies. This task however is computationally intensive. The strategy of using effective 
schemes to rank all credible contingencies and of applying detailed analysis programs only to critical 
contingencies is widely accepted. In order to identify critical contingencies which will severely violate static 
security constraints, we developed three look-ahead ranking schemes which are to be incorporated into the 
tool.  The first look-ahead scheme ranks the set of all credible contingencies in terms of load margin to 
system collapse and to select the top few critical contingencies. The second look-ahead scheme ranks the set 
of all credible contingencies in terms of branch MVA violation and selects the top few critical contingencies. 
The third scheme ranks all credible contingencies in terms of bus voltage violation and selects the top few 
critical contingencies.  
 
Table 4-15 VSA&E Enhancement Control gives control actions to increase the margin 
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4.19.6 Parallel VSA&E Software Architecture  
 
The performance requirements for RT/VSA&E of large-scale power systems are very demanding. The 
current production system, which executes a new analysis and control cycle every 3 minutes, consists of 
12,500 buses, 4,250 generators and a contingency list numbering 3,000 and growing. To meet this need, BSI 
developed Parallel RT/VSA&E, a software architecture designed to run on tightly coupled multi-processor 
systems and loosely coupled distributed systems interconnected by high-speed communications networks. A 
















The Parallel RT/VSA&E software architecture, shown in the Figures 4-81   and 4-82 , provides a flexible 
distributed computing environment for parallel computations hosted by blade servers, multi-processor 
computers, single processors distributed across a LAN or WAN and combinations of these platforms. 
 
The heart of this design is the Parallel Operation Manager that handles the VSA&E user requests and the 
real time feed of data received continuously from the Energy Management System. The Parallel Operation 
Manager monitors the availability of processors running the VSA&E computational engine, assigns work 
the processors and monitors work progress to effectively balance the workload. The VSA&E engine can run 
on all processors in the system. It receives real-time input data, runs the analysis and control functions of 
VSA&E as instructed by the Parallel Operation Manager and returns detailed VSA analysis and the required 
preventive and/or enhancement control results. 









User 1 User 2
User m
High-speed Network 









Figure 4-81  Representation of a distributed parallel computing platform for Parallel RT/VSA&E 
Figure 4-82 Parallel RT/VSA&E software architecture 
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Field Proven in a 12,000 Bus System 
  
The entire implementation, installation and validation procedure of VSA&E based on real-world data 
conducted over an extended period of time. The VSA&E system is now operating as tightly integrated 
application in PJM real-time EMS environment. The system features two modes of operation. The 
real time mode offers periodic voltage security assessment and control, 24 hours per day, 7 days per 
week. The on-line study mode of the system allows all users to easily execute shared planning 
activities and cooperative problem study and solving to mitigate potential operating shortfalls in 




4.19.7 System Modeling 
 
1. Generators  
Generators are modeled as active and reactive power sources which also provide voltage control. The 
MVAR output of each on-line generator is adjusted during power flow solutions in order to control 
the voltage of the local bus (the bus where the generator is connected to) or a remote bus. The 
generator’s MW output has fixed limit. And the generator's MVAR output has is limited by fixed 
limits the so-called capability curves.  
 
 
Figure 4-83 RT/VSA&E main user interface window display showing summaries for each interface and trending over time. At the 
bottom of the window are buttons to access detailed information about a selected interface. 
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2. Loads 
Loads can be modeled as constant power (P-Q), constant current (I), or constant impedance (Z), or 
any linear combination of them. The tool can also accept nonlinear load models as long as they are 
expressed as nonlinear functions of voltage. 
 
3. Control Devices  
The following control devices are modeled 
•  Switchable shunts and static VAR compensators 
•  Interchange schedules 
•  ULTC Transformers 
•  ULTC phase shifters 
•  Static tap changer and phase shifters 
 
4. DC Network 
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4.20 State-of-the-Art of DSA in the USA – Southern Company 
 
4.20.1 General Description 
 
Southern Company is a super-regional energy company with 
more than 40,000 megawatts of electric generating capacity 
in the southeastern United States (Figure 4-84).  Southern 
Company supplies energy to a 120,000-square-mile service 
territory spanning most of Georgia and Alabama, 
southeastern Mississippi, and the panhandle region of 
Florida.  Approximately 53 tie lines interconnect the 
Southern Company grid to neighboring utilities in the 
southeastern United States. 
 
The desire to implement transient stability assessment on a 
real-time basis at Southern Company is driven by several 
factors.  Reliability concerns arise when an increasing 
number of merchant generating plants interconnect to the 
transmission system, and opt not to procure the long-term 
transmission service necessary to solve various thermal and/or stability concerns which may exist 
from time to time as a result of this new generation.  Transmission service may then be requested and 
offered on a shorter-term basis – usually as a result of a daily evaluation.  Given the ever-changing 
system conditions encountered in real-time system operations, it simply is not feasible to study every 
conceivable system snapshot in the planning environment. Therefore, the risk exists that transmission 
service may be granted without realizing that a potential stability limit could be violated.  Conversely, 
there may be occasions when the planning models and any resultant limits identified may be too 
conservative in the determination of a stability limit.  Whatever the case, a greater degree of certainty 
should be derived from a transient security assessment based upon an accurate real-time state 
estimator power flow model.  For all the reasons stated above, a goal was established to implement 
real-time transient stability assessment on at least an hourly study cycle in Southern Company’s 
system control center. 
 
At the time this project was first initiated at Southern Company in 2003, very few utilities were 
actively pursuing the implementation of a real-time stability application. With limited commercial 
software availability because of a small user base, evaluation of different software packages was often 
times an “apples to oranges” comparison – since different packages tend to focus on different features 
or functions.  After considerable evaluation, Southern Company ultimately purchased the Transient 
Security Assessment Tool (TSAT) application from Powertech Labs Inc. in December of 2003.  
Details of the real-time system are provided in [1]. 
 
4.20.2 System Model 
 
The Southern Company state estimator network model used for steady-state power flow analysis 
applications has insufficient internal machine detail required for transient stability analysis.  Because 
of limited measurement availability or other reasons, combined cycle units and hydro units are often 
modeled as a single generator. In order to provide sufficient detail for transient analysis, expanded 
internal generator representation is accomplished by mapping any aggregated machine output to an 
 
Figure 4-84  Southern Company’s service territory 












Figure 4-85 Southern’s on-line TSA architecture 
assumed explicit machine output as derived from more detailed planning models.  The first step in 
creating a transient stability base case, therefore, is to internally expand the latest state estimate and to 
solve the expanded case. 
 
The external equivalent portion of the state estimator network model is also inadequate for performing 
transient stability analysis. A replacement external equivalent is generated from a reference planning 
base case which has a  custom-built, dynamically reduced external model. The second step in creating 
a transient stability base case is to remove the external equivalent from the state estimate and to attach 
the dynamic equivalent.  
One unique aspect of this enhanced state estimator model is a highly reduced external system, which 
provides a virtually identical dynamic response as the much larger original from which it was derived.  
An empirical process was developed to build this special dynamics-ready external equivalent, which 
included use of a small-signal analysis program to identify the inter-area modes of oscillation that 
should be retained.   A summary comparison of the original and reduced models is shown in Table 
4-16 below.  The CPU time represents a total number of seconds for the entire set of benchmark 
contingencies evaluated. 
 
Table 4-16 Size Comparison of Base and Reduced Case. 
 
 Original Reduced % of 
Orig. 
Buses   43,138     7,977   18.5% 
Branches   57,740   16,950   29.5% 
Machines     7,019     2,548   36.3% 
D-States 296,086 111,254   37.6% 
CPU time     9,285     1,405   15.1% 
 
  
4.20.3 System Architecture 
 
Southern’s on-line TSA system is based on two pieces of 
software from Powertech’s DSAToolsTM package: 
 
• TSAT (Transient Security Assessment Tool): this is 
the computation engine that actually performs TSA. 
TSAT uses time-domain simulations as the core 
technology from which a number of TSA functions 
are built, including swing-based stability margin 
calculation, Prony analysis for damping 
determination, a versatile stability limit computation 
module. Special features for on-line applications are 
also included, such as early termination of 
simulations, and automatic detection and correction 
of bad data in real-time cases. 
 
• DSA Manager: this is the interfacing module for on-line operation. It provides three main 
functions: (1) data connection between EMS and TSAT; (2) on-line system configurations; (3) 
computation monitoring and result visualization. 
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Figure 4-85  shows the on-line TSA system architecture implemented at Southern’s system control 
center. The real-time system snapshots are created on EMS side and passed to the DSA Client through 
a defined data exchange protocol. The TSA software (TSAT and DSA Manager) processes the cases 
primarily on the DSA Client (a workstation with dual 2.4 GHz Xeon CPU), with options to include 
multiple servers so as to distribute computation scenarios. Users can access TSA results on the DSA 
Client as well as on any workstations in the network on which the DSA monitoring software is 
installed. 
 
The initial phase of the TSA project implemented at Southern in June 2005 has the following 
capabilities and features: 
 
• The real-time system snapshots are created on an hourly basis. 
• For each system snapshot, roughly 250 contingencies are processed to evaluate transient security 
of the system. This takes about 30 minutes without optional computation servers. 
• Security assessment results, including insecure contingencies, stability margin information, 
swing curves, etc., can be examined on any workstations properly configured, by operators, 
operation support engineers, and planners. 
 
• Real-time cases of up to one month are archived in the form that can be directly opened in 
TSAT. These cases can be readily used for various off-line scenario studies. 
 
4.20.4 Operational Experience 
Southern Company has already derived significant benefit from incorporating key results of this real-
time stability assessment into the reliability decision-making process.  Following Hurricane Katrina in 
late August and early September of 2005, hourly real-time studies revealed problems with damping 
and transient voltage recovery in Mississippi and Alabama.  Additional studies were quickly 
performed off-line to determine safe generation limits in the Gulfport/Biloxi (Mississippi), Mobile 
(Alabama), and Pensacola (Florida) areas as the transmission system was being restored.  On other 
occasions during periods of heavy transmission system maintenance, certain other generators were 
identified as contributors to stability limit violations – and appropriate system adjustments were then 
made to alleviate the reliability concern. 
 
While the initial on-line TSA implementation can presently be made available to Southern Company 
transmission system operators, results are presently monitored by an operations support engineer on 
an as-needed basis.  Deployment to real-time floor operations is being deferred until the next phase of 
development (see below) is complete, and a suitable operator training program has been developed. 
4.20.5 Development Plans 
Recognizing the benefits that the initial implementation of the on-line TSA system bring, Southern 
and Powertech are working together on the next phase of the development which will include the 
following: 
• Enhancing the selection of contingencies to be evaluated. 
• Increasing the processing power: multiple servers will be used to distribute computation 
scenarios. 
• Improving the system reliability: a dual client structure will be used to allow better failover 
protection. This is already a standard feature in DSA Manager. 
• Including advanced analysis features: under considerations are stability limit computation and 
preventive control measure determination which are also standard features of TSAT and DSA 
Manager. 
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• Including other security assessment options: voltage security assessment using Powertech’s 
VSAT software will be added. 




[1] James Viikinsalo, Alan Martin, Kip Morison, Lei Wang, and Frederic Howell, “Transient 
Security Assessment in Real-time at Southern Company”, paper to be presented at the IEEE 










ON-GOING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
CHAPTER 5   On-going Research and Development 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 presented a general set of requirements for on-line DSA systems.  Some of these 
requirements have clearly been achieved as indicated in the state-of-the-art implementations described 
in Chapter 4.  However, on-line DSA remains an emerging technology and the potential capabilities, 
and need for such capabilities, is enormous.  Aside from the ever increasing power of computers, a 
number of developmental areas include, 
 
• improved system architectures and computing methods 
• use of intelligent systems 
• new analytical tools and techniques 
• use of new technologies such as PMUs or real-time damping measurement devices 
• improvement in state estimation and modeling 
• application of DSA results to protection and control 
 
This Chapter outlines some of the on-going research and development underway in  various parts of 
the world.  
 
5.2 On-going R&D in Canada - Hydro Quebec 
 
Off-line studies, based on stability robustness and respect of different criteria and constraints, try to 
find the best optimal limits applicable for a large range of operation. These limits are stored in the 
LIMSEL system as previously described.  For some real-time power network conditions, these limits 
sometimes computed more than one year before, are still conservative and could be improved. 
 
Since 1994, Hydro-Québec has stored all historical snapshot data in every 5 minutes coming from the 
state estimator with the corresponding dynamic models.  These data can be accessed by an in-house 
developed software called CILEX and have already been used for stability studies on real cases or for 
post-mortem analysis and also for giving feedback to off-line studies. 
 
Hydro-Québec’s specificities in term of security and organization require, due to its challenging 
power network dynamic characteristic, strong and strict interrelation, continuity and coherency 
between operation planning and operational environments. An on-line DSA system, if just indicating 
the real operational state is secure or not, is not sufficient because we already have this information in 
LIMSEL system. An on-line DSA system computing real-time transfer limits provide limited 
economic gains because these limits are not available for planned transactions. However, economic 
analysis has shown that the best gains happen for specific constraint situations in operation planning.  
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Currently, an on-going DSA research project at Hydro-Quebec takes knowledge from expertise and 
develops a systematic approach to determine off-line, optimized transfer limits for the Hydro-Quebec 
transmission system for a specific network configuration corresponding to a constrained planning 
operation or operation situation or to a network event (see Figure 5-1 ).  The transfer limit 
determination process has to be revised and optimized to allow a global response time of only a 
couple of days for a constrained situation foreseen by example one week in advance. Presently, this 
process as described before takes several months for a complete study on a main corridor. Limits are 
stored in LIMSEL system and correspond to off-line study done often on a worse case scenario. The 
new approach has the potential for a specific configuration to raise the transfer limits by taking into 
account a better knowledge of the real state of the network (CILEX can be used) and the uncertainties 
associated with certain variables. The new limits will replace, just for a short period of time 
corresponding to the constrained forecasted situation, the limits already stored in the control center 
LIMSEL system covering this specific configuration. 
 
 
The new approach will provide operation planning engineers a fast and systematic process to establish 
in advance secure transfer limits and also to optimize the daily operation scheduling over a horizon of 
up to a few weeks. This process is expected to reduce the study time from several days to a few hours 
eventually. It will also be used for off-line studies and give operation planning engineers opportunities 
to explore more network configurations which can not be covered before. 
 
The challenge of this research project is to generate, for a constrained situation and in a time frame 
compatible with the operation planning (ideally a few hours), a systematic way to output limits which 
will be valid for a specific period of time. The way to determine the limits has to be built in continuity 
with the current process. In the first step (short term horizon), the limits will be computed in a more 
systematic way with the help of the operation planning engineers supported with data processing and 
decision making tools.  This process can last a few days. In the second step (mid term horizon), the 
engineers will only supervise the process execution and validate the results before entering them in 
the LIMSEL system at the control center. 
 
Another challenge of this research project is the performance of the contingency analysis which is 
crucial for the success of the second step of the project. With the complex and detailed modeling 



































Figure 5-1 - Transfer limits optimized by the new approach 
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frequency criteria by operation planning engineers, it is difficult if not impossible with current 
contingency analysis methods to provide 100% reliability with a good efficiency.  
 
5.3 On-going R&D in China - CEPRI 
 
CEPRI is developing a number of  projects related to DSA,  including,: 
(1) Improved dynamic security assessment. 
Based on the results of the parallel computation, the DSA system will carry out fast stability 
sensitivity analysis, which gives the pre-decision to improve the stability level of the power system, 
even give the real-time control. The sensitivity analysis includes transient stability assessment, small 
signal stability assessment and voltage stability assessment. 
The national dispatch center of China is now establishing the dynamic stability monitoring and 
control system, which is based on the DSA and other advanced technology. 
 (2) Dynamic security area visualization research. 
The function is based on parallel computation, using the stability maximum of the transmission power 
of the important power system interfaces and uses 2D and 3D visualization software to draw the 
current operation point and the security area. Thus the operator of the dispatch center can quickly 
understand the stability level of the power grid at any point in time. 
 
5.4 On-going R&D in Europe  
 
5.4.1 Transient stability assessment and control 
 
Current and further research activities in the field of SIME-based TSA and control are/will be focused 
around testing and possible refinements of E-SIME (most notably extension to the use of phasor 
measurements) and Open Loop Emergency Control (OLEC), development of SIME-based adaptive 
emergency control, application of OLEC technique in liberalized electricity markets as well as design 





Following a disturbance inception and its clearance, the E-SIME aims at predicting the system 
transient stability behaviour and, if necessary, at deciding and triggering control actions early enough 
to prevent loss of synchronism. Further, it aims at continuing monitoring the system, in order to assess 
whether the control action has been sufficient or should be reinforced. The method relies on real-time 
measurements, informing about machines parameters. 
 
Predictive transient stability assessment 
 
The prediction relies on real-time measurements, acquired at regular time steps, it ’s, and refreshed at 
the rate itΔ , in post-fault stage. The procedure consists of the following steps. 
 
(i) Predicting the OMIB structure: use a Taylor series expansion to predict (say, 100 ms ahead), the 
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individual machines’ rotor angles; rank the machines according to their angles, identify the largest 
angular distance between two successive machines and declare those above this distance to be the 
“candidate critical machines”, the remaining ones being the “candidate non-critical machines”. The 
suitable aggregation of these machines provides the “candidate OMIB”. 
 
(ii) Predicting the δ−aP  curve: compute the parameters of this “candidate OMIB”, and in particular 
its accelerating power and rotor angle, aP  and δ , for three successive data sets acquired at ii tt Δ− 2 , 
ii tt Δ− , it . Write the equation 
 
 cbaPa ++= δδδ 2)(                                                   (1) 
 
for the three different times and solve for cba ,, . Subsequently, using newly acquired sets of 
measurements and processing a least squares technique, which shows to be particularly robust, refine 
the estimated curve. A further improvement consists of using a weighted least-squares (WLS) 
technique, by giving more important weights to the last sets of measurements. 
 
(iii) Predicting instability: search for the solution of 
 
0)( 2 =++= cbaP uuua δδδ                                            (2) 
 
to determine whether the OMIB reaches the unstable conditions 
0)(),( >uaua PP δδ & . 
 
 
If not, repeat steps (i) to (iii) using new measurements sets. 
If yes, the candidate OMIB is the critical one, for which 
the method computes successively [1] , [2], [3], 
– the unstable angle uδ  
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where iδ  stands for )( itδ  and iω  for )( itω . 
 
(iv) Validity test. The validity test relies on the observation that under given operating and 
contingency conditions, the value of the (negative) margin should be constant, whatever the time step. 
Hence, the above computations should be repeated at successive itΔ ’s until getting a (almost) 





 Salient features 
 
• The method uses real-time measurements acquired at regular time intervals and aims at 
controlling the system in less than, say, 500 ms after the contingency inception and its clearance.  
• The prediction phase starts after detecting an anomaly (contingency occurrence) and its clearance 
by means of protective relays. Note that this prediction does not imply identification of the 
contingency (location, type, etc.).  
• The prediction is possible thanks to the use of the OMIB transformation; predicting the behavior 
(accelerating power) of all of the system machines would have led to totally unreliable results.  
• There may be a tradeoff between the above mentioned validation test and time to instability: the 
shorter this time, the earlier the corrective action should be taken, possibly before complete 
convergence of the validation test. 
 Above descriptions aim at giving a mere flavor of the method. Detailed developments may be 





On the basis of real-time measurements taken at the power plants, the method pursues the following 
main objectives: 
• to assess whether the system is stable or it is driven to instability; in the latter case 
• to assess “how much” unstable the system is going to be; accordingly, 
• to assess “where” and “how much corrective action” to take (pre-assigned type of corrective 
action); 
• to continue assessing whether the executed corrective action has been sufficient or whether to 
proceed further. 
 
Block 2 of Figure 5-2  covers the two first steps: prediction of instability, and appraisal of the size of 
instability, in terms of margins and critical machines. Block 3 takes care of the design of control 
actions. For example, when generation shedding is of concern, the action consists of determining the 
number of generators to shed. 
 
Further, the method sends the order of triggering the action, while continuing to monitor and control 
the system in closed-loop fashion, until getting power system stabilization. 
 
Observations: 
• The prediction of the time to (reach) instability may influence the control decision (size of 
control; time to trigger it; etc). 
• The hardware requirements of the emergency control scheme are phasor measurement devices 
placed at the main power plant stations and communication systems to transmit (centralize-
decentralize) this information. These requirements seem to be within reach of today’s technology 
[5]. 
• The emergency control relies on purely real-time measurements (actually a relatively small 
number of measurements). This frees the control from uncertainties about power system 












Design of Control Action 
Find appropriate action to stabilize 
the system                (3)
Applying the 








Using phasor measurements 
 
Measurements acquired by Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) such as voltage and current 
magnitudes, and voltage and current phase angles, are not directly usable by E-SIME and have to be 
pre-processed. Current research efforts are focused around the use of Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN) to estimate (and predict) internal machine angles, rotor speeds and accelerations from the 
measurements acquired by PMU located at extra-high voltage side of the substation of a power plant. 
The important engineering observations about PMU measurements with respect to their use in 
transient stability assessment and control are: 
• The rotor angles and speeds of the synchronous generators are the most important quantities in 
power system transient stability assessment and control. 
• PMU measured quantities are electrical variables that may experience fast changes unlike rotor 
angle which is a mechanical variable. PMU measured quantities can experience discontinuity 
under switching in the electrical network. 
• Wrong or noisy rotor angles and speeds may result in wrong transient stability prediction and 
wrong determination of control actions. 
The rotor angle is a nonlinear function of the machine terminal variables and the main idea is 
to employ a pattern recognition scheme to map the patterns of inputs (variables measured by a PMU) 
to the required rotor angle (and speed, two schemes are currently under investigation [6], [7], 
estimation and prediction of rotor angles, and rotor angles and speeds). This mapping can be 
represented by  
 
 { } { } 1: RRuf knk ∈→∈ δ                                                   (5) 
 
 
where { } [ ]Tvkkkkkk ttItVtItVu )...(),1(),1(),(),( θ−−= at any instant  k  , and n  depends on the 
number of input variables as well as number of previous measurements used. 
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To realize the mapping of the machine terminal variables measured by a PMU to the rotor angle we 
use the multi-layer feed-forward ANN. Multi-layer feed-forward ANNs with back propagation 
supervised learning have several advantages over conventional computing methods. Those advantages 
are robustness to input and system noise, learning from examples, ability to memorize, handling 
situations of incomplete information and corrupted data, and performing in real-time. The results of 




Current E-SIME technique has some limitations that have to be tackled in near future research 
activities. These limitations are as follows:  
• Though E-SIME prediction scheme has been validated on various realistic power systems other 
power systems may bring some new phenomena and prediction scheme should be adjusted 
accordingly. It is expected that prediction scheme will be system dependent.  
• Methodology relies on the proper contingency occurrence and its clearance identification. Both 
problems may be solved by using consecutive phasor measurements (this problem is to be 
investigated in terms of proper fault clearance detection procedure). This requests for additional 
processing power and will tight requirements on time delays.  
• Appraising various types of control actions such as load shedding, fast excitation control, fast 
valving, dynamic breaking, mechanical power modulation, etc., should be examined (in the 
available version, E-SIME deals only with the generation tripping). The emergency control 
scheme will be strongly system dependent and appraising different types of control action will 
make algorithm much more flexible. Even existing generation tripping scheme should be 
modified to meet different requirements that different systems can impose (generation pattern in 
the system, giving slight priority to hydro plants, taking into account benefits and impacts of 
generator tripping, etc.). The generators could be ranked (prioritized) according to some specific 
criteria that are to be investigated.  
 
E-SIME deals with global rather than local control. In emergency one should rely on local control 
actions that are fast enough and less demanding in terms of information needed and corresponding 
communication requirements.  
 
For the time being, E-SIME assumes that the rotor angles, speeds and acceleration are known for all 
system machines. It would be interesting to explore how to reduce the number to a small subset (of 
course, w. r. t. a given “fragilized” area of the power system).  
 
It could happen that the system problem cannot be solved by generation tripping at one power plant 
only and coordinated control should be examined. The E-SIME provides the amount of generation to 
be tripped. There are two possible approaches. The first is to trip at once all the estimated generation 
to be tripped, as soon as the first unstable margin appears, by tripping the most advanced machines 
that comprise the estimated generation to be tripped (this is the case when estimated time to instability 
is tight with respect to the delays in control action application). The second approach is to trip 
machines one by one, by tripping the most advanced machine first, then monitor system state, if the 
computed stability margin is still negative and time to instability is large enough trip again the most 
advanced machine and continue until the margin becomes positive, but if after tripping the first 
machine the time to instability is tight with respect to the delays, trip all the remaining generation 
(estimated to be tripped) at once. 
 
Because of short time frame (system emergency states) delays in data collecting, processing and 
delays in determined control actions application can considerably influence whole system. The delays 
due to data acquisition and processing in the PMU are:  
   ratepcacq TTTT ≤+=   
where: 
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cT  – sampling period of instantaneous quantities measured at PMU site  
pT  – adjourning period of processing by PMU  
rateT  –  sampling rate (e.g., every cycle of fundamental frequency)  
 
The whole cycle (data acquisition and processing - prediction, assessment, decision on control action - 
control action application) can be expressed as:  
 
   uswssimeesrate TTTTTTTT ≤+++++=   
where, 
sT  – delay in communication system (it is assumed that delay in receiving measurements are 
approximately the same as the delay in sending control signal to the system, in reality the delays are 
slightly different),  
eT  – identification of the fault clearing.  
simeT  – time occupied by E-SIME to properly predict instability and to decide on appropriate control 
action. 
swT  – delay in switchgear operation ( sws TT +  – delay in application of the control action). 
uT  – the time to instability. 
 
The longer the delays in communication system the shorter the time to E-SIME to predict instability 
(appearance of the first unstable margin). All this can result in a ‘too late‘ control action application, 
for some particular situations. 
 
Current E-SIME algorithm is intended to first-swing instability control and has to be disarmed as soon 
as the system goes into back-swing. Further development is needed to assess its applicability in back-




The leading idea is to mitigate preventive actions (generation shifting) by complementing them with 
emergency actions (generation tripping) that would automatically be triggered only if the postulated 
contingency actually occurs. The procedure realizing this idea is summarized in the following steps 
[8]. 
1. For an initially unstable scenario (operating condition subject to a pre-defined harmful 
contingency and its clearing scheme), compute the corresponding (negative) margin and 
determine the corresponding critical machines. 
2. Assuming that (some of) these machines belong to a power plant equipped with a generation 
tripping scheme, select the number of units to trip in the emergency mode. 
3. Starting with the initial scenario, perform SIME’s simulations up to reaching the assumed 
delay of generation tripping; at this time, shed the machines selected in step 2, and pursue the 
simulation until reaching instability or stability conditions. If stability is met, stop; otherwise, 
determine the new stability margin and corresponding critical machines (to check whether they 
are the same or not with the previous simulation). 
4. Run the transient stability control program to increase to zero this new (negative) margin. To 
this end, perform generation shifting in the usual way, from the remaining critical machines to 
non-critical machines.  
5. The new, secure operating state results from the combination of the above generation 
rescheduling taken preventively, and the consideration of the critical machines, previously 
chosen to trip correctively. 
6. Repeat the above steps 1 to 5 with each one of all possible patterns of critical machines to trip, 
until getting an operating condition, which realizes a good compromise between security and 
economics. 
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7. After the “optimal” number of machines to trip is determined, the settings of the special 
protection activating the generation tripping scheme in the plant is adapted so as to 
automatically disconnect these machines in the event of the contingency occurrence. 
 
Application of OLEC technique to liberalized electricity markets 
 
In the restructured electric industries, the operating condition of the system is set up in several 
cascading markets, which can be purely financial futures markets, used for expanding the system, or 
short-term markets for the physical delivery of electric energy. Generators scheduling is performed by 
bilateral contracts and auction markets that run one-day up to 1 hour ahead of real time operation. 
After this new “unit commitment” process, the system operator conducts real-time markets in order to 
balance system generation and load and solve transmission constraints or “congestions”. The specific 
rules of these real-time markets vary from one system to another, but they share a common feature: 
generators submit their prices for being re-dispatched up or down (if necessary) and the operator 
performs this security rescheduling with the economic objective of minimizing its total cost. 
 
 Most of the current markets take into account thermal constraints only. The near-optimal preventive 
control techniques proposed in [9] provide valuable tools for including transient stability limits in the 
auction mechanism of the balancing market. Note that these techniques may call upon an OPF 
software, as advocated in [9], or be adapted to any auction market software currently in use. 
 
In the context of optional balancing markets, an additional advantage of the near-optimal preventive 
control techniques is that they can perform transient stability control using only a sub-set of the 
critical machines [9]. This allows meeting requirements regarding transparency of operator’s 
decisions and non-discriminatory access of all transactions to the transmission system. 
 
Nevertheless, the examples described in the present paper show that, in some cases, the sole re-
dispatch mechanism of the balancing market becomes very expensive. In such cases, the OLEC 
technique provides interesting alternatives, allowing considerable reduction of the power to re-
dispatch preventively and hence of its cost.  
 
Another interesting aspect of OLEC is that it can enhance significantly the security of the system by 
making economically possible its protection against the whole set of harmful contingencies, 
considered simultaneously.  
 
OLEC is also helpful in adapting on-line the optimal number of generators to trip to the current 
system operating conditions, so as to minimize the imbalance between generation and load. Note that, 
depending on the amount of disconnected generation, this imbalance is generally compensated either 
by bringing on-line spinning reserve (in less severe cases), and/or by shedding load (in the most 
constraining cases). Hence, whenever necessary, i.e., if generation tripping is too important or 
generation rescheduling too difficult to realize, the amount of load to automatically shed in the 
emergency state should be assessed preventively by OLEC. 
 
A final notice: other congestion management methods, like counter trading, can also be adapted to 
include transient stability constraints, using SIME-based information about critical machines’ 
identification and corresponding amount of power shifting. 
 
Contracts for system protection schemes 
 
Installing system protection schemes is significantly easier in vertical utilities than in liberalized 
electric industries where, however, such schemes could be fully justified. Indeed, experience has 
always shown that system protection devices have a positive impact on the overall financial account 
of the electric utilities, besides improving power system dynamic performance. They allow operating 
the system under conditions very close to those established by economic considerations (minimum 
cost in traditional utilities, equilibrium of the auction market in restructured electric industries) while 
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ensuring system stability, thus achieving a good compromise between economics and security. 
 
In order to apply OLEC, the system operator can sign contracts with the companies owning the 
generating plants in which system protection schemes are installed. This type of contracts, which have 
already been implemented in some electricity markets [10], can also be used in other transient 
stability-constrained systems.  
 
An advantage of using contracts for emergency control is that it allows mitigating considerably the 
preventive countermeasures and hence keeping almost unchanged the power system operating 
conditions established by the market; generally, the emergency control scheme remains inactive, since 
the triggering event does not occur often. 
 
SIME-based adaptive emergency control 
 
Converting a remedial scheme in an adaptive system protection is a very hard task, because their 
action should consider the overall system dynamic behavior. One of the solutions to this problem 
consists in using pre-calculated arming tables (computed off-line in the operation planning context) 
for updating the settings of the generation tripping device. Solutions to compute on-line the settings 
of the remedial scheme can be classified into the following two main approaches: 
• System protection scheme (SPS) becomes response-based, and use (almost) instantaneous real 
measurements to assess system stability and adapt their control action depending on the 
current dynamics, after the contingency has actually occurred [11] 
• System protection scheme remains as an event-based device, automatically triggered by 
system protections when a pre-selected contingency takes place, but their settings (like the 
amount of generators to shed and the time to perform the control), are updated by simulations 
performed on-line at the EMS (or other location) under changing system operating conditions, 
on a periodical basis [11]  
 
SIME-based control is now able to perform, and combine, both types of system protection 
schemes against transient instabilities:  
• E-SIME as a response-based system protection scheme. 
• OLEC as the event-based system protection scheme. 
This combination is described below. 
 
Coupling E-SIME with OLEC  
 
Generally speaking, closed-loop and open-loop controls have more or less complementary features 
and assets [12], [13]. Hence the idea of combining closed-loop with open-loop emergency control 
techniques. The idea is even more appealing when the two techniques rely on the same basic method. 
 
Indeed, despite important assets, E-SIME needs some delay (say, 450 ms from the disturbance 
inception) before triggering the control action, and the larger this delay, the larger the generation 
shedding needed. This delay can even become fatal to the system integrity, if the contingency is very 
severe. 
 
On the other hand, OLEC is likely to act much faster (say, 150 ms after the disturbance inception) 
since the automatic protection activating the generation tripping scheme uses only local measurements 
to detect the fault and act, in contrast to E-SIME, which- at least in principle- needs all machines’ 
rotor angles and powers. But the suggested action may be incorrect, at least partly, given the 
uncertainties about the anticipated operating conditions. 
 
Coupling the above two techniques may combine their advantages while avoiding part of their 
weaknesses, at least from a theoretical viewpoint. In short, this combination yields the following 
scenario of events. 
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• At t0: disturbance inception.  
• At t1 = 150 ms: triggering the generation shedding pre-defined by OLEC. 
• At t2 = 180 ms: based on sets of real-time measurements (supposed to arrive every 20 ms): E-SIME 
predicts instability size (margin); time to instability (when the system will lose synchronism 
irrevocably in the absence of control action); CMs) and decides about control action (number of CMs 
to shed). 
Further, E-SIME compares the above control action based on the measurements with the one decided 
by OLEC and already triggered 30 ms earlier, and:  
• if E-SIME assesses the latter to be sufficient, it does not take any additional action but simply 
continuous monitoring the system, based on incoming sets of measurements; 
• if, on the contrary, it deems the OLEC action insufficient, it predicts the system new transient 
stability status (new instability size and time to instability), given the action already triggered.  
Note that the new time to instability is larger than the one assessed under the 
assumption of no OLEC action; hence, there is more time left to refine its assessment, if 
necessary, and/or to make the delay of 300 ms sufficient for preserving the system integrity. 
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Figure 5-3  SIME-based emergency control actions against transient stability (Adapted from [13].) 
 






Sensitivities computed from the Jacobian matrix of the load flow or long-term equilibrium  equations 
have been used for a long time. Within the VSA context, sensitivities have been proposed as voltage 
stability indicators, although in practice the latter are not likely to be as meaningful as the power 
margins provided by ATCs.  
 
A central contribution to sensitivity analysis has been provided by [14], where a general formula is 
obtained for the sensitivity of a loadability margin to parameters. It involves the left eigenvector 
relative to the zero eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix computed at a saddle-node bifurcation point. 
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This formula was derived within the context of loadability limit computation. An extension to the 
analysis of post-contingency unstable scenarios was proposed in [15], which involves the computation 
of sensitivities along the system trajectory and eigenvector at the so-called critical point.  
 
Another early approach to the diagnosis of voltage instability relies on the modal analysis of the 
reduced Jacobian of reactive power with respect to voltages [16]. Information is retrieved from 
eigenvectors or participation factors relative to real dominant eigenvalues. This approach can suggest 
instability modes at normal operating points. However, owing to nonlinearities, the analysis has to be 
performed at the saddle-node bifurcation or at the critical point [17], where the Jacobian has an 
(almost) zero eigenvalue. The corresponding eigenvector is included in the eigenvector of the 
unreduced Jacobian, which is preferred in order to exploit matrix sparsity. 
 
The above two approaches identify the best remedial actions from the eigenvector of an (almost) zero 
eigenvalue. This, however, may suffer from two drawbacks. First, dominant eigenvalue computation 
methods may experience problems when the initial estimate of the dominant eigenvalue is not 
accurate enough. This is especially true when the loadability limit corresponds to a switching point, 
where a generator field current limit is imposed, in which case the real dominant eigenvalue jumps 
from a negative to a large positive value [18]. Second, in practice, voltages are often requested to stay 
above some thresholds (corresponding for instance to under-voltage tripping of equipments). In some 
cases, these minimum voltage limits can be more constraining than voltage stability limits. If so, the 
system response will be already unacceptable before the loadability limit is reached. At the last 
acceptable operating point, voltages are low but stable and the Jacobian eigenvalues are still on the 
stable side; hence, the eigenvector computation does not apply. 
 
A unified approach that encompasses the low voltage, the zero eigenvalue and the switching 
loadability limits described above has been proposed in [19], where it is proposed to replace the 
eigenvector computation by a simple sensitivity calculation which provides very close results, but is 
non iterative and can still be computed when the system reaches low but stable voltages. This method 
is combined to time simulation and consists of: 
• identifying bus l that experiences the largest voltage drop (due to the load increase when 
computing loadability limits, or the contingency when performing contingency analysis); 
• computing the sensitivities of the Vl  voltage at that bus with respect to the candidate controls p  






⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ ∂= ⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦p
l l lK                                                 (6) 
• evaluating these sensitivities: 
- in voltage unstable situations: at the point of the trajectory where a Jacobian eigenvalue passes 
through zero (this is easily detected through sensitivities changing sign through infinity); 
- in low voltage situations: at the final point of the system evolution. 
 
It can be shown that in voltage unstable cases, the proposed sensitivities computed near the loadability 
limit or the critical point, yield practically the same control ranking as the eigenvector-based formula 
[14] and can be substituted to the eigenvector to compute the sensitivity of the power margin to p . In 
low but stable voltage cases, the information carried by sensitivities is also meaningful. Last but not 
least, the method is simple and reliable, since it is non-iterative and requires solving a single sparse 




An Optimal Power Flow can be used to optimally modify the controls p  so as to restore power 
margins to a desired value dM . Denoting by ( )
oM p  the margin corresponding to the current value 
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S p M M
=
Δ ≥ −∑ p  
where the sensitivities jS  are computed as outlined in the previous section and 
o
j j jp p pΔ = −  is the 
change in the j -th control variable. A constraint (13) is considered for each contingency with a 
margin below of somewhat above the threshold dM . Further details and examples can be found in 
[19]. A similar formulation has been applied for the optimization of network autotransformer taps in 
order to maximize loadability margins in the presence of switching loadability limits [H]. 
 
Multiple (simultaneous) limits 
 
Switching loadability limits occur when a sudden event, such as the activation of the over-excitation 
limiter of a generator, causes an immediate instability that prohibiting a further increase in system 
loading. Such limits can occur simultaneously which results in non-smooth loadability conditions, for 
which sensitivity formulas and other linearized indices cannot be used without further analysis. [20]. 
 
5.4.3 Improved Load Modeling 
 
Loads play an important role in Voltage Stability. Many efforts have been devoted to collecting 
information about load behaviors and setting up appropriate models. However, work remains to be 
done in several directions 
 
The effect of induction machine load (and generation in some special cases where simple squirrel 
cage machines are used for wind power generation) is causing significant concern for VSA analysis. 
QSS simulation can easily incorporate induction machines by adding a single torque equilibrium 
equation for each motor. Alternatively, aggregate load models can be used that incorporate motor and 
static loads in a parametric representation.  
 
Motor stalling can be identified as a loss of short-term equilibrium and this can be further analyzed 
using the method outlined in Section 3.3 below. 
 
Finally, better models are needed for representing both short and long-term behaviors of load 
aggregates fed through sub-transmission networks (i.e. the loads seen from the bulk transmission 
system). The idea of parametric model can be re-used while properly accounting for the losses in the 
sub-transmission network as well as for the load power restoration by the multiple load tap changers 
controlling distribution voltages. 
 
A different, although somewhat related, issue is the representation of large wind parks in voltage 
security assessment. Studies are on the way to set up a model offering a good compromise between 
simplicity and accuracy. 
 
Incorporation of Induction machine models in VSA 
 
The effect of induction machine load (and generation in some special cases where simple squirrel 
cage machines are used for wind power generation) is causing significant concern for VSA analysis. 
On-line VSA can easily incorporate induction machines using equilibrium conditions as part of the 
QSS simulation. Possible short-term voltage instability in this case is identified as a loss of short-term 
equilibrium and this can be further analyzed using eigenvalue/vector techniques. 
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Alternatively aggregate load models can be used that incorporate motor and static loads in a 
parametric representation. 
 
QSS SIMULATION IMPROVEMENTS AND EXTENSIONS 
 
Coupling between QSS and detailed simulations 
 
The QSS approximation is very appropriate for checking voltage security with respect to “normal” 
(typically N-1) contingencies [21]. When dealing with severe disturbances, expectedly the QSS model 
meets some limitations. 
 
The first limitation lies in the implicit assumption that the neglected short-term dynamics are stable. 
After a large disturbance, the system may lose stability in the short-term time frame (within - say - the 
first 10 seconds after the disturbance) and hence never enter the long-term phase simulated under the 
QSS approximation. 
 
The second limitation is linked to the discrete events. A large disturbance may trigger controls with 
great impact on the system long-term evolution (e.g. shunt compensation switching, under-frequency 
or under-voltage load shedding, etc.). Since the sequence of controls depend on the continuous 
dynamics, it might not be correctly identified from the simplified QSS model. 
 
To deal with the above situations, a coupling between detailed and QSS simulation has been proposed 
in [22]. Detailed time simulation is used to analyze the short-term period following the simulated 
disturbance, detect possible instability and identify the discrete controls triggered. Next, QSS 
simulation is used to simulate the same time interval with the discrete controls imposed as external 
events before letting the system evolve as usual in the long term. Successful results have been 
obtained on the Hydro-Québec system, where it is going to be used in combination with the PSS/E 
software. 
 
Extension to frequency dynamics 
 
QSS simulation belongs to the family of long-term dynamic simulation methods. The QSS model 
extensively used in long-term voltage stability studies can be extended to incorporate the frequency 
dynamics that takes place over the same time scale. This extended QSS model relies on a common-
frequency assumption. Its advantages, limitations and possible improvements are discussed in [23] 
where simulation results are provided on the Hydro-Québec system, in particular a comparison with 
full time scale simulation. Disturbances with an impact on either frequency or voltages are considered 
and the coupling between these two aspects of long-term dynamics is briefly discussed. 
 
Diagnosis of QSS singularities 
 
When the QSS equations stop having a solution, the simulation undergoes a singularity. Reference 
[24] proposes a method to identify which component(s) are responsible for the loss of equilibrium. 
The corresponding equations are identified using the Newton method with optimal multiplier. The 
method has been validated with respect to full time simulation, in cases where long-term voltage 
instability triggers loss of synchronism. The proposed method enhances the QSS time simulation at 
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5.5 On-going R&D in Finland 
 
The testing of the on-line estimation of power oscillations started by off-line measurements in 
February 2004. An 1-year license of the system [1] with an option for a second test year was 
purchased in the beginning of year 2005. A Master's thesis is under way on the suitability of the on-
line monitoring system [1] for the needs of Fingrid.  
 
Fingrid is also currently testing another method of on-line measurement of power oscillation. That 
method is based on a standard Power Quality (PQ) measurement device in which a tailored analysis 
software has been installed. The software is based on digital band-pass filtering of the measured 
active power and on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT). The system is currently in operation in one 
substation and monitors the power oscillations on one of the 400 kV interconnecting AC lines 
between Finland and Sweden. 
 
Unlike the other system [1] the one based on a PQ measurement device does not continuously  store 
the active power and the estimated modes of oscillations in memory but only those periods when the 
amplitude of oscillation exceeds an adjustable limit for an adjustable period of time. It is however 
possible to remotely inspect the power signal and the band-pass filtered signal continuously in real-
time and to compare the measurements with the results given by other on-line monitoring systems. 
 
The test period has shown that on-line monitoring of power oscillations can be achieved by relatively 
inexpensive standard PQ measuring devices and by utilizing basic signal processing algorithms. The 
modes of frequencies and amplitudes can be estimated satisfactorily. More work is needed if such a 
system is to be made accessible simultaneously by several users or to be integrated to the 
SCADA/EMS system.   
 
Fingrid is currently planning to purchase a few PMUs and a system for analyzing the measurements. 
The other Nordic TSOs already have PMUs. By combining the phasor measurements done in the 
different parts of the synchronously operated power system it is possible to further increase the 
understanding of power system oscillations and possibly to create better practices for on-line security 
monitoring. This future work should take place as Nordic co-operation. 
 
PMU-measurements can also be utilized as input to the state estimator of the SCADA/EMS-system to 
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5.6 On-going R&D in Greece 
 
5.6.1 Brief Summary 
 
In isolated island systems with high wind power penetration, dynamic system security and control of 
frequency are major problems in the operation of the system. A common aspect to these problems is 
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the requirement to ensure that sufficient reserve capacity exists within the system to compensate for 
sudden loss of generation. 
Fast wind power changes and very high wind speeds resulting in sudden loss of wind generator 
production can cause frequency excursions and dynamically unstable situations. Moreover, frequency 
oscillations and high df/dt variations might trigger the under-frequency protection of wind turbines, 
thus causing further imbalance in the system generation/load. Such changes are more frequent in 
systems with high wind penetration due to the stochastic nature of wind power production. The 
dynamic behaviour performance of these systems depends not only on the total load and the size of 
the conventional units in operation, but also on their location and the response of the available 
spinning reserve [1]. 
 
In order to guard isolated power systems against the consequences of these disturbances it is 
necessary to keep acceptable security levels in the network. On-line dynamic security assessment and 
monitoring are very important functions to assure these requirements. The objective of the EU funded 
CARE (DGXII R&D JOULE Programme, JOR3-CT96-0119) [2] and MORE CARE (Contract 
ERK5-CT1999-00019) [3] projects financed within the Energy Program, is to develop an advanced 
control software that will optimise the overall performance of isolated power systems by increasing 
the share of wind energy and other renewable forms and providing advanced on-line security 
functions. The main features of the control system comprise advanced software modules for load and 
wind power forecasting, unit commitment and economic dispatch of the conventional and renewable 
units and on-line security assessment capabilities integrated in a friendly Man-Machine environment. 
Advanced inductive inference and statistical methods, as well as artificial neural networks have been 
used to provide on-line dynamic security assessment and security monitoring in this software, as 
described next.  
 
MORE CARE has been interfaced to the on-line SCADA Data Base and installed in the Control 
Center of Crete in July 2002. The evaluation of this installation has shown satisfactory performance, 
clear economic gains and timely assessment of dynamic security.  
  
5.6.2 Crete DSA Context  
 
The Power System of Crete is the largest isolated system in Greece, with the highest increase in 
energy demand (8%), nationwide[4] . In 2000, when the MORE CARE software was developed, the 
peak demand was 435MW and the Consumed Energy 2078 GWh. At that time, there were two 
thermal stations with total installed capacity of 490MW, comprising 20 steam, diesel, and gas turbines 
units. The latter are used to cover the peak demand at increased costs. The installed Wind Power 
capacity was 67 MW producing 10% of the energy consumed [4]. The maximum hourly wind 
penetration exceeded 30% and the maximum monthly wind penetration was 12.7%. 
 
Extensive simulations on the power system model using EUROSTAG software have shown that for 
the most common wind power variations, the system remains satisfactorily stable, if adequate 
spinning reserve is provided [3]. On the other hand for various short-circuits and conventional unit 
outages, the system frequency might undergo fast changes and reach low values that can activate load 
shedding. In any case, the dynamic security of the system depends critically on the amount of 
spinning reserve provided by the conventional machines and the response of their speed governors.  
 
As an example, Figure 5-4  shows the change of the system frequency in two different operating 
conditions, following the disconnection of three wind parks producing approximately 30 MW. First, 
the system is considered to operate with 28% of wind power, equal to 46 MW and with fast thermal 
units, such as the Diesel machines to provide the spinning reserve (fast spinning reserve). The lower 
value of the frequency is 49.31Hz. Secondly, the system is again considered to operate with the same 
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high penetration of wind power, but with the slower machines, such as the steam turbines to cover 
mainly the spinning reserve plus some Diesel machines (slow spinning reserve). In this case, the 
lower frequency value, which is equal to 49.04Hz, can possibly cause the operation of the protection 




Figure 5-4 Frequency change during disconnection of three Wind Parks. 
 
The effect of the wind power penetration, as well as of the response of the available spinning reserve 
is further shown by simulating the disconnection of a Gas Turbine producing  20MW. In Figure 5-5  
the change of frequency and the diesel machine power in three different operating conditions, are 
shown. First, the system is considered to operate without wind turbines and it seems to be quite stable. 
Second, the system is considered to operate with 28% of wind power, equal to 46MW and with the 
fast conventional units, such as diesel machines and gas turbines to be in operation (fast spinning 
reserve). In this case, the system seems to be stable again. The lower value of the frequency is almost 
the same as in the previous case.  Third, the system is again considered to operate with the same high 
percent of wind power but with the slow machines, such as steam turbines, to cover the main spinning 
reserve (slow spinning reserve). In this case, the lower frequency value is equal to 49.14 Hz. This 
shows that spinning reserve needs to be optimized both in quantity but also in speed of reaction. 
 
Figure 5-5 Frequency and Power change in case of a GT outage 
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5.6.3 MORE CARE on line DSA 
 
 
The MORE CARE software includes various modules for forecasting, operational planning and 
Security Assessment [5-8]. Its basic architecture is shown in Figure 5-6 .  
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Figure 5-6 More-Care Architecture 
 
 
The Dynamic Security Assessment functions provide on-line monitoring of the system in the event of 
pre-specified, probable disturbances and detect insecure dispatching recommendations to the operator 
in preventive mode. Artificial intelligence techniques, like Decision Trees and Artificial Neural 
Networks have been applied to achieve the essential on-line performance. 
 
Figure 5-7 shows the execution cycles and the succession of the MORE CARE modules to generate 
the power system operation schedules. This flow-chart is appropriate for relatively larger systems 
comprising steam and diesel or gas units. The power system of Crete is typical of such island systems. 
Units requiring both longer and shorter scheduling times characterize these systems, therefore both 
longer and shorter horizon forecasts and unit commitment functions are included. For island systems 
comprising only diesel units or gas turbines, it is possible to simplify these execution cycles. 
 
The following two modules responsible for the evaluation of dynamic security relatively to a number 
of pre-specified disturbances: 
 
5.6.3.1 The Dynamic Security Assessment Module (DSA) 
The security assessment module has the task of evaluating if a given unit commitment dispatch policy 
is dynamically secure. In case an insecure situation is detected, relevant security constraints are 
extracted in the form of rules and are supplied as input to the Unit Commitment module. These rules 
concern attributes relevant to control variables mainly affecting the frequency behaviour of the 
system, i.e. active generation and spinning reserves of the conventional units and possibly wind 
production or penetration and active load. The UC is solved again with security restrictions in the 
form of penalties, provided by the output of ANN and introduced in the fitness function used by the 
GA approach.     
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5.6.3.2 The Dynamic Security Monitoring Module (DSM) 
The dynamic security monitoring module is used, upon operator request, for evaluating the dynamic 
robustness of the economic dispatch module and the present system operating state. As in the DSA 
Module, the DSM will also provide corrective control measures, i.e. the produced generator set-points 
will be modified, in case an insecure state is detected.  
 
 
Figure 5-7 Overview of the MORE CARE execution cycles 
 
5.6.4 Software Description 
 
The following "Learning from examples” techniques have been used to provide fast evaluation of 
system frequency stability by defining security rules and security functions. 
5.6.4.1 Decision Trees  
The Decision Trees (DT) method, uses an inference inductive procedure, and derives classification 
structures of the type "if-then-else", able to provide a fast secure or insecure classification of each 
operating point. The DTs provide an overview and understanding of the dependence of the system's 
security on its pre-disturbance state. Thus, they have proven suitable not only for the assessment of 
operating scenarios or states, but also for corrective control advice. If the proper control variables are 
used as candidate attributes, they are able to provide explicit and quantitative information about the 
actions to be taken, if a potentially unsafe operating state is detected. The DTs are readily converted to a 
set of rules that can be very easily stored and incorporated in the security assessment software. 
 
5.6.4.2 Artificial Neural Networks  
The Artificial Neural Networks (multi-layer perceptron type), uses as inputs relevant system attributes 
to provide the frequency deviation and the derivative of frequency relatively to time (df/dt). A 
previous feature selection stage is performed to select from the initial set of characterizing features the 
ones that are less correlated with each other. 
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5.6.4.3 OFF-Line Modules Preparation 
The application of both methods is based on previous knowledge about the behaviour of the system, 
obtained from a large number of off-line dynamic simulations. A learning set (LS) is required 
consisting of operating points (OPs), covering the most probable states of the power system under study. 
Each OP is characterised by a vector of pre-disturbance steady-state variables, called attributes, which 
can be either directly measured or indirectly calculated. The performance and the reliability of the 
designed classifiers is evaluated with an independent test set (TS), which has the same structure as the 
LS, but comprises different OPs of the power system.  
The DSA learning set has a fixed structure, comprising: 
? A number of pre-disturbance steady-state variables related to frequency, e.g. active powers and 
spinning reserves of all units, production of wind parks, active loads, wind penetration, etc. 
(attributes). 
 
? Three disturbances for which the system safety is assessed. These include outage of a major gas 
turbine, a three-phase short-circuit and loss of wind generation 
 
? Two attributes related to frequency that characterise the system safety when subjected to each one 
of the 3 disturbances, i.e. maximum frequency excursion and frequency rate of change. 
 
5.6.5 Performance and Reliability 
 
The output of the developed models comprises: 
 
⇒ Minimum frequency value is provided by ANN 
 
⇒ Rate of change of frequency or maximum rate of frequency for only negative rates is provided by 
ANN 
 
⇒ OP classification is provided by the DT and ANN methods. 
 
⇒ Corrective security rules in the form of “if…then…else” are provided by the DT and sensitivity 
measures by ANN methods.  
 
The Decision Tree structure developed for the short-circuit disturbance is shown in Figure 5-8. The 
attributes selected concern the spinning reserves and operating levels of the thermal units. In this 
example, the system is classified as insecure, if the Combined Cycle production is less than 54 MW 
and the Gas turbines provide less than 43 MW. This is apparently related to a lower spinning reserve 
provided by on-line Gas turbines. In the lower part the performance of the DT structure as tested by 










The ANN trained for the short-circuit disturbance is presented in Figure 5-9  (2 hidden layers with 12 
and 8 units). The 17 inputs include the power productions and spinning reserves of all units, the load, 
wind power and wind penetration. The testing set (TS) errors obtained with this ANN are presented in 
the lower parts of Figure 5-8. In this figure, each point represents one OP of the TS, where its vertical 




















Figure 5-9 ANN structure  and Performance 
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Figure 5-10 Display of DSA results 
  
 
In Figure 5-10 , the Dynamic Security Assessment results for 48 hours ahead, are displayed in a form 
of lines that represent the frequency that is expected in case of the considered disturbances under the 
predicted load demand and wind production. The acceptable limits of the frequency (49-51 Hz for 
Crete) are also shown. The upper waveform shows the forecasted load, while the lower curve the 
forecasted wind power. 
 
5.6.6 Proven Benefits 
 
Figure 8 shows the information recorded during the trip of a 17 MW Gas Turbine on the 23rd of June 
1999. In Table 5-1   this is compared to the security assessment output.   
 
 













From Figure 5-11  it can be seen that the frequency drop predicted by the security assessment is very 
close to reality considering the differences in the disturbance assumed.  
 
On the 25/10/2001 the Crete system experienced a total blackout [11]. The collapse of Crete system 
was due to cascading unit outages initiated by the loss of a gas turbine of the combined cycle unit.  
 
Figure 5-12  displays the frequency deviation assessed by the DSA module based on Neural Networks 
during October 2001. It is shown that although the disturbance that initiated the system collapse was 
different than the ones used to train the security modules, the DSA modules have successfully 
assessed insecure operation. The security modules were evaluated on actual load, wind and economic 
scheduling data. In the same figure the frequency deviation assessed by the DSA module based on the 
 Actual Data from 
SCADA 
CARE Security Assessment 
TOTAL PRODUCTION                    329,1 MW 
DISTURBANCE Trip of a 17 MW 
Gas Turbine with 
small droop 
Trip of a 25 MW Steam Unit 
with high droop 




proposed scheduling of the UC and ED MORE CARE functions. The improvement in the Dynamic 




Figure 5-12 October 2001 frequency deviations resulting from three disturbances, as assessed by the MORE CARE Neural 
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5.7 On-going R&D in Italy 
 




Due to the increasing power exchanges and new transactions, congestions are likely to occur in 
transmission grids, which will be operated closer and closer to their limits [1][2][3]. The operation 
under stress forces power engineers to provide fast and reliable tools to correctly compute security 
levels, considering both thermal and voltage constraints in different time-frames [4]. Security margins 
can be evaluated by different approaches, models and goals: the main available tools are steady state 
(SP) and time-domain dynamic (DP) procedures, characterized by a different degree of complexity in 
both modeling and interpretation of results; another procedure available for large real power systems 
relies on Quasi Steady-State approximation [5], which replaces the transient differential equations 
with equilibrium equations, resulting in a procedure that is conceptually a time-domain simulation, 
but characterized by a high computational efficiency.  
 
Depending on the system features, on the phenomenon under study, on the limiting constraints, the 
first or the second approach may be more suitable, and the results obtained may be more or less in 
agreement [6][7]. The SP tools are easier to use, do not require data difficult to collect and allow the 
determination of effective control actions; the DP tools allow the power engineer to study very 
accurately the power system behavior, provided that the data available are complete and updated: 
these requirements are not always easy to put into practice. Therefore, it is not trivial to study the 
same scenarios and operating conditions using both SP and DP and to compare their results with the 
field tests (in particular, e.g., for the analysis of significant perturbations). The results of this analysis 
allows the ISOs to use the SP for the screening of the most dangerous situations, and the DP tools and 
models only for those scenarios requiring the most accurate methodology. SP and DP can be 
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integrated to provide reliable information on the power system security against different phenomena.  
 
In the following, the results achieved on a real large power system, put in evidence the agreement 
between the steady state and the dynamic procedures in use at the Italian ISO (TERNA) to assess 
security. In order to focus on an application of modern EMS, the actual and peculiar issue of the 
interconnection between Italy and the remaining part of the UCTE system (called in the following 
“foreign system”) is considered. The computation of loadability margins through this border is 
important due to the increasing internal demand of cheap power to be imported from neighboring 
countries. The integrated framework of SP and DP has shown in particular: 
• the loadability margins: both tools are adopted to evaluate the impact of a load ramp through the 
interconnection lines between Italy and the foreign system. Both N and (N-1) security constraints 
are considered, i.e., a detailed contingency analysis of the critical lines is carried out;  
• the security enhancement due to the application of the Hierarchical Voltage Control (HVC). In the 
Italian transmission network, the voltage control is achieved by a hierarchical structure [14][15], 
made by a primary level (Primary Voltage Regulation, PVR), given by the generator AVRs, a 
Secondary Voltage Regulation (SVR) and a Tertiary Voltage Regulation (TVR). Both SP and DP 
procedures allow the simulation of the Secondary Voltage Regulation (SVR), which is already 
partially in operation in the Italian EHV system. 
 
The study cases used in the project are based on the Italian EHV system together with the UCTE 
network in both the current operation and some planned scenarios. The results show a good agreement 
between the SPs and DPs in the assessment of both the contingency severity and the impact of the 
SVR. Complete details of the project are given in [18]. 
 
5.7.1.2 SP and DP Tools Used 
 
SICRE (Dynamic Analysis) 
The DP adopted for this study is based on SICRE [8], an interactive power systems dynamic 
simulator, covering different time-scale phenomena and modeling levels (grids, units, control systems 
and protections). It can simulate both electromechanical and long-term dynamics: an automatic 
adjustment of the models and larger integration steps allow speeding up the simulation when the 
electromechanical phenomena and the fast control loops reach their new steady state conditions.  
 
VOSTA (Steady-state Analysis) 
VOSTA (VOltage STAbility) [9][10] is the SP developed for the voltage collapse analysis, assuming 
that the involved dynamics are very slow. This assumption allows representing the behavior of the 
system by the power flow (PF) equations where also the steady state models of the primary and 
secondary voltage controllers and the voltage dependence of loads can be included. The SP adopted 
can perform:  
• a reliable estimation of the MW distance of the current operating point from the voltage collapse 
conditions, through an iterative procedure based on successive load and generation increases 
along user-defined patterns; 
• the computation of control actions to reduce the risk of voltage collapse: reactive compensation, 
load shedding and generation re-dispatch; 
• the contingency screening and ranking, useful for (N-1) security analysis concerning both 
generators and lines.  
 
5.7.1.3 Comparison and integration of SP and DP 
 
The comparison and the integration of the SP and the DP approaches is based on the simulation of a 
slow load ramp. The adopted SP determines, at each step of the load ramp (in this case discrete): 
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a) the indices of the voltage collapse margin; 
b) the ranking of the critical contingencies;  
c) the pre-contingency secure power flow on the critical lines.  
The severity of each contingency is then evaluated by the Time Domain Simulation (TDS) on the 
basis of:  
d) the maximum post-contingency system loadability (PCL);  
e) at a particular load level P0, the trip of all the lines in the contingency set is simulated and, for the 
critical ones, the relevant time to collapse is computed.  
 
In both sets of dynamic tests, the PCL (point d) is computed starting from the outaged system in the 
base case loading conditions and increasing the load with a continuous slow ramp; this is carried out 
for all the lines in the contingency set. The contingency ranking computed in d) and e) is compared to 
the ranking evaluated in b) and c). The results show that it is suitable to filter contingencies using SP 
and to use the more detailed TDS only in the most critical cases. The possibility to integrate steady 
state and dynamic procedures is checked also from the voltage control point of view. Two different 
voltage control strategies, PVR and SVR, are investigated to evaluate the model adequacy, 
highlighting the HVC beneficial impact given by the coordination among area reactive resources, 
feature not available in PVR. 
 
5.7.1.4 Tests and results 
 
The simulations have been performed on the Italian EHV-HV network (400kV/230kV/132kV) in its 
interconnected operation with an equivalent model of the UCTE system. In the complete system 
(1400 nodes), about 200 generators supply a load of about 150 GW. The base case used is pertinent to 
the morning peak of a March 2001 working day. 
 
In the SP, the load ramp is applied to the Italian system busses and the incremental generation is 
supplied by the foreign system generators, thus resulting in the increase of the power flows through 
the interconnecting lines. The ramp at each bus is performed at a constant rate, according to load 
distribution factors evaluated at the base case. Four indices are used [11] for the contingency ranking: 
the sensitivities of σmax with respect to the considered line admittance and to the real power flow, both 
in absolute value and weighted by the initial admittance/flow value respectively. Table 5-2 shows the 
ranking based on the index ( ) ijij PP Δ∂∂ maxσ  after a 5000 MW load ramp that heavily loads the Italian 
network. The comparison of the SP results based on the power flows and on the admittances (columns 
I and III) shows a good agreement between the two SP ranking procedures. 
 
The efficiency of the ranking procedure has been tested by the TDS, first determining the PCL 
according to point d). A continuous 100 MW/minute load ramp is assumed, that can be considered 
slow on a system with 45 GW load. The TDS results are depicted in Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-16: the 
curves show the voltages of two pilot nodes as the load ramp proceeds (the contingencies take place at 
the beginning of the load ramp and therefore the initial transient due to the trip is not shown). Due to 
the ramp constant rate and to the constant PQ load model, the total load is proportional to the time: 
actually, Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-16 are obtained as (t,V) curves and can show only the upper part of 
the conventional (PV) curves; the remaining portion could be obtained, e.g., by a Continuation Power 
Flow (which is actually a SP). Bold lines are relevant to the intact network (no contingency); the other 
lines show the voltage profiles after a major single contingency (using the abbreviations of Table 5-3).  
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σ∂ max  
 
Bulciago-Soazza 2.571 110012 2.602 2.259E-04 
Musignano-Lavorgo 1.529 42097 1.553 1.434E-04 
Rondissone-Albert. 0.867 70788 0.899 1.063E-04 
Rondissone-
Turbigo 0.748 21883 0.781 9.839E-05 
Cagno-Musignano 0.694 6.3 0.713 7.873E-05 
Rondissone-Albert. 0.649 53142 0.690 8.387E-05 
Magenta-Pallanzeno 0.656 17633 0.670 1.701E-04 
Cislago-Sondrio 0.583 40343 0.594 2.384E-04 
Bovisio-Bulciago 0.558 4.3 0.569 6.815E-05 
Sils-Soazza 0.542 14123 0.552 5.220E-05 
Marginone-Spezia 0.517 17782 0.528 7.007E-05 
Castelnuovo-Trino 0.487 12348 0.510 7.536E-05 
Soverzene-Lienz 0.474 27544 0.479 1.387E-04 
Spezia-Vingnole 0.451 24832 0.474 2.416E-04 
Lacchiarella-
LaCasella 0.424 5.2 0.443 7.766E-05 
Scorzè-Soverzene 0.434 20370 0.438 1.439E-04 
Villarodin-Venaus 0.408 5.9 0.417 4.415E-05 
Baggio-Castelnuovo 0.342 5.6 0.369 7.381E-05 
Bovisio-Verderio 0.328 2.5 0.339 5.321E-05 
Vado-Vignole 0.313 6.8 0.333 8.048E-05 
Gorlago-Verderio 0.288 2.7 0.298 6.513E-05 
Redipuglia-Divaca 0.281 4.1 0.288 4.276E-05 
Baggio-Lacchiarella 0.256 1.1 0.263 3.316E-05 
Cagno-Cislago 0.249 1.4 0.260 3.787E-05 
Leyni-Valpelline 0.248 14487 0.254 8.553E-05 
 
All contingencies in the contingency set have been simulated; the results of the TDS show that the 
trips that most limit the PCL are captured by the SP (bold in Table 5-2). Some exceptions are justified 
by the network topology: according to the ranking, the line Redipuglia-Divaca seems to be not 
particularly critical, while it does according to the TDS: actually, the Italian system interconnection 
with Slovenia is made by a 400 kV line, in parallel to a 230 kV line; therefore, the first line must be 
operated at a “low” load and this results in an underestimation of the ranking index. The results of 
TDS for some contingencies are not shown: the line Bovisio-Bulciago, because it is in series to the 
line Bulciago-Soazza, already considered; the Marginone-Spezia, because not interested by exchanges 
with the foreign system. The Rondissone-Albertville is a double circuit: in Table 5-2, only the single 
trip is considered, while in Table 5-3 and Figure 5-13 to Figure 5-16 both the single (R-A1) and the 
double (R-A2) trips are evaluated. 
 
The voltages of the pilot nodes S.Rocco (Milan area) and Casanova (Turin area) are shown both with 
(Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-16) and without (Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-15) SVR in operation. The 
comparison of Figure 5-13 with Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15) with Figure 5-16 and the analysis of 
Table 5-3, give further information on the SVR benefits: the SVR does not affect the DP ranking, but 
optimizes the reactive resources, allowing larger PCL. The security margins are always larger (about 
400 MW more), for each contingency considered. The S.Rocco and Casanova voltages (Figure 5-14 
and Figure 5-16) behave differently when the SVR is in operation. In the considered scenario, the 
Casanova area (Figure 5-16) has an average load level, with enough reactive margins on the 
controlling generators: thus, the regulator is able to keep the scheduled profile (400 kV) until area 
reactive resources are available. On the contrary, at a 2000 MW load ramp, the S.Rocco area is 
heavily loaded and the reactive margins of its generators are already exhausted: the regulator is not 
able to keep the scheduled voltage profile and the voltage progressively decreases (Figure 5-14). The 
oscillations in Figure 5-15 and Figure 5-16 are caused by the interactions between the AVRs of some 





Loadability of the Italian network starting from the base case 
LINE TRIP MAX LOAD RAMP IN PVR
MAX LOAD 
RAMP IN SVR
Bulciago-Soazza            (B-S) 4362 4840 
Musignano-Lavorgo       (M-L) 4562 5015 
Rondissone-Albertville 
(double circuit) double trip        
                                    (R-A2) 
4766 5049 
Rondissone-Albertville  
single trip                     (R-A1) 5395 5729 
Rondissone-Turbigo      (R-T) 5429 5812 
Cagno-Musignano         (C-M) 5012 5312 
Venaus-Villarodin          (V-V) 4966 5399 
Redipuglia-Divaca       (R-D) 5283 5650 
INTACT SYSTEM 5720 6133 
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Figure 5-16 - Voltage in the pilot node Casanova (SVR), static load. 
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5.7.2 DSA-Integrated Load Shedding Scheme for Emergency control 
5.7.2.1 Introduction 
 
The growing security and stability needs, recently pushed in the Italian power network by the on-
going privatization and liberalization processes, strongly demand for a more powerful and affordable 
emergency control system, capable to effectively accommodate and optimize, on-line, both preventive 
and corrective remedial actions. At the same time, the availability of advanced methods for 
emergency control, as well as of the recent telecommunication facilities and progressive equipments, 
permits to develop and implement sophisticated protection schemes, mainly called Special Protection 
Systems (SPS), which may represent a solution to improve the transmission network security level in 
a deregulated scenario.  
 
The theoretical approaches, which have largely investigated in the past for the Static and more 
recently for Dynamic Security Assessment (SSA and DSA), represent an interesting and useful 
starting point for a revision process of the Italian defense plan. The Italian ISO, TERNA (formerly 
GRTN), has initiated some years ago such a process, mainly promoting the refurbishment of the 
existing system for automatic shedding toward an 'Evolved System for Automatic Shedding' 
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(ESAS)[6]. ESAS, based on the integration of SSA and DSA tools with a sophisticated loads/units 
interruption system, aims to automatically selects the most suitable remedial actions, in a predefined 
set of allowed maneuvers, for mitigating contingencies scenarios.  
 
The corrective remedial actions are autonomously activated on field and selected on the basis of 
preventive static and dynamic security analyses. ESAS, conceived for the real-time static and dynamic 
security assessment and control, represents an evolution of an existing system, actually in operation at 
TERNA, monitoring overload and tripping events of a set of tie lines, called "critical network 
sections" (cross-border or internal).  
 
Such evolution has addressed very substantial improvements, as mainly concerns the system 
architecture, the protection goals, the adaptation rules, the loads/units selectivity and the control room 
operators’ diagnostics. 
 
5.7.2.2 The Italian Defense Plan 
 
The Italian power system had in 2001 a total installed capacity of about 79 GW (21 GW hydro plants, 
57 GW thermal plants, 1 GW renewable plants), for an overall energy consumption of 327 TWh (here 
included auxiliary systems and pumping units), 279 TWh coming for the internal power production 
and 48 TWh from the neighboring countries exchanges. The Italian transmission system has an 
overall extension of 65.000 km, here included both AC and DC lines; 16 interconnection border lines 
and 267 power stations.  
 
For such a large electrical system, an effective defense plan had to be conceived, including all the 
automatic and manual control actions capable to maintain/restore the power system itself, otherwise 
passing through an ‘alarm status’ or evolved to an ‘emergency status’. The Italian Defense Plan [1] 
includes two main levels of remedial actions, those related to the interconnected system operation and 
those conceived for the islanded grid condition. The first level remedial actions are: 
• control of the "critical sections" through a system for automatic shedding (SAS) with fixed 
thresholds; 
• programmed fast tripping of critical generating units through Automatic Tele Tripping Equipment 
(ATTE); 
• manual operation of Emergency Maneuvering Console (EMC), for medium voltage and 
residential loads, and Interruptible Maneuvering Console (IMC), for high voltage industrial loads; 
• programmed action of the Emergency Plan for System Security (EPSS) for rolling blackouts. 
 
The following remedial actions belong to the second class:  
• autonomous load shedding action based on frequency relays with fixed thresholds; 
• programmed fast tripping of some relevant generating units by Automatic Tele Tripping 
Equipment (ATTE). 
5.7.2.3 The Existing System for Automatic Shedding 
 
For the Defense Plan a set of 420 kV electrical lines is defined as "critical section" if their cascade 
tripping could evolve to network separation. In the Italian transmission grid the emergency control of 
critical sections is achieved by a system which aims to prevent separations, interrupting a certain 
amount of loads in a very short time (less than 1s).  
 
The system trigger is a line tripping event detected in predefined conditions, essentially related to 
fixed thresholds of power flows through the lines in critical section. Therefore, the operation of this 
system requires the acknowledgment of both a structural and an operational critical state of the 
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controlled section. In particular, the section is considered "operationally critical" if at least one of the 
following conditions is satisfied: 
• over-exceeding the so-called "low" power threshold in any lines belonging to section with (k+2) 
where k lines are out of service; 
• over-exceeding the so-called "high" power threshold in any lines belonging to section with (k+3) 
where k lines are out of service; 
 
Being in principle very different the post-contingency scenarios to be faced, the amount and 
localization of load to be shedded depends on which lines were out of service in pre-fault conditions, 
as well as on which threshold has been over-exceeded and which line has tripped. Until now, the 
structural design of the critical section configuration and power thresholds, as well as the remedial 
actions, have been off-line defined, based on steady-state and transient studies with different grid 
configurations and load-flow conditions. In general, the goals of the pursued remedial actions were:  
• possible overloads on 420 kV and 245 kV lines have to be limited accordingly to their thermal 
security limits; 
• under-voltage violations have to be everywhere contained and not associated to voltage instability 
phenomena; 
• starting and action of line distance protections, following the electromechanical transients due to 
remedial interventions, have to be carefully prevented. 
 
Considering the Italian transmission network, the main cross-border and internal critical sections are: 
• the overall cross-border section between Italy, France, Switzerland and Austria (Slovenia 
excluded); 
• the partial cross-border section between Italy and France; 
• the internal section between the Northern Italy and the Central Italy grids; 
• the internal section between the Southern Italy and the Sicily island grids. 
 
5.7.2.4 The Evolved System for Automatic Shedding 
 
For the last 15 years the existing automatic shedding system have been proving itself to be very 
effective in increasing the system operation security, mainly in case of contingencies involving lines 
within critical sections. More precisely, for its design characteristics and conservative tunings, this 
system has never exhibited lacks of intervention; on the contrary, at least in one case, an inadequate 
intervention was experienced. However, the complete electric service after the unnecessary shedding 
was restored in 10 minutes. Due to the increase of power flows and the creation of new critical 
sections, TERNA [2, 3] has recently initiated the renovation of the existing system toward an evolved 
one (ESAS), with the goal to solve also some drawbacks and limitations: 
• ESAS will be designed and erected through a flexible and modifiable architecture, based on state 
of art of standard telecontrol and network protocols; 
• ESAS will control critical sections continuously following their configurations (i.e. for the 
insertion of phase-shifter transformers). Then, an adaptation of power thresholds and load 
shedding strategies will be implemented;  
• ESAS will control sections which are not always structurally critical but could become critical 
only in particular market scenarios or weather conditions;  
• ESAS will adapt the load shedding amount to the actual operating conditions related to the critical 
section, without the risk to activate, for facing the current contingency scenario, an insufficient or 
excessive  interruption; 
• ESAS will completely control the cross-border section, including the Slovenia border, and will 
monitor both the national and the foreign sides of the other border lines; 
• ESAS will take into account of the actual load conditions  as well as of the possibility to shed 
pumping units; 
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• ESAS will be rich of diagnostic information for the control room operator (commands, alarms, 
warnings). 
 
The goal of ESAS is to apply flexible intervention criteria and shedding strategies on the information 
coming, in real-time, from SCADA and EMS. At the same time ESAS should integrate SSA and DSA 
tools with a sophisticated loads/units interruption architecture, distributed on the field and based on 
standard tele-control equipment and protocols. These key features, which represent the basis for 
ESAS architecture (Figure 5-17), can be logically subdivided in two modules:  
• the analysis module (ESAS-Analysis) is devoted to study, in both static and dynamic viewpoints, 
the grid reactions that follow a set of plausible single and multiple contingencies, which are by 
operator choice or automatically screened and ranked from a specific routine. The analysis 
module provides, at a preventive stage and starting from the current network state estimated from 
EMS, the list of possible steady-state and transient network violations, associated to each critical 
contingency in the examined set, and their index risk; 
• the control module (ESAS-Control) is devoted to define, solving a linear programming 
constrained problem, the optimal load shedding remedial action, on the basis of the actual load 
forecast or measurements coming from SCADA. For each critical event, this module provides the 
list of necessary interruptions to be executed, at a corrective stage.  
 
In other words, ESAS-Analysis determines the IF part of the logical rules, distributed on the shedding 
architecture for their autonomous activation. The THEN part of such rules is defined by ESAS-
Control. It aims to achieve a certain corrective security level N-k. 
 
5.7.2.5 The functions of the ESAS-Analysis module 
The ESAS-Analysis module computes the steady-state and transient responses of the power system, 
modeled in detail by sophisticated simulation tools [4, 5] and initialized from the current network 
state estimation. The list of contingencies may be manually set by operators, or defined according to a 
statistic extraction, or achieved from the historical archive of the really occurred contingencies. In 
alternative the contingencies of the list may be automatically screened and ranked based on a N-1 
static security or sensitivity analysis. 
 
The complete system, which describe about 450 units, 1000 transformers and lines, 800 loads and 
some equivalent networks, have to be analyzed. The TD simulations and data analysis lasts from few 
seconds up to a couple of minutes in the worst cases where voltage or transient instability arise. A 
parallel computation on a different HW platform perform static N-1 analysis on the same system. This 
lasts for about a couple of minutes for the whole system, longer when stressed system occurs.  
 
The static and dynamic post contingencies responses of the power system are examined in terms of 
both steady-state violations and dynamic transients, such as voltage instability or collapse, transient 
instability, cascade line tripping.  
 
5.7.2.6 The functions of the ESAS-Control module 
The ESAS-Control module computes the real and reactive power amounts ΣCΔPC and ΣCΔQC, to be 
shed for facing the examined dangerous contingencies. These amounts are associated to a 
combination of load interruptions or generator trippings, derived from an on-line solving of an 
optimization problem. At the same time, it tries to mitigate different violations and to reduce the 
shedding strategy costs. Once solved this problem, the ESAS-Control module verifies also the 
effectiveness of the suggested remedial actions, whenever such a verification is not implicit in the 
optimization method. More precisely, the critical scenarios associated to static events may be directly 
solved and verified by non-linear approaches, such as resolution methods with integrated load-flow. 
On the contrary, critical scenarios associated to dynamic events may be firstly solved by linear 
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approaches, such as sensitivity based methods, and then post-verified with the complete dynamic 
analysis and simulation of corrective actions. To formulate the control problem as a linear 
programming one, the sensitivity matrices between the singular real and reactive sheds, ΔPC and ΔQC, 
and the risk indices are necessary. 
 
The verification of shedding strategy is performed by means of the same procedures previously used 
by the ESAS-Analysis, in presence of contingency scenarios inclusive of corrective control remedial 
actions. The possible causes of imprecision, requiring the introduction of conservative coefficients, 
are: 
• linearization error, affecting both the computation  of the sensitivity matrices and the related 
superposition effects. This error may be attenuated using realistic shedding amounts during the 
sensitivity computation phase, as well as introducing suitable corrective factors depending from 
the instantaneous values of the active and reactive shed; 
• modeling error, related to the description of actual loads behavior. This error may be reduced 
using more precise static and dynamic models, mainly for large voltage or frequency variations in 
the post-contingency scenario; 
• biasing error, suggesting too much extended shedding maneuvers, mainly in case of significant 
network violations with reduced shedding resources. This error may be attenuated pre-filtering 
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Figure 5-17 – Overall architecture of the Automatic Shedding Processor (ASP): on the left side it is shown the 
interconnection of existing ATTE, SAS, EMC and IMC (exchanging with Load Shedding Peripheral Units - LSPU - and 
Remote Terminal Units RTU: tele-measurements TM, tele-signals TS, alarms and rules), on the right side it is shown the 
architecture of SSA and DSA modules, providing ESAS-Analysis and ESAS-Control functions, acquiring information from 
SCADA and EMS (state estimation), and exchanging data with ATTE, SAS, EMC and IMC (load configuration and 




After these analyses, which can take some minutes, it is foreseen that the central system remotely 
prepares (arms) the peripheral devices, in the grid sections potentially exposed to static or dynamic 
risks, with the corrective control actions needed to face the related critical contingency. The armament 
is calculated and implemented upon each significant variation occurring of the power system’s 
operating condition.  
 
A prototype of the ESAS-Analysis and ESAS-Control modules has been running under 
experimentation at TERNA.   
At present, ESAS project appears quite well conceived and the related prototype is giving very 
promising results. The ESAS-Prototype will be a benchmark at TERNA for the static and dynamic 
security assessment methods, as well as for the preventive and corrective emergency control 
approaches, whose interest will certainly increase in the new deregulated energy market scenarios. 
 
Future developments will foresee the integration of the voltage and phases measurements coming 
from a set of Phase Measurements Units (PMU) already planned inside the TERNA Wide Area 
Measurement System (WAMS). As an example, the detection of dynamic instability could firstly 
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5.8 On-going R&D in Romania 
5.8.1 Introduction 
In the context of electricity market operations, a common scenario consists of compensating load 
increases and/or generation outages in a system area by raising the generation elsewhere.  In order to 
ensure that the grid does not get too close to its stability limits, it is therefore important to evaluate the 
maximum transfer capability across the "links" that interconnect the areas involved in such 
transactions.  
A "link" identifies a group of transmission lines that form a topological cut-set, i.e., their removal 
splits the network in two areas, one on each side of the link. The maximum power that can be 
transferred across a link is limited by thermal and stability constraints. The stability limit of a link can 
be quantified by the further loading of the link, i.e., the additional amount of power that can be sent 
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from one side of the link to the other side, without causing instability. This indicator, which is referred 
to as the stability reserve of the link, can be expressed either in MW or in percentage from the 
maximum link loading. In a sense, the concept of "stability constrained link" is similar to the concept 
of “congestion path”, with the difference that the former is concerned with stability, rather than 
thermal, violations. 
"Stability constrained links" may appear in any multi-area power system where large MW blocks are 
transferred between weakly interconnected areas. This is often the case in longitudinal transmission 
networks that span distinct system areas with significant load-generation unbalances. The analysis of 
recent blackouts due to instability revealed that most of them followed a similar pattern: 
? Large MW blocks get transferred from areas with inexpensively priced energy toward areas 
where the load demand has increased due to an actual increase in load, or perhaps because one or 
several local generating units are scheduled for maintenance, or simply because the local 
generation is too expensive 
? As a result, certain links get loaded closer and closer to their stability limits and their stability 
reserves get smaller and smaller 
? At this moment, a generation or transmission outage takes place. Typically, such incidents evolve 
into cascading outages 
? Since the link was already operating with a small stability reserve, the physical phenomena 
leading to blackout are triggered and the wide-spread disturbance becomes unavoidable. 
The detection of critical links is an intrinsically difficult proposition. To begin with, the search of all the 
possible links entails a graph topological procedure that may find hundreds of thousands of links even for 
moderately sized networks. Once the full set of links has been determined, a stability criterion should be 
used to compute the maximum transfer capability of each link. Then, the links need to be ranked in the 
order of their stability margins. In addition, it should also be possible to evaluate user-defined links. 
Recognizing the fact that current network analysis technologies neither provide for quickly detecting 
the security constrained links nor have the ability to recommend what generating units should be acted 
upon in order to avoid the blackout, significant research has been performed during the last decade to 
develop an innovative method that solves this complex problem thoroughly and expeditiously. 
5.8.2 Approach 
Background 
Traditionally, the operating reliability studies encompass: 
? Load-flow and contingency analysis 
? Stability assessment 
An important goal of stability assessment is to determine whether the system can withstand a list of 
large, yet credible, contingencies. This is the realm of transient stability analysis [6], [7]. An equally 
important objective is to evaluate the risk of approaching instability in small steps, e.g., via small load 
changes accompanied by slow changes in the bus voltages that may trigger a voltage collapse, or by 
gradual load changes that may eventually cause one or several generators to get out of synchronism. 
Traditionally, this topic has been addressed by steady-state stability analysis [3], [4], 13].  
Steady-state instability occurs when a change of the state variables causes the Jacobian matrix 
associated with the dynamic state equation to become singular. One might think that instability 
happens in only one way regardless of how the system conditions were stressed, or "worsened", in 
order to reach the limit. Published references, however, indicate that the network characteristics that 
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generate the most probable system stressing patterns should be taken into account when selecting the 
procedures and indicators used for steady-state stability analysis.  
For vast interconnected systems, it is therefore essential to assess stability when large blocks of power 
are transferred across the network. This, in turn, requires evaluating the maximum transfer capability 
across the link, i.e., between the areas that get involved in the transactions, when a reduction in 
generation in one area is compensated by raising the generation elsewhere. 
Potentially, there are many such links in the network -- some with adequate margins to further 
increase the MW transfer without risk of instability, but some others where a further loading of the 
link might cause steady-state instability. The early identification of such stability constrained links is 
imperative for the operating reliability of the transmission system. 
Stability Reserve of the Link 
The stability reserve (steady-state stability margin) of the link can be expressed in terms of the further 
link loading, i.e., the additional amount of MW that can be transferred between the areas separated by 
the link, before reaching steady-state instability. The stability reserve of the link is an indicator 
computed by applying a steady-state stability criterion which assumes that the system is stressed by 
increasing the MW transfer between the areas on the two sides of the link. In order to identify the 
stability constrained links, a systematic search of all the possible links must first be performed, 
followed by the evaluation of each link and, finally, by ranking them in the order of their stability 
reserves. Given a solved load-flow case or a state estimate, the approach described originally in [9], 
[10] consists of: 
? Detecting all the links within the transmission system 
? Computing the steady-state stability reserve for each link 
? Ranking the links in the order of their steady-state stability reserves 
? Recommending a control strategy, i.e., raise or lower the MW output of certain machines, which 
can help increase the stability margin of the link. 
There are situations where certain links are known before hand. Therefore, the actual implementation 
of this technique  also must provide for performing the same array of calculations on user-defined 
links. An additional, and obviously important requirement is that the computations be fast enough to 
enable the fast evaluation of the power transfers between areas known a priori to have stability 
limitations -- as often as needed, for each transaction, off-line and in real-time. 
5.8.3 Algorithm 
The first step of the algorithm consists of parsing the original power system transmission network and 
identifying all the available links. Figure 5-18 depicts schematically a link that separates the power 
 
Figure 5-18 Original system separated in two areas by a link 
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system network in two areas. 
In order to determine how much additional power can be transferred between Area 1 and Area 2 
before reaching the steady-state stability limit of the link, a network transformation must be applied to 
convert the original system to a simple network consisting of two equivalent generators 
interconnected through an equivalent link.  
An efficient and elegant solution to this otherwise difficult problem is achieved by building a special 
type of REI equivalent with 2 REI generators and 2 REI loads [5], [8], [11], [12]. The generators 
situated in Area 1 are aggregated in the equivalent REI generator REI G1, whereas the generators 
situated in Area 2 are aggregated in the equivalent REI generator REI G2. Similarly, the loads in each 
area are aggregated in the REI L1 and REI L2, respectively. Then, after the REI reduction has been 
performed, an equivalent model consisting of two generators connected by a link is obtained, as 
shown in Figure 5-19, 
: 
where: 
       
                                                                                                                                                             (1) 
 
δ 111 argEE =    and   δ 222 argEE =        (2) 
are the  e.m.f. of generators G1 and G2 
δδδ 2112 −=            (3) 
 ψ 121212 argZZ =          (4) 
is the reciprocal (transfer) impedance of the equivalent link, i.e., the transmission system between 
equivalent generators G1 and G2. 
 ψα 12012 90 −=          (5)
  
 
Figure 5-19 Power transferred between Area 1 (equivalent generator G1) and Area 2 (equivalent generator G2) across the 
equivalent link 
5-39  
From the maximum power transfer theorem [2], [13], the maximum power that can be transferred 












max12 sin += α         (6) 
at the critical angle given by: 
αδ 12012 90 +=crt          (7) 




12max12 −=          (8) 




121−=            (9) 
provides the percentage amount of additional amount of power that can be carried across the link up 
to the limit of steady-state stability. 














−−=          (10) 
Let's note that the formulae (1) through (10) were originally developed for the very simple case of two 
generators connected by a line (Venikov) but here we applied them to an equivalent network 
consisting of two equivalent generators connected through an equivalent link. It may be useful to 
show how the values of  δ 111 argEE =    and   δ 222 argEE =  are derived in this case. 
Pomârleanu and Bejuscu [9], [10] have shown that the power generated by the machines in the Area 1 
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where: 
S1- complex power generated by the REI generator G1 
 E1  - complex e.m.f. of  REI generator G1 
 I1  - complex current of REI generator G1 
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 S g1- complex power generated by the machine g that is aggregated in the REI generator G1 
 I g1  - complex current of generator g 
 U g1- complex voltage at the terminals of generator g 
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The transfer impedance Z12  of the equivalent link results from the REI network reduction process.  
The accuracy of this technique has been verified by comparing its computational results with those 
obtained by using a conventional steady-state stability program [1]. In all the cases that were 
evaluated the difference between the stability reserve of the link computed with this method, on one 
hand, and the additional amount of power that could be transferred between the two areas determined 
with the conventional stability program, on the other hand, was in the range of 10% of the stability 
reserve, i.e., if the conventional stability program computed a stability reserve of 30%, the value 
determined with this technique was in the range of 27% through 33%. An early implementation of the 
algorithm described in this document has been used for quite sometime in an actual control center and 
the results obtained to date confirm the solidity of the technique and its suitability for detecting 
stability constrained links in a large transmission system. 
5.8.4 Topological Search of all the Links in the Network 
The identification of all the links in the transmission system is performed by using a graph topological 
search technique. Starting from each node of the graph (bus in the transmission network) new edges 
(lines and/or transformers) are added  until a link, i.e., a group of edges that separate the network in 
two separate areas, is identified. Throughout this process, the numbers of generators assigned to Area 
1 and, respectively, Area 2 change continuously but their sum remain constant. Also, if new links 
containing previously links are disregarded. Let's note that the aggregation of generators is based on 
topological considerations, rather than type (thermal, hydro, etc.) or ownership. The percentage of 
90% of generator nodes identified in an area is used as a criterion for having completely covered the 
area. 
5.8.5 Detection of Stability Constrained Links 
For each one of the links identified during the topological search described above, a two-REI 
generator equivalent is built in accordance with the previously algorithm δδ 2121 ,,, EE   are 
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computed from (12) and (13); δ 12  is obtained from (3). The value of the transfer impedance 
between the equivalent generators G1 and G2 is ψ 1212 argZ  and the angle α12  is given by (5). 
We can now determine directly from (10), for each link, the value of its stability reserve. The last step 
of the procedure consists of ranking all the links in the decreasing order of their stability reserves. For 
practical purposes, only the most dangerous links are retained in the final list of stability constrained 
links. 
5.8.6 Remedial Action 
Once the stability reserve of the link has been computed, the program identifies how the generators in 
both areas should be acted upon in order to unload the link, i.e., to reduce the transfer across it. Let's 
say the power is transferred from Area 1 towards Area 2. Increasing the stability reserve of the link, 
i.e., reducing the amount of MW that cross it, can be achieved by raising the generation in Area 2 and 
simultaneously lowering the generation in Area 1. The generators in each area are identified and the 
required control action +/-, i.e., raise/lower, is displayed in the output results. 
5.8.7 Conclusions 
The algorithm described in this section and further documented in [9], [10] solves a contemporary, 
and extremely important, problem: the stability of power transfers across vast interconnected systems. 
It determines the stability reserves of all the links in the network and ranks them in the order of their 
distance to instability, thus allowing the program user to identify those links that are potentially 
dangerous. The actual implementation of this solution technique [14] is fast and robust and is suitable 
for off-line and in real-time, in system and market operations, and for a broad range of operational and 
planning studies.  
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5.9 Intelligent Systems for On-line DSA 
 
There are significant opportunities for the introduction of intelligent systems (IS) for use in on-line 
DSA.  Many on-line DSA systems in use today may be referred  to as deterministic systems since they 
rely largely on enumerated analytical solutions.   Intelligent systems are seen to have four features 
which can bring benefits to the real-time environment, 
 
• Intelligent systems can be very fast.  Although distributed computation is now commonplace, full 
simulation methods require minutes of time to reach a conclusion. For large power systems in 
which many contingencies must be assessed, even with multiple-CPU computing, this time may 
be of concern and for on-line analysis, time is critical; particularly if a system is entering an 
insecure state and decisions must be made quickly.  Once developed, IS technologies such as 
neural networks (NN) or decision trees (DT) can provide solutions very quickly. 
 
• Intelligent systems are learning systems.   Deterministic systems will conduct the same 
computations every cycle even if some of the calculations could be deemed inconsequential or if 
conditions arise rendering the computations less accurate.  IS systems have the ability to establish 
if a system condition has been seen previously and predict the solution accordingly.  Similarly, if 
properly designed, an IS can adapt to new conditions by “learning” from situations previously 
seen. 
 
• Intelligent system can provide a high degree of discovery.  Discovery refers to the ability to 
uncover salient, but previously unknown, characteristics of, or relationships in, a system. For 
example, through the development of NN or DT, the system parameters which are crucial to 
security can be established, much in the same way as an operator would discover such traits over 
extended periods of time by observing the system behavior. 
 
• Intelligent systems have the ability to synthesize large volumes of data into manageable and 
meaningful information.   Considering the potentially massive volume of data provided from 
system measurements and simulation results, the ability to sift through such data and “collate” the 
useful results is critical for DSA systems. 
 
The role of intelligent systems is seen as one that is complementary to the so-called deterministic 
DSA approach.  The concept is that an IS will supervise the DSA and perform the following 
functions, 
 
• Establish if the system security can be established without full simulations 
• determine what full simulations may be required 
• assist in the interpretation of the simulation results and provide insight into system critical 
parameters 
• learn from the results of  simulations 
• assist in the specification of remedial actions 
 
Based on the above functions, the IS can provide (a) fast computational abilities with learning 
capabilities and/or (b) supervision to existing on-line systems, much in the same way that a human 
operator could if sufficiently experienced and fast. 
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Numerous applications of artificial intelligence methods to power system security have been reported. 
A review of some recent examples is detailed in the following.  An automatic learning framework for 
power system security assessment, proposed in [28], is illustrated in Figure 5-20  . Random sampling 
techniques are considered to screen all relevant situations in a given context, while existing numerical 
simulation tools are exploited to derive detailed security information. 
 
 
Figure 5-20  Machine learning framework for security assessment 
 
The heart of the framework is provided by machine learning methods used to extract and synthesize 
relevant information and to reformulate it in a suitable way for decision-making. This consists of 
transforming the data base (DB) of case-by-case numerical simulations into a power system security 
knowledge base (KB). As illustrated in Figure 5-20  , a large variety of automatic learning methods 
may be used here in a toolbox fashion, according to the type of information they may exploit and/or 
produce. The final step consists of using the extracted synthetic information (decision trees, rules, 
statistical or neural network approximators) either in real-time, for fast and effective decision-making, 
or in the off-line study environment, so as to gain new physical insight and to derive better system 
and/or operation planning strategies 
 
5.9.1 Supervised learning methods 
5.9.1.1 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) 
 
The field of artificial neural networks has grown since the early work on perceptrons to an important 
and productive research field. Figure 5-21  illustrates the classical feed-forward multi-layer perceptron 
(MLP). The first or input layer corresponds to the attribute values, and the last or output layer to the 
desired security classification or margin information. Intermediate layers enable the network to 
approximate arbitrarily complex input/output mappings, provided that its topology and its weights are 
chosen appropriately.  
 



































In recent years, much progress has been made in improving efficiency of optimization techniques for 
the learning procedures of MLPs, but the MLPs are still very slow at the learning stage, which may 
prevent extensive experimentations for data base sizes typical of security assessment of realistic 
power systems. One of the difficulties with MLPs comes from the very high number of weights and 
thresholds related in a nonlinear fashion, which makes it almost impossible to give any insight into the 




Reference [3] proposes a family of small ANN with different network parameters whose estimates are 
combined through a voting mechanism, as illustrated in Figure 5-22  in order to have a  better 
performance  than a single large ANN. 
 
 
Figure 5-22  Proposed model [3] 
 
 
The authors in [25] discuss an approach to on-line assessment of power system dynamic security 
using modular neural networks. This paper presents a first attempt to use the emerging technology of 
ANNs as a dispatcher's aid for power systems dynamic security assessment. 
 
In [2] ANN are applied to power system DSA. The paper copes with the curse of dimensionality in 
power systems and proposes a methodology for feature selection. A case study is performed on the 




Reference [11], proposes Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural Networks to assess the security of the 
Greek mainland power system.  Radial functions are a special class of function. Their characteristic 
feature is that their response decreases (or increases) monotonically with distance from a central point. 
The centre, the distance scale, and the precise shape of the radial function are parameters of the 















The most general formula for any RBF is 
 
 
where φ is the function used, c is the centre and R is the metric. The term  is 
the distance between the input vector x and the centre c in the metric defined by R. 
 
Often the metric is Euclidean. In this case R=r2I  for some scalar radius r and where I is unity 
diagonal. If Gaussian, φ(z)=exp-z, is used then (1) simplifies to transfer function, 
 





Each of d components of the input vector x feeds forward to M basis functions whose outputs are 







and the free variables are the weights $\w$. 
 
The model f is expressed as a linear combination of a set of M fixed functions h which are often called 
basis functions. 
 
The flexibility of f, its ability to fit many different functions, derives only from the freedom to choose 
different values for the weights. The basis functions and any parameters, which they might contain, 
are fixed. If this is not the case, that is, the basis functions can change during the learning process or if 
there are more than one hidden layer, then the model is non-linear. 
 
Linear models are simpler to analyze mathematically. In particular, if supervised learning problems 
are solved by least squares then it is possible to derive and solve a set of equations for the optimal 
weight values implied by the training set. The same does not apply for nonlinear models, such as 
multi-layer perceptrons, which require iterative numerical procedures for their optimization. 
 
The proposed method has been applied to security classification of the Greek Mainland system 
projected to 2005 with increased wind power penetration in a critical area. The voltage level in the 
area is used to clarify security. For the verification of the method experiments have been performed 
using independent input load and wind data produced with a random procedure and the classification 
of each testing sample has been compared with the one of the corresponding stored testing sample. 
 
5.9.1.3 Support Vector Machines (SVM) 
 
The foundations of SVMs have been developed by Vapnik [26]. The method is gaining popularity due 
to its many attractive features, and promising performance [9,10]. The main idea of a SVM is to 
construct a hyperplane as the decision surface, in such a way that the margin of separation between 
positive and negative examples is maximized. The machine achieves this desirable property by 
following a principled off-line approach rooted in the statistical learning theory. More precisely, the 
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SVM is an approximate implementation of the method of Structural Risk Minimization (SRM) [9,10]. 
This induction principle is based on the fact that the error rate of a learning machine on the test data 
(i.e. the generalization error rate) is bounded by the sum of the training-error rate and a term that 
depends on the Vapnik-Chervonenkis dimension(VC). The VC dimension is a measure of the capacity 
of a learning machine. 
 
A notion that is central to the construction of the support vector learning algorithm is the inner-
product kernel between a ``support vector'' xi and the vector x drawn from the input space. The 
support vectors consist of a small subset of the training data extracted by the algorithm. Depending on 
how this inner-product kernel is generated, different learning machines may be constructed, 
characterized by nonlinear decision surfaces of their own. In order to apply SVMs to regression 
problems, an alternative loss function that includes a distance measure needs to be defined. There are 
several kinds of loss functions, as, the conventional least squares error criterion, the ε-insensitive loss 
function, the Laplacian loss function and Huber's loss function.  
 
Support Vector Classifiers (SVC) 
 
For a two-class partition a probability distribution P(x,y) is assumed, where for every input row 
(sample or operating state in our application) x ∈ Rn, y∈{-1,1} which is the corresponding class, i.e. 
secure or insecure. The SVC seeks an optimal separating hyperplane between the input vectors which 
belong to classes. This problem can be made easier if the vectors are mapped from the input space to a 
higher dimensional space H which is called feature space. The mapping is, Φ: Rd ? H. The hyperplane 
assumes the form, ,where M is equal to the dimensionality of the feature space and 
φ∈Φ is a non-linear function. This is a linear separating hyperplane on the feature space. This can be 
reformulated as, , where ai are the Lagrange multipliers. K is called the inner 
product kernel defined as, . The optimization problem presented as 




subject to the constraints,  
Radial basis functions most commonly use a kernel of the form,  
 
Note that the number of basis functions, the center parameters, that correspond to the support vectors 
and the weights in the output layer are all automatically determined via the optimal hyperplane. All 
basis functions have the same width parameter which is specified a priori. 
 
 
Support Vector Regressors 
 
The problem of approximating the set of data, , where x∈Rn, y∈ Rn, by a  
function that has at most ε deviation from the targets (yi) and is as flat as possible [30], is considered. 
Initially, a linear function of the form, f is considered,  
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The task is to minimize the empirical risk, , subject to the 
condition , where c0 is a constant. 
 
The loss function Lε(y)has the form,  
 
 
A more challenging problem is to aim at solving the nonlinear regression task. Similar to the case of 
nonlinear classification, this will be achieved by considering a linear regression hyperplane in the so-
called feature space. Then  function f becomes  
The optimal regression function is given by the minimum of the function, 
 
 
subject to the constraints, 
C is 
a pre-specified value and a trade off between flatness of $f$ and the amount up to which deviations 
larger than ε can be tolerated.  are slack variables representing upper and lower constraints on 
the outputs of the system. 
 
Then the problem is transformed into the dual form of the  Lagrange optimization task and the 
solution is given by, 
 
where  are the Lagrange multipliers, with constraints, 
 
 
where K(xi,xj) is defined as in the SVC case, i.e. The two ε and C 
parameters must be defined by the user. 
 
Solving equation (9) with constraints (10) determines the Lagrange multipliers, , and the 
regression function is given by, 
 
5.9.1.4 Decision trees 
 
The Decision Tree (DT) is a tree, structured upside down, built on the basis of a Learning Set (L.S.) of 
pre-classified states [4,13,15,28]. The construction of a DT starts at the root node with the whole L.S. 
of pre-classified O.Ps. At each step, a tip-node of the growing tree is considered and the algorithm 
decides whether it will be a terminal node or should be further developed. To develop a node, an 
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appropriate attribute is first identified, together with a dichotomy test on its values. The test T is 
defined as:  
 
 
The subset of its learning examples corresponding to the node is then split according to this 
dichotomy into two subsets corresponding to the successors of the current node. A more detailed 
technical description of the approach followed is described in [15,28].  
  
D.Ts are evaluated using the Testing Set (T.S.). The most important evaluator of the DT reliability 
and performance is the rate of successful classifications, defined as the ratio of successfully classified 
O.Ps to the number of O.Ps tested. 
 
Decision trees have been quite extensively studied in the context of various security assessment 
problems [1,4,15,17,21]. A main asset lies in the explicit and logical representation of the induced 
classification rules and the resulting unique explanatory capability. In particular, the method provides 
systematic correlation analyses among different attributes and identifies the most discriminating 
attributes at each tree node. From the computational viewpoint it is efficient at the learning stage as 
well as at the prediction stage.  
 
In [31] DTs methodology not only performs DSA but also focuses on the application of DTs for the 
determination of optimal reserves and the provision of corrective advice. More specifically based on 
the DT classification, new unit dispatch is calculated on-line, until a dynamically secure operating 
state is reached. This technique provides the flexibility of displaying the cost of each proposed 
solution, it can therefore be used as a valuable on-line decision making aid. Results from the 
application of the method on actual load series from the island of Crete are presented. It is believed 
that the fast execution times required by the DTs for classification make the method suitable for on-
line control of larger systems. Figure 5-23   illustrates the implementation of dynamic security 

























Figure 5-23  Implementation of dynamic security function in the on-line control software. 
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Reference [21] demonstrates how decision trees can be constructed off-line and then utilized on-line 
for predicting transient stability in real-time. A non-trivial power system is simulated (New England 
39 bus test system),under increased loading conditions in order to exhibit instances of instability 
caused by faults less than 8 cycles in duration (typical breaker failure time).Stability prediction is 
based on a short (8 cycle) window of realistic-precision, post-fault phasor measurement. 
 
A single tree is constructed to handle all fault locations in the network, including all the bus faults as 
well as randomly located line faults. Faults in the test set range from 1 to 8 cycles in duration. Every 
fault that is simulated is cleared by removing the faulted transmission line. The trees are constructed 
for a particular loading condition, but their robustness to variations in the operating point is 
investigated using a test set of 40,800 faults from 50 randomly generated operating points.    
 
A decision tree designed to work for arbitrary fault locations must have a sufficiently diverse training 
set. The training set contains examples of three-phase, short circuit to ground faults on either end of 
every transmission line with the transmission line removed at clearing time. Faults of several 
durations are simulated for each location. Each example contains the post fault phasor measurements, 
along with whether the fault produced instability. A decision tree is generated to fit the training set, 
and then tested on new, unseen data.  
 
5.9.2 Unsupervised learning methods 
 
In contrast to supervised learning, where the objective is clearly defined in terms of modeling the 
underlying correlations between some input variables and some particular output variables, 
unsupervised learning methods are not oriented towards a particular prediction task. Rather, they try 
to identify existing underlying relationships among a set of objects characterized by a set of variables 
or among a set of variables used to characterize a set of objects. Thus, one of the purposes of 
clustering is to identify homogeneous groups of similar objects, in order to represent a large set of 
objects by a small number of representative prototypes. Graphical, two-dimensional scatter plots may 
be used as a tool in order to analyze the data and identify clusters. Another application of the same 
techniques is to identify similarities (and redundancies) among the different attributes used to 
characterize objects. In the context of power system security both applications may be useful as 
complementary data analysis and preprocessing tools.  
 
The Kohonen self-organizing map (SOM) memory runs an unsupervised clustering algorithm. It is 
easily trained and has attractive properties such as topological ordering and good generalization. 
Kohonen Self Organizing Maps has been applied successfully in DSA and SSA [5,7,19,29]. 
 
The drawbacks of the method are on the one hand that it uses fixed network architecture and on the 
other hand that hierarchical relations between the input data are not mirrored in a straightforward 
fashion (Kohonen, 1999). Two approaches to resolve these limitations are the Growing Hierarchical 
SOM and the Growing Neural Gas (GNG). Below the application of Growing Hierarchical Self 
Organized Map (GHSOM) and GNG on DSA is discussed  
 
5.9.2.1 Growing Hierarchical Self Organized Map 
  
In [32] a GHSOM-based method is presented to calculate the estimate security index so that an output 
neuron calls the index corresponding to an input pattern. The effect of the control parameter for the 
depth/shallowness of the GHSOM is examined and the effectiveness of the proposed technique is 





Figure 5-24 Proposed model [32] 
 
 
The overall structure of the devised neural architecture is illustrated in Figure 5-24 . The Projection 
Network with Stochastic Interconnects (PNSI) is a supervised three-layer ANN which models an 
input–output relationship by clustering both input and output spaces and establishing a 
correspondence between the clusters of the two spaces by viewing the training data only once [16]. 
The pre-fault state vector is the input of an array of PNSIs which work in a parallel way. Their 
purpose is the fast prediction of the post-fault state vector for each contingency. The learning phase of 
the PNSIs is performed on a main training set composed of pre-fault and post-fault state vector pairs 
of every outage for many operating points of the power system. The number of the hidden layer units 
is not to be determined a priori, but adapts automatically to the learnt data.  
 
The outputs of the PNSI’s are then fed into a GHSOM which has been trained for classifying the post-
fault vector in several bidimensionnal maps.  The GHSOM training set is composed of the post-fault 
state vectors for all the contingencies. The underlying idea is that the generalization properties of the 
GHSOM which adapts its architecture during its unsupervised training process and when trained on a 
set of the post-fault state vectors, it could fix the rough estimates obtained by the PNSIs.  
 
5.9.2.2 Growing Neural Gas 
 
The GNG was proposed by Fritzke [8]. Similar to the SOM, feature vectors wj are distributed in an 
input space of training data. In contrast to the SOM, the neighboring structure will also be defined in 
the training process. Connections cvw can be set or deleted between states sv and sw and their feature 
vectors wv and ww. These connections represent the topological structure of the data space. 
Figure-5-25 shows the structure of the GNG and an example. 
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Figure-5-25 Structure of the GNG and an example of connected feature vectors in an input space 
 
The advantage of growing neural gas is that the number of feature vectors and connections is not 
fixed. They will be adapted in a continuous process. An adaptation to a changing input data space can 
be realized easily. The principle accuracy of the input space representation is greater because of a 
higher degree of freedom in comparison to the SOM. On the other hand, the visualization of the 
results is not possible. 
 
 
5.9.3 Probabilistic Neural Networks for On-line DSA 
 
An online supervised learning method for multiclass classification of power system frequency 
stability ,tested with on-line data from an actual power system, is presented in [33]. The method is 
general and can be applied to all types of stability problems, by simply changing the security 
classification criteria. It is based on Probabilistic Neural Networks (PNNs) [27,34], and it is capable 
to capture automatically network changes. 
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The d components x1,...xd of the multivariate input X are forwarded to the hidden layer, whose 
activation functions (Gaussians) are used to compute the kernel densities fj(x), with mean μj and 
variance σj2, computed from the learning procedure, for all kernels j = 1,...,Kc, of class c. The outputs 
of the hidden layer are multiplied by the respective weights ω computed from the learning process and 
the output unit sums its inputs to compute . 
 
Typically there is one PNN for each possible class. Its output provides the corresponding class-
conditional Probability Density Function (PDF) p(x|c), where c is the class, and x is the input vector. 
These probabilities can be used in a subsequent decision-making stage to arrive at a classification. For 
the input PDF a particular parametric model, called finite Gaussian mixture model, is used. This 
model allows application of a parametric method of evaluating PDFs [22,24] that can be implemented 
by a feed-forward neural network. It approximates the unknown PDF by a mixture of Gaussian 
kernels, the parameters of which are computed from the set of the input samples, which are taken 
sequentially, one at a time. The number of kernels, their parameters and weights are iteratively 
estimated from the input samples using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) process. Simple statistical 
tests involving the mean, the variance and the kurtosis of the kernels are employed in order to decide 
when a kernel should split in two or when two kernels should join in one. Similarly, a simple test 
involving the mixing weight of a kernel to decide upon its removal, is used.  This technique has been 
preliminary presented in [33]. 
 
The  security structures developed by the on-line learning method  show adaptability to changing 
operating conditions, when applied to the power system of Crete. Two distinct operating situations of 
the system with different distributions (non stationary), are identified. First the system is considered at 
its current configuration and seconds its future operation after the installation of a pumped hydro 
storage plant. For the verification of the method, experiments have been performed using actual load 
and production time-series provided by the EMS system. It is shown that the method is capable to 





Study Case System 
 
The proposed method is applied to the Crete, island of Greece, power system in order to classify its 
dynamic security by on-line supervised learning. The Crete system is the largest isolated system of 
Greece, with an installed capacity of 572 MW, a peak load of 514 MW (summer 2002) and a low load 
of 114 MW. The generation system comprises two power plants, in Central and Western Crete, which 
consist of steam, gas and diesel units, and one combined cycle plant.  Eleven wind parks with an 
installed capacity of 68.3MW are currently connected at the eastern part of the island reaching 
occasionally 30\% or higher wind power penetration, especially in low load periods. 
As an isolated system with no interconnections with larger ones, the Crete system experiences 
frequency stability problems in the event of generation outages. Operation with increased share of 
wind power deteriorates the problem, as wind turbines are non-controllable sources that cannot 
provide extra power in case of a power unbalance.  
The installation of a pumped hydro plant in the Crete system is currently studied. The operation of 
this system offers significant economic advantages and allows a better exploitation of the available 
wind power. 
 
In the proposed application two training sets are used. Each training set consists of 6552 patterns or 
operating points (OPs), each with its corresponding security status. The first training set corresponds 
to the current case of the Crete system and is based on actual operating points taken hourly from the 
database of the Crete Energy Management System. This is termed as system current case. The second 
training set corresponds to a future case of the Crete system that includes the operation of the hydro 
plant. This is termed as system future case. 
The OPs are labeled accordingly to classes, as follows:  
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IF V_min <=   0.9 
THEN the system is insecure (class B) 





Figure 5-27 and Figure 5-28 show the dynamic variation of the number of kernels (dashed line) for 
the training set of the future case of the system, during the training process for the secure (A) and 
insecure (B) class, respectively. In the described application the class-A density is approximated with 
a number of kernels up to 97 and the class-B density with up to 76 kernels. The larger number of 
kernels corresponds to rather unobserved and thus more ”difficult” to learn samples. At each learning 
step n, the security of the current sample is evaluated using the PNN structures of the previous n-1 
steps. In other words the current sample is used for testing and subsequently used for training. 
 
This is equivalent to use testing data that are decoupled from the training data. At each learning step, 
the success rate is calculated with two ways, first from the number of samples that were successfully 
classified in all previous n steps and second from the number of samples that were successfully 
classified in the last 500 steps. The second way provides a more objective index, as the first one has a 
rather masking effect on the calculations. The results are displayed by continuous (all previous steps) 
and dashed-dotted (last 500 steps) lines in Figure 5-27  and Figure 5-28 . It can be seen that the 
success rate exceeds 90 percent after the first 4135 samples for the secure state and after the first 485 
samples for the insecure state in case of testing with all previous samples. 
 
 
Figure 5-27 Dynamic variation of the number of kernels (dashed line) compared to the success rate (continuous and dashed-





Figure 5-28 Dynamic variation of the number of kernels (dashed line) compared to the success rate (continuous and dashed-
dotted line) during the class A training process for the current-future case. 
 
 
5.9.4 An Application of Decision Trees for On-Line DSA 
One example of an IS technology developed for on-line use is the  POSSIT project [34]. Completed in 
2004, a software environment was developed which can use intelligent systems together with existing 
dynamic security assessment software to provide very fast on-line transient stability assessment of 
power system transient stability limits.   The approach uses Decision Trees (DT) and Regression 
Trees (RT) as the primary component in the IS.   This approach was chosen due to the maturity of DT 
and RT tools and their natural and simple fit to the power system problem.   The concept is to develop 
DT onto which any given system condition (i.e snapshot in the form of a solved powerflow from the 
state estimator) can be “dropped” and the outcome of the tree used to establish the security of the 
system.    The POSSIT environment allows the trees to be generated quickly and updated as new 
“unseen” system conditions occur.  In this sense the system is learning system.  Also, as noted earlier, 
the branches of the trees provide valuable information regarding the critical system parameters for 
which the system stability is most sensitive. The structure of the IS is shown in Figure 5-29.   
 
To initially develop the decision trees, a very large Data Base (DB) is created, using the Scenario 
Generator tool,  which consists of a large number of objects, each representing a power system pre-
contingency state (effectively, each object is a set of key attributes from a powerflow solution) 
together with the results (stable or unstable) of a transient stability simulation for a contingency as 
shown in Figure 5-30 .   
 
The stability condition reported in the DB is established using a full time-domain simulation. Prior to 
running the time-domain simulations, the Engineered Attribute Selector may be used to specify which 
output quantities (such as bus voltages or generator output powers) should be eliminated or retained. 
This assists in reducing the output database size. 
 
The large database can be interrogated and reduced to eliminate redundant data using special 
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clustering and correlation methods in the DB Interrogator.  The reduced database is then used as input 
to DT Builder tools that can build decision trees (DT).  The POSSIT design is intended to be general 




Once the trees are developed, they are placed in the on-line architecture shown in Figure 5-31.  When 
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Figure 5-29 Structure of the POSSIT Environment 
 
Figure 5-30 Database Structure 
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Figure 5-31 Integration of IS into on-line DSA System 
a snapshot is taken from the real-time system, the full on-line DSA engine is started as usual.  In 
parallel, the DB is searched using a nearest neighbor (KNN) routine to ensure that the snapshot is 
within the scope of the DB; if it is not, the DT path is not used and conventional DSA is used.   The 
snapshot is then “dropped” on the decision tree and the stability condition is provided virtually 
instantaneously.  As the full DSA solution completes for all contingencies, the DB is appended, and 
new DT can be built at anytime.  This process is critical to ensure the system “learns” over time. 
 
It is clear that this IS should perform very well when system conditions are within, or close to, the 
expected bounds of operation. The advantage is that a security indication is provided very quickly.  If 
a condition arises that is well beyond criteria  (i.e loss of multiple right-of-ways), it may be difficult 
for the IS to accurately predict the system stability due to lack of prior knowledge unless the IS was 
trained using such conditions.  In such an event, the conventional DSA engine provides the accurate 
result.  Work is currently underway to integrate the POSSIT technology into commercial DSA 
products. 
 
It is important to appreciate that although the approach described above was used for the assessment 
of transient stability, it can be readily extended to other applications provided the problem can be 
formulated to conform with the database structure shown in Figure 5-30 .  That is, each condition 
analyzed (“object”) can be defined in terms of a set of initial conditions (“attributes”) and a result 
(“outcome”).   If the outcome is a discrete binary result (such as stable/unstable) then decision trees 
are suitable.  If the outcome is continuous (such as a stability limit or voltage) then regression trees 
must be used.   
 
The POSSIT approach has also proven to be very useful in the off-line mode such as encountered in 
system planning.  In this application the main value of the method is in the level of discovery it 
provides in analyzing complex power systems.  It is often difficult to establish what factors most 
significantly influence a system’s stability; this is particularly true for large complex systems.  Using 
the process described above, a large number of simulation s can be loaded into a database from which 
5-57  
a decision tree can be developed.  The branches of the tree provide good insight into the key system 
parameters which most heavily influence the system security.  These may include such attributes as 
line loadings, generator outputs or angles, bus voltages, or load magnitude.  
 
5.9.5 Kernel Ridge Regression for Transient Security Assessment 
 
Integration of machine learning techniques and time domain simulations for fast transient security 
assessment has been widely explored and reported in literature. In particular, the application of 
multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) and decision trees (DTs) have been widely explored and many case 
studies have been presented in the literature [35-37]. Recently the application of support vector 
machines classifiers (SVMC) for transient security assessment has been reported [38]. The benefit of 
these approaches is their ability to quickly assess the security of a power system based on the 
knowledge extracted from off-line calculations [39]. 
 
The method presented in this report is similar in concept to the above methods except the non-linear 
extension of well known Ridge regression algorithm, Kernel ridge regression (KRR), is employed as 
the learning algorithm.  The important features of this method are: (1) the transient stability margin is 
expressed in a non-linear form yielding a high accuracy; (2) very high computational efficiency due to 
the use of an implicit mapping technique along with an appropriate linear estimation technique; (3) it 
has a very high accuracy for the operating points close to the boundary of stability. This feature 
ensures that any misclassified cases are those close to the boundary; (4) simple design procedure that 
can be easily programmed in software. 
 
The KRR approximates the stability margin (y) in the feature space (Z) with a linear function 
(i.e Ty ≈ w z ; where Tw is the transpose of the weight vector w of the linear function and z  is the 
co-ordinate vector in the feature space.) The optimal value of the weight vector w  is determined by 
minimizing the sum of square error (SSE) function appended with term Tλw w , 
( ) TE SSE λ= +w w w  
SSE is calculated by taking the summation of the square of error between predicted and actual 
stability index for the training data set. The user-defined parameter λ  controls the over-fitting of 
approximated function. This parameter performs a similar function as feature selection, weight decay, 
early stopping, and pruning used in other machine learning methods.   It can be shown [40-41] that the 










= ∑ z z  
where l is the number of training samples and iα  is a real scalar value. It can be shown [40-41] that 
iα  has a global and unique closed form solution.  The inner product Tiz z   in the above equation can 
be expressed in terms of original variables using Dot-product Kernel functions. There are several dot-
product Kernels such as Polynomial Kernels, Sigmoid Kernels (used in MLP), Radial basis Kernels 
that can be used to implicitly map the original variables to feature variables. For example, substitution 
of the mth order polynomial Kernel function ( 1)T T mi i= +z z x x  in the above equation results in the 










= +∑ x x  
The above substitution is the key feature of the KRR method that allows the unknowns siα  and $y  to 
be determined without expanding the expression ( 1)T mi +x x . Note that the dot-product Tix x  is one 
dimensional regardless of the dimensionality of the original variable vector x . 
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In order to compare the performance of KRR method with other available methods, a test system with 
470 buses and 45 generating units was used. Critical clearing times (CCT) for different power flow 
cases for two contingencies having the actual fault clearing time of 12 cycles were determined by 
means of transient stability simulation. The stability status (stable/unstable) for each power flow case 
was determined by comparing the corresponding CCT with the actual clearing time for each 
contingency. For the purpose of comparison, the decision tree (DT) and the support vector machines 
algorithms were used.  SVMC and DT algorithms approximate the stability status (i.e. stable or 
unstable) while the KRR algorithm approximates the CCT from which the stability status can be 
directly determined. A training set of 200 data points was used in the learning process of each 
algorithm and an independent test set of 200 data points was used to evaluate the performance. The 
following table shows the training times and the performance indices for the independent test set. 
 
 Contingency-01 Contingency-02 
 KRR SVMC DT KRR SVMC DT 
Training 
time(s) 
22 * 5.0 23 * 4.0 
% False 
Alarms 
1.0 8.0 12.0 2.0 10.5 18.0 
% False 
Dismissals 
0.5 6.0 9.5 2.5 5.0 8.5 
% False 
Classifications 
1.5 14.0 21.5 4.5 15.5 26.5 
False Alarms 
Range 

















* Several minutes. 
 
Although the DT is the fastest in parameter training, it shows the worst classification accuracies 
(False classifications of 21.5% and 26.5% for two contingencies). The KRR shows the lowest values 
for all the error indices.  False dismissals range for the KRR algorithm is 11.6-12.0 cycles; i.e. all 
dismissals with KRR in this case fall in the range of 11.6-12.0 cycles.  Accuracy of SVMC lies in 
between those of DT and KRR methods, and it is the slowest in training among the three methods. 
The DT program used in this study is the commercially available CART software, the SMVC 
program is SVMlight software written in C (available in public domain), and the KRR program is 
written using MATLAB.  The results of our comparisons show that the KRR method has a great 
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SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
CHAPTER 6   Summary and Future Directions 
 
This report has documented various aspects of on-line DSA systems including the need for such 
systems, their requirements, the state-of-the-art, and on-going research work.  This section 
summarizes the findings and provides closing observations including possible opportunities for future 
development work. 
 
Power System Security Issues 
 
Maintaining security in power system operation is a critical function which has become more 
challenging in recent years largely due to the growing complexity of power systems and their 
associated controls, deregulation, and a general trend for load growth to outpace generation and 
transmission additions. 
 
Traditionally, security has been achieved solely through off-line analyses using forecasted 
information.  In the new environment, this approach has proven inadequate and often impractical.  As 
a result, on-line DSA has emerged in which a snapshot of the current system is obtained and is used to 
conduct security assessment.  This approach reduces the need for prediction of system conditions and 
therefore is expected to provide more accurate assessments.  However, since all data must be 
assimilated in near-real-time, and computations must be conducted automatically with little or no 
human intervention (and in a tightly constrained cycle time), on-line DSA has many inherent 
challenges. Depending on the nature of a given system, the scope of DSA may be quite broad 
including the analysis of any or all of transient security, voltage security, small signal security, and 
frequency security. 
 
On-Line Security Assessment Requirements 
 
The requirements for on-line security assessment are very challenging and include such basic 
characteristics as speed, accuracy, and reliability.  By definition, on-line systems must perform 
complex calculations on highly non-linear power system models and in addition, must be able to 
provide operators with the results that are critical to secure operation of the system. 
 
The detailed requirements of any on-line system are determined largely by the specific characteristics 
of the power system under study.  The basic scope of a DSA system is determined by,  
 
• Security analysis required – what types of phenomena and contingencies/transfers must be 
considered? 
• Cycle time needed – how fast must the computations be conducted? 
• Output Information needed – what should the system tell the operators? 
  
Key considerations in developing a DSA system include, 
 
• Inputs needed – raw SCADA measurements, state estimator output, PMU outputs, etc 
• Models needed – what special device models are needed? What study system model and external 
models are needed and available? 
• Automation – how much human intervention is acceptable? 
• Reliability/Availability – what levels are acceptable for the intended use? 
• Users – who will have access to the control and output of the DSA system? 
• Visualization – how should information be presented to the system users?  
• Adaptability – how flexible is the system in dealing with new or changing future requirements?   
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State-of-the-Art in on-line Security Assessment 
 
It is clear that significant advances have been made in the field of on-line security assessment 
technologies; this report has documented some fifteen state-of-the-art installations and reported the 
existence of numerous others which are either in-service or under development.  These systems 
include assessment of voltage security, transient security, and small signal security.   The range of 
assessment capabilities includes determination of critical contingencies, transfer limits, and 
determination of remedial measures necessary to ensure security. The computational methods used for 
each type of security assessment is varied, and depends on the specific requirements (speed, accuracy, 
reliability), system characteristics (large, small, meshed, radial, etc) and, in some cases, the techniques 
available in the state-of-the-art tools used. 
 
Transient Security Assessment 
 
• Full time-domain simulation 
• Direct methods 
• Simplified methods 
• Intelligent systems 
 
Voltage Security Assessment 
 
• Steady-state methods 
• Time-domain simulations 
• Quasi-dynamic simulation 
• Simplified or direct methods 
 
Small Signal Stability Assessment 
 
• Time-domain simulation using Prony analysis 
• Measurement based methods 
 
The capabilities of state-of-the-art DSA systems include, 
 
• Contingency screening and ranking 
• Basecase security assessment  
• Stability limit determination 
• Determination of remedial actions 




A significant amount research and development is on-going in the field of on-line; most R&D aimed 
at extending the features and capabilities of existing system.   Areas of work include handling of new 
technologies such as wind farms, improving speed and scope of assessments, improving visualization 
of results to operators, using optimization in determination of remedial measures, and use of 
intelligent systems. 
 
Research and Development Needs 
 
In addition to the on-going R&D reported in this document, there are a number of areas that warrant a 




Speed of Analysis 
 
Although the current DSA systems in-use have generally met the specified performance requirements, 
as the dimension of system models increase and the desire to analyze larger numbers of contingencies 
grow, there is an on-going need to enhance the performance of the DSA systems.  Currently, 
acceptable performance (a balance between accuracy, comprehensiveness, and speed) is achieved 
through a combination of model simplification (equivalencing), distributed processing, and simplified 




It is recognized that the basic task of obtaining a powerflow snapshot of the current system state can 
be challenging; the state-estimator model (i.e. components and topology) must be good and the 
powerflow must solve to a valid solution.  For dynamic analysis, the modeling process is further 
complicated since the powerflow model must be matched with the system dynamic model and then 
properly initialized.  Relatively minor data errors, or incomplete data sets, can cause this process to 
fail, thereby resulting in no useable DSA result for that given cycle.    Research work is needed on 
ways of hardening the solution to flawed or inadequate data.  Data problems may be quite likely 
during time of system upset (such as when the system is fragmented or has suffered numerous 




The importance of load modeling cannot be over-emphasized as it can affect the outcome of all forms 
of security assessment.  While the concern for proper load modeling is not unique to on-line DSA (it 
is equally critical for off-line planning studies), on-line analysis provides no opportunity for 
sensitivity assessment or investigative studies of the impact of different load models.  It is well 
understood that load modeling is a challenge due to the diversity of load types and characteristics, 
lumped load models used in many simulations, and the time-varying nature of load.  Methods are 
needed to obtain load model information and to synthesize this information into a form that can reflect 
the important characteristics of the actual load. 
 
System modeling  
 
Most on-line DSA systems use a base simulation model derived from SCADA measurements 
(processed by a state-estimator).  Since the geographical area covered by SCADA is limited, 
assumptions must be made regarding the “unobservable” (or ”external”) parts of the actual systems.  
One current practice is to derive off-line equivalent of the external systems and patch them together 
with the state-estimator result.  This approach can be quite approximate (since the number of 
equivalents must be limited) and time consuming.  Until the day arrives when wide-area state-
estimations are readily available, new techniques are needed to assist in the task of on-line system 
model development.     
 
Risk Based Security Analysis 
 
The concept of risk-based security assessment has been widely discussed and worked on the power 
system planning environment.   The idea is to compute the risk of insecurity by assessing the 
probability of a given contingent event and evaluating the impact of the event (such as the loss of a 
single load or a system-wide blackout) should it happen.  Assessing the impact, or “damage function” 
of a given event is often difficult when examining stability since many system control and protections 
may come into play to determine how widespread the event is.  Also, the duration of the impact must 
be considered as well.   However, a risk-based DSA system would provide operators with information 
to more fully utilize the existing system assets.  Events that are low-probability/high-impact or high-






While some on-line DSA systems currently use intelligent technologies (IT), there exists tremendous 
opportunity for the widespread use of such systems.   Opportunities for intelligent technologies 
include, 
 
• Extracting information from volumes of data 
• Automatically learning from the results of on-going security assessment 
• Providing smart decision recommendations 
• Discovering important features or characteristics of the power system  
 
Optimal Remedial Measures 
 
Although the base function of an on-line DSA system is to determine whether or not a system is 
exposed to a security threat, either in the current condition or some future state, perhaps the most 
important function is to provide some recommendations for remedial measures needed to avoid the 
risk.  Operators are most interested in “what to do” when provided with a security alarm.  A number 
of state-of-the-art DSA installations currently offer some methods for determination of remedial 
measures (such as load shedding or generation maneuvering), however, there is a need to extend the 
scope of such measures to provide operators with a number of choices for optimal control actions.  
Research is also needed in the implementation of automated control action; that is systems in which 
the DSA tools make security assessments, determine remedial measures, and automatically take those 
actions (such as arming of load or generation tripping, switching of devices, or adjusting system 
control parameters).  Such systems must be adaptive in order to respond to ongoing system changes 
and require high degrees of robustness and reliability and must be designed to avoid false operations. 
